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Abstract 
There is consensus among economists, engineers, and lawyers that a traditional command-and-control 
approach to spectrum assignment is inefficient and that a market-based or commons approach can be 
more efficient. The purpose of this thesis is to find the benefits of using spectrum commons for 
frequency assignment in Thailand. To satisfy this purpose, four main contributions are provided: 1) a 
framework to understand the institution of spectrum commons and its application to Thailand, 2) an 
approach to explain the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons, 3) an exploration of the 
use of a framework for a benefit and cost analysis to valuate the spectrum commons, and 4) possible 
implications of using spectrum commons in Thailand. These contributions will serve as information 
for a regulator to make better-grounded decisions on frequency assignment and on whether to license 
or unlicense spectrum. 
The thesis uses history, content analysis, and literature critique as its main sources. The content 
analysis and literature critique are based on the public consultation in 2008 by the European Radio 
Spectrum Policy Group. It addresses the aspects of a European approach to the collective use of 
spectrum and identifies the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons. To describe the 
institution of spectrum commons, the property rights regimes by Schlager and Ostrom (1982) are used. 
This is based on three economic institutions originally described by Kiser and Ostrom (1982) and later 
adopted by Field (1992). This information is examined, together with the benefit and cost analysis 
based on the research by Campbell and Brown (2003), Indepen (2006), and Sweet et al. (2002). Data 
from this examination contribute to defining a framework that can be used to valuate spectrum 
commons in Thailand.  
The institution of spectrum commons in Thailand comprises technical and non-technical aspects. The 
technical aspects are power limitation and use of the specified frequency band, and the non-technical 
ones are frequency sharing among users and no endowed rights to request compensation from 
interfering parties.  
The advantages of spectrum commons are lower entry barriers for new entrants, a reduction in 
administration work (such as defining property rights to use frequency, auction process, etc.), and 
enhancing social benefits. These attributes contribute to increasing the potential for innovation and 
stimulating further demand for new technologies. The main disadvantage of spectrum commons is 
irreversibility after spectrum assignment, congestion, and limited quality of service. Even these 
eventual limitations can be solved with the advancement of technology, while the threats, e.g., lack of 
innovation while sharing with licensed services, are questionable. 
The thesis argues that spectrum commons has more strengths and opportunities than weaknesses and 
threats. In order to implement the spectrum commons and valuate the usefulness of this approach in 
practice, a framework of benefits and costs is defined. The output of this thesis can be used as 
information for regulators to decide whether the frequency should be licensed or unlicensed and to 
evaluate the consequences of implementing spectrum commons. 
Keywords: spectrum management, spectrum assignment, spectrum commons, collective use of 
spectrum, benefit and cost analysis 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Nowadays, telecommunication devices and services are mandatory tools in both business and the 
household. Wireless technology, in particular, with its increasing mobility, is the key. Wireless devices 
using radiocommunication are part of day-to-day activities, ranging from garage openers, remote 
controls, toys, closed circuit television (CCTV), navigation systems (land, air, and sea), earphones, 
cordless telephones, and card readers, to Internet connection (Wi-Fi) in smart phones. Most of these 
are low-power, unlicensed devices whose uses are increasing. The unlicensed devices use frequency or 
spectrum as a carrier of communication and share frequency or spectrum with other devices or uses. 
Spectrum is a limited resource. Understanding the nature of spectrum will therefore help to use it 
efficiently. 
1.1 What is spectrum? 
Spectrum is an electromagnetic wave comprising electric and magnetic fields that can be characterized 
as properties of light and particles. It can also be referred to as radio, radio wave, radio frequency, or 
frequency. Spectrum refers to the subset of the electromagnetic wave spectrum that is below 3,000 
GHz (Radio Regulations 2008). According to the propagation characteristic, spectrum using higher 
frequencies reaches shorter distances but has a larger carrying capacity. Conversely, spectrum using 
lower frequencies reaches longer distances but has a lower carrying capacity. This characteristic limits 
the application of spectrum. The spectrum is a non-depletable resource. It can be reused by dividing it 
into frequencies, time, angle of arrival, polarization, geography, and uses. Spectrum cannot be 
controlled for transmission. Due to its nature, transmission will propagate across country borders until 
the power runs out. The spectrum services are not only useful in telecommunications, fixed and 
mobile services, but also in broadcasting, satellite, maritime, and aeronautical services. 
1.2 Why manage spectrum? 
In terms of technical aspects, the spectrum is similar to roads carrying traffic. It needs rules or 
regulations to control the use of each application to prevent disorder and harmful interference. In 
addition, proper spectrum management can maximize spectrum use by allowing for the maximum 
number of users, while keeping interference and congestion manageable. 
In terms of social aspects, in some countries, such as Thailand, spectrum is a national resource of 
public interest. As stated in the Thai Constitution 2550 ("The Constitution of Thailand," 2007), there 
must be an independent regulatory body with the duty of distributing frequency and supervising its 
use. There shall be regard for maximum public benefit at national and local levels in education, 
culture, State security, other public interests, and fair and free competition, including encouraging the 
public to participate in the management of public mass communication. A country typically has a 
regulatory authority. Such an authority is denoted by law, i.e., administrator, national regulatory 
authority, or regulator.  
In terms of economics, spectrum is a scare resource and limited by its frequency band, time, and place. 
The spectrum can be used for different purposes or services. The different services of spectrum make 
it similar to other goods that follow supply and demand. Demand for spectrum is created by the users, 
and supply of spectrum is provided by the regulator. A particular aspect of spectrum, from an 
economic point of view, is that it is non-excludable, non-depletable, and subject to congestion 
problems. It therefore has some properties that are similar to public goods, although it is not purely 
public goods, as will be explained below. 
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1.3 How is spectrum managed? 
With regard to the propagation of spectrum, there are three levels of spectrum management: allocation, 
allotment, and assignment. Allocation1 and allotment2 are designed at international level, while 
assignment is the responsibility of national agencies. Management at international level is by the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a United Nations specialized agency, through issuing 
Radio Regulations (RR) via the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) to harmonize the 
allocation of frequency bands with radiocommunication services. 
Harmonization can also be regional. Active regional organizations are the Asia Pacific Telecommunity 
(APT), the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), the 
Inter-American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL), the African Group, and the Arabic Group. 
They help to consolidate and compromise different ideas within and across regions. 
The national assignment3 and the modes of assignment vary by country. Spectrum may be assigned by 
an administrator, national regulatory authority (NRA), or relevant ministry, depending on the laws of 
the country. Before the spectrum is assigned, the NRA normally checks the availability of spectrum, 
existing users, related regulations (national and international), and suitable technical characteristics 
imposed on the use of spectrum and radiocommunication equipment.  
All obligations imposed by the authority must comply with the ITU RR, however, to avoid harmful 
interference between countries and maintain priority on claims on using this spectrum. Within their 
territory, the regulators have the right to manage the spectrum by their own authority but not to 
interfere with neighboring countries. They set up coordination and cooperation with neighboring 
countries to help manage interference.  
1.4 What is spectrum assignment? 
Spectrum assignment policy is limited to wireless or radiocommunication in a national territory. Each 
country has its own sovereignty. Spectrum assignment is a subset of spectrum management. Spectrum 
assignment is one of most important functions of spectrum management, beside other functions, such 
as planning and regulation, financing, allocation and allotment, national liaison and consultation, 
international and regional cooperation, standards, specifications and equipment authorization, 
monitoring, and enforcement (Radiocommunication Bureau, 2005).  
Spectrum management policy is a subset of telecommunications policy. Telecommunications policy 
includes technical, economic, and social aspects. It overlaps the natural sciences (technic) and social 
science (economics and society). Telecommunications policy often, but not always, deals with 
institutional analysis. An institutional analysis is the analysis of an institutional arrangement or set of 
rules governing the number of decision-makers, allowable actions or strategies, authorized results, 
transformation from internal to decision situations, and linkages between decision situations (Kiser & 
Ostrom, 1982). Telecommunications policy also includes economic analysis of, for example, the social 
value or value to private players of the spectrum. The regulator may impose conditions on spectrum to 
make it excludable, which in turn makes frequency use a specific right for a designated entity or 
person.  
                                                            
1 Allocation (of a frequency band): Entry in the Table of Frequency Allocations of a given frequency band for the purpose of being used by 
one or more terrestrial or space radiocommunication services or the radio astronomy service under specified conditions. This term shall also 
be applied to the frequency band concerned. (International Telecommunication Union – Radio Regulations 2008) 
2 Allotment (of a radio frequency or radio frequency channel): Entry of a designated frequency channel in an agreed plan, adopted by a 
competent conference, for use by one or more administrations for a terrestrial or space radiocommunication service in one or more identified 
countries or geographical areas and under specified conditions. (International Telecommunication Union – Radio Regulations 2008) 
3 Assignment (of a radio frequency or radio frequency channel): Authorization given by an administration for a radio station to use a radio 
frequency or radio frequency channel under specified conditions. (International Telecommunication Union – Radio Regulations 2008) 
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In the language of telecommunication planning, the regulator has the right to assign frequency to 
assignees. If the frequency is assigned to the specific entities, i.e., individuals and legal persons, it is 
called licensed frequency, in short, licensed. The entities that obtain this assigned frequency are named 
as licensees. If the frequency is not assigned to specific entities, in other words, assigned to the general 
public, it is called unlicensed frequency or, in short, unlicensed. A characteristic of licensees is that 
they have the exclusive right to use frequency. The unlicensed frequency does not carry this right 
however. 
The typical approaches of spectrum assignment include command-and-control, market-based, and 
spectrum commons. There are two approaches to licensed frequency: the command-and-control and 
the market-based approach. These approaches grant the exclusive right to use frequency to licensees. 
Spectrum commons, however, is unlicensed. Brief details of each approach are described below. 
 
Figure 1. Options for spectrum assignment 4 
Historically, spectrum has been assigned by a command-and-control approach, an administrative 
approach in which the competent authority, mostly government, uses its power of discretion to grant 
an exclusive right of use of some frequency bands to assignees with conditions. These conditions 
include power limitation, antenna specification, and other technical requirements of 
radiocommunication equipment, mainly for the purpose of avoiding harmful interference. Under this 
approach, spectrum is assigned on a first come, first served basis. This process raises the issue of 
transparency. If spectrum usage is requested by government agencies, it is usually assigned.  
There is consensus among economists, lawyers, and engineers, however, that the command-and-
control approach is inefficient (Wang, 2009). The flexibility of the use of frequency under this 
approach is limited. All frequency operations, including the location, working frequency, bandwidth, 
output power, antenna gain, modulation technique, and technology, are decided by the NRA. When 
users want to adopt new technology, they have to go through an administrative process to be approved 
before implementation.                                                             
4 Source: Geiss (2004) 
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Technological development, together with increased spectrum demand, makes spectrum scarce. 
Hence, a market-based approach has been introduced in many countries, because, under this approach, 
it is believed that the market knows best. Here, spectrum is mostly assigned using an auction or 
secondary trading scheme. This approach creates more flexibility for regulators and operators to 
manage the spectrum and makes the process more transparent than a command-and-control approach.  
The 3G auction in the UK in April 2000 was the largest auction so far. After BT had won the spectrum 
auction, however, the business was not commercially viable and the spectrum was sold to O2. 
Although the market-based approach can maximize spectrum efficiency in some cases, the outcome 
may be competition among strong financial parties to buy most of the available spectrum on the 
market. As a result, the market may become monopolized if the regulator does not have proper control 
- spectrum caps (limit to obtaining spectrum).  
The characteristics of spectrum as goods depend on the approach to spectrum assignment, with the 
market-based approach treating spectrum as goods that can be owned and the commons approach 
treating spectrum as being without ownership rights. In general, goods can be classified into two 
groups: private and public goods. Public goods are non-excludable goods that an individual can 
consume without prohibiting others from consuming. Private goods are excludable goods that an 
individual can consume while prohibiting others from consuming. The cost of exclusion for public 
goods is therefore higher than the cost of exclusion for private goods. 
Goods can be further refined into four groups: private goods, toll goods, common-pool goods, and 
public goods. Each group has different characteristics defined by the level of subtractability and the 
cost of exclusion (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982). Table 1 shows four categories of goods. 
Table 1. Categories of goods5 
Level of subtractability 
Cost of exclusion 
High Low 
Low Private goods Toll goods 
High Common-pool goods Public goods 
The level of subtractability is defined by the characteristics of the goods that can be separated. Private 
goods can be separated by individual consumption, but public goods cannot. For example, rice can be 
consumed from a bowl by taking a spoon as private goods. Air in the park is a public good. People can 
breathe, but no one can separate air for individual consumption. 
Private goods, such as bread, milk, automobiles, and haircuts, have a low cost of exclusion and a high 
level of subtractability. Toll goods, such as, theaters, nightclubs, telephone service, cable TV, electric 
power, and libraries, have a low cost of exclusion and a low level of subtractability. Common-pool 
goods have a high cost of exclusion and a high level of subtractability. Examples of common-pool 
goods include water pumped from a ground basin, fish taken from an ocean, and crude oil extracted 
form an oil pool. Public goods, such as peace and security of a community, national defense, mosquito 
abatement, air pollution control, and weather forecasts, have a high cost of exclusion and a low level 
of subtractability (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982). 
1.5 Spectrum commons 
The exclusive right to use frequency granted by a regulator, with a command-and-control or market-
based approach, transforms spectrum into private goods. The regulator therefore limits the use of 
                                                            
5 Source: Kiser and Ostrom (1982, p. 198), Table 7.1 
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frequency to licensees who can access the frequency. In the command-and-control approach, the 
regulator holds all the rights to the use of the frequency. The regulator has full control over licensees, 
creating inflexibility in terms of changing to new technology. Under the market-based approach, the 
regulator allows licensees to transfer frequency to other parties by a market mechanism that will be 
discussed in terms of the institution of spectrum commons and the bundle of rights to use frequency in 
Chapter 2. The market mechanism may also raise an unexpected auction fee and affect long-term 
investment. 
On the other hand, the non-exclusive right to use frequency unlicensed can be treated as common-pool 
goods. In this situation, no one has an exclusive right to use frequency. Everyone can use the same 
frequency under some constraints. Nevertheless, services under spectrum commons cannot claim 
protection, because spectrum commons is open to anyone with any application, under the given 
limitations. For example, in the use of a Wi-Fi hotspot in a conference room, anyone who has a Wi-Fi 
device can access the Wi-Fi hotspot for conference material. It is hard to prohibit or exclude other 
participants from accessing the Wi-Fi hotspot. When the use of the Wi-Fi reaches its maximum 
capacity, however, there is no more access to the Wi-Fi hotspot, because all of the frequencies are 
occupied. 
In the Radiocommunication Act of Thailand, no one can use any radiocommunication device without 
permission from the regulator. For example, prior to 1996, there was no use of Wireless Local Area 
Networks (WLANs) in Thailand, because the regulator did not authorize the use of WLANs. In 1996, 
the regulator granted authorization of WLANs with relevant radiocommunication licences. The use of 
WLANs in Thailand began in a limited area, because it required relevant radiocommunication 
licences. Once the WLAN was included in the portable computer and mobile phone chipset, mass 
production of WLAN devices rendered the price of WLAN devices cheaper. The use of WLAN 
devices then increased. The regulator realized that relevant radiocommunication licences limited the 
use of WLANs. In 2004, the regulator declared that the use of radiocommunication devices in the 
2400-2500 MHz band with power up to 100 milliwatts (equivalent isotropibcally radiated power, 
e.i.r.p.) was exempted from all radiocommunication licences.  
Here, the regulator assigns specific frequency as spectrum commons, also known as unlicensed band, 
collective use or license-exempted. Regulators impose constraints on devices in terms of power 
limitation, frequency, and necessary technical specification to avoid harmful interference. 
Most short-range devices (SRDs) use the industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) applications band, 
but not all applications become widely used. The phenomenon of the expansion of Wi-Fi devices is 
growing around the world, with examples such as the laptop, personal device accessories (PDAs), 
mobile phones, and printers. Moreover, there is ongoing growth in Wi-Fi-enabled devices, which will 
reach almost 300 million in 2010, according to forecasts by Celine (2008). Figure 2, obtained from 
Celine (2008), shows the growth in Wi-Fi-enabled devices. 
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Figure 2. Wi-Fi-enabled, application-specific devices shipment forecast6 
In general, spectrum commons has its advantages and disadvantages. Spectrum commons has many 
advantages compared with other approaches, including lowering the entry barrier for new entrants, 
lowering the administration cost, increasing social benefit, creating innovation, and stimulating 
demand. Spectrum commons also has several disadvantages, however, e.g., irreversibility of 
frequency, overuse, and difficulty estimating demand. 
The value of spectrum commons can help regulators determine the optimal time to implement 
spectrum commons. The concept of the benefit and cost analysis helps find the value of spectrum 
commons. The projection of benefits and costs in the future predicts the value of spectrum commons 
in the future and discounts it to the current value of spectrum commons. 
1.6 Motivation 
The traditional command-and-control approach is inefficient because it is inflexible and unable to cope 
with emerging technologies. The market-based approach limits the number of frequency users to those 
who pay most. The characteristic of the exclusive right to use frequency limits the number of people 
who can access the frequency. Spectrum commons grants a non-exclusive right to use frequency 
however. This increases the number of people who can access the frequency.  
In Thailand, most frequency assignments use a command-and-control approach, which is inefficient in 
terms of the frequency licensee distribution. Most frequency licensees are government agencies or 
state-owned enterprises. It is interesting to explore the Thai case, because the development of 
spectrum commons policy involves two separate processes: an authorization of the use of 
radiocommunication devices and an exemption of relevant radiocommunication licensed or 
unlicensed. 
An exploration of the spectrum management institution provides a starting point for understanding the 
current situation in Thailand. The history of spectrum management in Thailand is explored to provide 
an understanding of the development of spectrum assignment. Three worlds of action, a property 
rights regime and natural resource concepts help to explain the interaction between stakeholders. An 
understanding of the current situation in Thailand offers potential for frequency assignment for 
spectrum commons. 
                                                            
6 Source: Celine (2008) 
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The investigation into the public consultation of the Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG) in 2008 
helps to understand the situation of spectrum commons in European countries. The advantages and 
disadvantages of spectrum commons are reflected in the stakeholder’s interest. It is a European 
example that will be adjusted for use in Thailand, in terms of a suitable time to implement spectrum 
commons.  
The indicator of spectrum commons implementation is the valuation of the spectrum commons. The 
benefit and cost analysis is the concept to measure the valuation of the spectrum commons. Moreover, 
the example valuation of spectrum commons in the UK in 2006 provides a practical procedure to 
measure spectrum commons. 
To measure the value of spectrum commons in Thailand, the adjusted framework and method will be 
applied to suitable and available information. The output from the valuation of spectrum commons 
will provide important information for the regulator on whether to license or unlicense a specific 
frequency band. 
1.7 Aim and research question 
The purpose of this licentiate thesis is to examine the spectrum commons approach to spectrum 
assignment. The examined case is Thailand. The main research question is: “What are the 
consequences of using spectrum commons for frequency assignment in Thailand?”  
The research problem is divided into three parts: conceptual, empirical, and analytical. The conceptual 
part deals with the right to use frequency and examines the framework associated with spectrum 
commons. The empirical part gathers information from history of spectrum management in Thailand 
and public consultation on spectrum commons in the context of European countries to explore the type 
of spectrum commons in Thailand and the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons. The 
analytical part uses the benefit and cost analysis concept on spectrum commons in Thailand.  
In its approach to the main research question: “What are the consequences of using spectrum 
commons for spectrum assignment in Thailand?” the thesis addresses five research sub-questions; see 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Research question 
Main  
research 
question 
What are the consequences of using spectrum commons for spectrum 
assignment in Thailand? 
RQ.1 What is a suitable framework for analyzing different types of spectrum commons? 
RQ.2 What type of spectrum commons has been used in Thailand? 
RQ.3 What are the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons in general? 
RQ.4 How can the benefits and costs of spectrum commons be measured? 
RQ.5 What are the implications of implementing spectrum commons in Thailand? 
RQ.1 looks at finding a framework to analyze different types of spectrum commons. Kiser and Ostrom 
(1982), and Field (1992) provide the three worlds of action as a framework to analyze spectrum 
commons. The five rights of the property regime by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) are also adopted in 
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order to find the interaction between the layer of the decision-maker and the right to use frequency. 
The comparison between property rights regimes and natural resources in the Maine lobster industry 
(Schlager & Ostrom, 1992) addresses the right to use frequency. 
RQ.2 looks at the use of the framework developed in RQ.1 to understand the institution of spectrum 
commons and its application to Thailand so far. The exploration of the history of spectrum assignment 
also helps the understanding of spectrum commons and the right to use frequency in Thailand. These 
are important premises for identifying possibilities for implementing spectrum commons. 
RQ.3 looks at the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons from the public consultation of 
the Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG) in November 2008 in the European Union to obtain the 
current thoughts of stakeholders that built up a general understanding regarding the use of spectrum 
commons.  
RQ.4 is the benefit and cost analysis of the spectrum commons concept from Campbell and Brown 
(2003), Indepen (2006), and Sweet et al. (2002) to build a framework that can be used to measure 
spectrum commons in Thailand. Campbell and Brown (2003) provide the framework of the benefit 
and cost analysis in terms of the undertaken project. The framework applies mostly to whether a 
company intends to undertake a specific project. The comparison between the current values of 
whether to undertake the project provides the decision-makers with important information. The values 
without undertaking the project are obtained from the same allocation resources for alternative uses. 
Indepen (2006) provides a practical method to measure the unlicensed application in the United 
Kingdom in 2006, based on the ten most important applications among a hundred applications of 
unlicensed devices. Sweet et al. (2002) provide the valuation of the spectrum using the engineering 
value – cost saving in the infrastructure of the network operator. 
RQ.5 covers the implications of implementing spectrum commons in Thailand. 
The five research questions are intended to contribute to increased understanding of using spectrum 
commons and to the effectiveness of using spectrum commons in Thailand. 
The scope of this thesis focuses on understanding the institution of spectrum assignment, including the 
decision-maker and decision situation – the institutional arrangement, events, and community – in 
order to find possibilities for implementing spectrum commons for spectrum assignment in practical 
ways in Thailand. It also covers the advantages and disadvantages of implementing spectrum 
commons in the context of Europe. This thesis also has an economic perspective on the value of the 
spectrum. By using the concept of the benefit and cost analysis, the value of spectrum commons has 
been identified as important information for the regulator to decide whether to license or unlicense the 
specified frequency band. 
1.8 Structure of thesis 
The licentiate consists of seven chapters, starting with the Introduction in Chapter 1, which includes 
the background, and research question of this research. Chapter 2 provides spectrum management 
from both the ITU and the rights to use frequency from academic papers, addressing a suitable 
framework for spectrum commons in RQ.1. Chapter 3 deals with the methodology of the thesis. 
Chapter 4 presents the development of spectrum management in Thailand, corresponding to RQ.2. 
Chapter 5 is about the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons, corresponding to RQ.3. 
Chapter 6 concerns the benefit and cost analysis concept, corresponding to RQ.4. Chapter 7 addresses 
the findings, corresponding to RQ.5, and the conclusion of this thesis. 
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Chapter 2  Spectrum management: Perspective from practice and 
literature 
This chapter addresses a suitable framework for analyzing the spectrum commons and elaborates on 
the first research question. Exploring the perspective from the ITU and relevant literature, in practice, 
helps to address the appropriate framework for understanding spectrum commons. 
Background 
Electromagnetic waves consisting of electric and magnetic components were first explained by James 
Clerk Maxwell in the 19th century. Their dualistic properties relating to light and particle motion were 
discovered in the early 20th century, when such waves also began to be used for communication. Radio 
waves are now also referred to as frequency, radio frequency, radio spectrum, or simply spectrum. 
This thesis only discusses the wave properties of frequency and wavelength. 
An important characteristic of spectrum is that higher frequencies reach shorter distances but have 
larger carrying capacity. Once frequency is transmitted, it will propagate until its power has dissipated. 
Physical boundaries cannot stop spectrum at the border of a country. Spectrum management activities 
have therefore been performed internationally by the United Nations agency ITU. 
2.1 Spectrum management by the ITU7 
The ITU uses the RR as a tool to manage spectrum internationally. The RR is revised every three to 
four years by WRC. The current RR is RR 2008, which was revised by WRC2007. RR 2008 defines 
the usable frequency up to 3,000 GHz and divides the uses of frequency into services. There are about 
40 services in RR 2008, including terrestrial and space services such as broadcasting, mobile, satellite, 
maritime, aeronautical, fixed, and earth exploration services. Each service can be shared as primary 
and secondary services. The primary service uses the capital letter and secondary service uses the 
lower case letter in the Table of Frequency Allocation in Article 5, RR. Moreover, the secondary 
service must not cause harmful interference to the primary service and cannot claim protection from 
harmful interference by the primary service and other secondary service8. 
The RR also divides the world into regions. The regions are defined by lines A, B, and C. Region 1 
covers all the European and African countries, Region 2 covers North and South America, and Region 
3 covers Asia and Australasia. For example, Sweden is in Region 1, the USA is in Region 2, and 
Thailand is in Region 3. The regions in RR 2008 are shown in Figure 3. 
Reuse of frequency has an indirect relationship with coverage area. A large coverage area has low 
reuse of frequency, and a small coverage area has high reuse of frequency. 
                                                            
7 This section is based on the ITU handbook of spectrum management 2005, but it is written in the author’s own words. 
8 5.23-5.32, Article 5, Radio Regulations (2008).  
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Figure 3. Regions in Radio Regulations 20089 
The frequencies are divided into ranges or bands. A wavelength equals its speed of propagation 
(normally that of light) divided by its frequency (λ = c/f). Each range of frequency has its own 
propagation characteristics, as in cases like sea-surface communication, stratospheric scattering, and 
long-range communication. Table 3 shows the propagation in different frequency bands. 
Table 3. Radio frequency propagation10 
Band Frequency Range Uses Bandwidth Interference 
VLF 3-30 kHz 1000s of km Long-range radio navigation Very narrow Widespread 
LF 30-300 kHz 1000s of km Same as VLF strategic 
communications 
Very narrow Widespread 
MF 0.3-3 MHz 2000-3000 km Same as VLF strategic 
communications 
Moderate Widespread 
HF 3-30 MHz up to 1000 km Global broadcast and Point–to-
Point 
Wide Widespread 
VHF 30-300 MHz 200-300 km Broadcast, PCS, Mobile, Wan Very wide Confined 
UHF 0.3-3 GHz < 100 km Broadcast, PCS, Mobile, Wan Very wide Confined 
SHF 3-30 GHz Ranges from 
30 km to 2000 
km 
Broadcast, PCS, Mobile, Wan, 
Satellite Communication 
Very wide up 
to 1 GHz 
Confined 
EHF 30-300 GHz Ranges from 
20 km to 2000 
km 
Microcell, Point-to-Point, PCS, 
and Satellite, (Personal 
Communication Services: PCS) 
Very wide up 
to 10 GHz 
Confined 
                                                            
9 Information obtained from 5.2-5.9, Article 5, Radio Regulations (2008)  
10 Table obtained from http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Section.2658.html 
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Spectrum-reusable characteristics vary with service, frequency, location, time, and transmitter power. 
The following section explains the Table of Frequency Allocation in RR 2008 and represents the 
allocation of frequency. 
Table 4. Example of table of frequency allocation  
410-460 MHz 
Table 4 shows the frequency allocation in the 410-460 MHz band. It consists of sub-bands 420-430 
and 432-438 MHz. The 420-430 MHz band is worldwide allocation, i.e., the same allocation for all 
three regions. There are two primary services, indicated by capital letters: fixed and mobile except for 
aeronautical mobile. There is a secondary service indicated by a lower case letter: radiolocation. There 
are three footnotes for all the services: 5.269, 5.270, and 5.271. 
In the other band, 432-438 MHz, frequency is divided into two sections. The first section is on the left, 
with frequency uses only in Region 1. There are two primary services: amateur and radio location. 
There is a secondary service: earth exploration-satellite (active) and it has 5.279A as a specific 
footnote. There are eight footnotes for all the services, e.g., 5.138 and 5.271. The second section is on 
the right, with frequency uses in Regions 2 and 3. There is one primary service: radiolocation. There 
are two secondary services: amateur and earth exploration-satellite (active). Only earth exploration-
satellite (active) has 5.279A as a specific footnote. There are seven footnotes for all the services, e.g., 
5.138 and 5.271. 
Furthermore, the RR works as an international treaty that all ITU Member States are obliged to follow. 
It is essential to understand the Table of Frequency Allocation in the RR to implement the correct 
spectrum assignment. 
Allocation and allotment are assigned by the ITU, but spectrum is assigned by the NRAs. Besides 
allocation and allotment, the ITU also regulates by adding footnotes to encourage the use of spectrum 
commons and improve the efficiency of frequency usage. 
2.2 Functional responsibilities and requirements for spectrum management 
The handbook, National Spectrum Management (2005), also provides functional responsibilities and 
requirements of spectrum management, as follows; 
a) Spectrum management planning and regulations; 
b) Allocation and allotment of frequency bands; 
Allocation to services 
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 
420-430 FIXED 
    MOBILE except aeronautical mobile 
    Radiolocation 
    5.269 5.270 5.271 
... ... 
432-438  
AMATEUR 
RADIOLOCATION 
Earth exploration-satellite 
(active) 5.279A 
432-438  
 RADIOLOCATION 
 Amateur 
 Earth exploration-satellite (active) 5.279A 
5.138  5.271  5.272  5.276 
5.277  5.280  5.281  5.282 
 
 5.271  5.276  5.277  5.278  5.279  5.281  5.282 
12 
c) Frequency assignment and licensing (including non-licensing allocations); 
d) Spectrum management financing, including fees; 
e) Standard, specifications, and equipment authorization; 
f) Spectrum monitoring; 
g) Spectrum regulation enforcement: inspections and investigations; 
h) International and regional cooperation including frequency coordination and notification; 
i) National liaison and consultation; and 
j) Spectrum management support function including administrative and legal, computer 
automation, spectrum engineering, and training. 
Spectrum management planning and regulations 
The spectrum management organization should take the advancement of technology as well as the 
social, economic, and political realties into the development of the implementation plans, regulation, 
and policies. The Table of Frequency Allocation is the output of the planning and policy-making 
effort, which reflects the various radio services or uses. In the event of competing uses or interests, the 
spectrum management organization should determine the use or uses that would best serve the public 
and government interest and how to share the spectrum. 
In order to allocate frequency, the following factors should be taken into account: public and 
government needs, technical considerations, and apparatus limitations. Public and government needs 
and benefit considerations are a requirement of the service for radio frequencies, the probable number 
of people who will benefit from the service, the relative social and economic importance of the 
service, the probability of establishment of the service, the degree of public support expected for the 
service, the impact of the new applications on existing investment in the proposed frequency band, and 
government requirements for security, aeronautical, maritime, and science services. Technical 
considerations are the need for the service to use the frequency with particular propagation 
characteristics and compatibility within and outside the selected frequency band, the amount of 
frequency required, the signal strength required for reliable service, the amount of interference that is 
likely to be encountered, and the viability of the technology. Apparatus limitations are the upper useful 
or higher limit of radio frequency, operating characteristics of transmitters, types of antenna 
availability and practical limitations, receiver availability, and characteristics. 
Allocation and allotment of frequency bands 
The national allocation table should represent the current national frequency assignment as well as the 
national plan for future use. The national allocation table provides details of current national uses, 
including all data on terrestrial and space services and their applications. Each country uses the ITU 
allocation table as guidance for the region allocation to which the particular country belongs. It is not 
necessary for every country to follow exactly the ITU table, which deviates to a limited degree to 
satisfy national requirements, if it does not cause harmful interference and protection is not required. 
Reasons to follow the ITU table are availability of equipment in the region according to the agreement 
of the allocation table, minimized interference from neighboring countries, conformity of equipment in 
the regional table, and global service such as aeronautical, maritime, and satellite service. 
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Normally, existing spectrum users oppose changes to frequency allocation tables because of the many 
costs incurred, including equipment costs, learning costs, and loss of customers. In order to develop 
national table frequency allocation, the spectrum management organization should follow the ITU 
Table of Allocation as closely as possible, develop the plan based on current use, not impede the 
advancement of future technology, allow efficient allocation for government and security, and align 
with other countries’ allocation. 
Frequency assignment and licensing (including non-licensing allocations) 
Frequency assignment is routine work for spectrum management organizations. Analyses select the 
most suitable frequencies for radiocommunication systems and coordinate proposed assignments with 
existing ones.  
The frequency assignment function includes the licensing function, national legislation, and 
regulations and related procedures to control the operation of stations by: 1) examining license 
applications and related documents to determine the licensing eligibility of the application and the 
technical acceptability of the radio equipment proposed; 2) assigning the radio call signs to individual 
stations; 3) issuing licences and collecting fees, if appropriate; 4) establishing methods for 
administering system or network licences, as appropriate; 5) renewing, suspending, and canceling 
licenses, as appropriate; and 6) conducting examinations of operators.  
The related procedures should specify information to be supplied with frequency applications to allow 
spectrum managers to perform better. Unnecessary or difficult procedures may discourage 
radiocommunication development. 
Spectrum management financing 
Spectrum is a natural resource that is a valuable national asset and typically controlled by government. 
The primary objective of the spectrum management fee policy should be to: 1) improve the 
telecommunication infrastructure through the efficient and effective use of radio spectrum; 2) support 
spectrum management infrastructure via administrative fees for all users; 3) encourage spectrum 
efficiency by providing appropriate incentives, assessing the fees according to the amount of 
bandwidth usage and the number of transmitters in the network; 4) reflect economic principles and 
radio standards required in the RR and ITU-R Recommendations; and 5) release inefficient and 
ineffective use of spectrum. 
License fees include application fees, construction permit fees (installation fee), spectrum usage or 
regulatory fees, operator certificate fees, and administrative fees. 
Standard, specifications, and equipment authorization 
In general, the spectrum management organization should follow the technical characteristics of the 
station in Article 3 of the RR, the maximum value for frequency tolerance and spurious domain 
emission, and other technical standards in Appendices 2 and 3 of the RR in order to avoid interference. 
Thus, administrators ensure that all the equipment characteristics within their territory conform to 
these regulations. 
There are two main functions of the standard: standard setting and standard compliance. The standard 
setting can be national or international depending on interests. Standard compliance spectrum 
management organization, however, can be by the administration itself or another party and comprises 
the compliance testing requirement and other administrative procedures related to compliance. 
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Administrative procedures, such as national acceptance of equipment test results from other 
administrations, self-certification, or private sector testing laboratories, help to reduce paperwork and 
cost, but spectrum management organization ensures that radiocommunication equipment meets 
standard requirements. 
As for self-certification, the spectrum management organization should have its own test laboratory to 
perform spot checks, including transmitting and receiving equipment, laboratory testing according to 
type approval procedures, maintenance and calibration of laboratory test equipment, and other 
inspection and monitoring equipment, acceptance evaluation of equipment for inspection and 
monitoring, and outfitting special/purpose monitoring vehicles, and calibration of equipment to be 
fitted in such vehicles. 
Equipment authorization is part of the global standard setting that helps avoid fragmentation of the 
market for the benefit of both consumers and industry. The ITU maintains principles of consensus, 
transparency, openness, impartiality, maintenance, public access to deliverables, consistent rules, 
efficiency, accountability, and coherence in order to maintain successful development of the global 
standard. 
Spectrum monitoring 
Spectrum monitoring feeds back to spectrum management, i.e., good frequency planning and 
assignment reduce the possibility of harmful interference. Spectrum monitoring responsibilities 
include routine monitoring of a wide range of frequency and special tasks to find illegal frequency 
uses or harmful interference. Monitoring provides actual use of spectrum as information for frequency 
assignment in order to compare spectrum planning with reality. The consequences are the adjustment 
of spectrum planning. 
Information from monitoring also supports the enforcement approach to the ideal of interference-free, 
properly authorized, and harmonized use of the spectrum. Monitoring can also be used to identify and 
measure interfering signals, verify technical and operational characteristics of radiated signals, and 
detect illegal transmitters. 
Spectrum regulation enforcement: inspections and investigations 
The purpose of the enforcement inspection is to strengthen spectrum management processes to reflect 
the effective management of the spectrum, depending on the ability to control its use through the 
enforcement of relevant regulations. The authority should grant appropriate authority to the spectrum 
management organization in order to enforce regulation and set appropriate penalties. 
Enforcement, inspection, and investigation should work closely with monitoring, assignment, and 
licensing units to collect information to investigate interference complaints, illegal operation, and 
operations not in accordance with the radio station license, collect information for legal prosecution 
and law enforcement, ensure that the radio station complies with national and international 
regulations, and take technical measurements. 
International and regional cooperation including frequency coordination and notification 
When interference cannot be contained nationally, international and regional cooperation, in terms of 
activities within international bodies, and bilateral and multilateral discussions should be conducted. 
The cooperation is conducted by ITU world and regional radiocommunication conferences (WRCs 
and RRCs), together with the three ITU Sectors (Radiocommunication, Telecommunication 
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Standardization, and Telecommunication Development). Moreover, the notifications from Member 
States to the Radiocommunication Bureau help to coordinate frequency authorization via the Bureau’s 
International Frequency Information Circular (BR IFIC). 
Moreover, discussions in other international organizations, such as the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO), and the Special Committee of the International Electrotechnical Commission 
for Interference (CISPR), help to settle interference issues via negotiation. The administration must 
therefore also give consideration to participating in these organizations. 
Bilateral cooperation between countries, especially neighboring countries, in terms of a joint 
committee, help to relieve interference at operational level. 
National liaison and consultation 
The spectrum management organization should set up liaison units for communication and 
consultation with users, including businesses, telecommunication industries, the government and the 
general public to disseminate information on policy, rules and regulations, and practices and provide 
mechanisms for feedback to evaluate consequences. A liaison unit, as a focal point of spectrum 
management organization, maintains the media relations, issues public notices, conducts meetings, and 
acts as a mediator to resolve interference problems. The form of the liaison unit ranges from informal 
to formal contact and depends on the tradeoff between efficient dialogue and quick results, and 
transparent administrative procedures that ensure fair and impartial treatment. 
Spectrum management organizations are encouraged to establish procedures for individuals and 
organizations to revise spectrum regulations and assignment or allocation to meet the needs of the 
national constituency. 
The spectrum management support function includes administrative and legal support, computer 
automation, spectrum engineering, and training 
Spectrum engineering support provides adequate evaluation information, capabilities, and choices in 
the field of technology and engineering analysis of technical factors. Administrative, legal, and 
computer support provides an efficient facility for the spectrum management organization. 
To conclude this section, the ITU provides the overall functional responsibility and requirements for 
spectrum management organizations, ranging from planning, assignment, monitoring, enforcement, 
and the supporting unit. The next section concentrates on the rights to use frequency in each spectrum 
assignment approach, including command-and-control, market-based and spectrum commons, which 
can be divided into three levels: constitutional choice, collective choice, and operational level. 
2.3 The rights to use frequency 
As mention in Section 1.4, Chapter 1, an overview of spectrum assignment is given, including three 
typical approaches: command-and-control, market-based, and spectrum commons. Each approach has 
a different set of rights – the particular actions that are authorized (V. Ostrom, 1976) – to use the 
frequency, depending on the rules that refer to the prescriptions that create authorizations (Schlager & 
Ostrom, 1992).  
The adoption of three economic institutions: the operational, institutional, and constitutional level 
from Field (1992), or the three worlds of action by Kiser and Ostrom (1982): the operational, 
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collective choice, and constitutional choice level of action, are considered below as a framework to 
address spectrum commons. Kiser and Ostrom (1982) provide the metatheoretical framework to 
explain the relationship between institutional arrangements and the individual in terms of the 
transformation of rules into individual behavior. 
Institutional arrangements are rules used by individuals to determine who and what are included in 
decision situations, how information is structured, what actions can be taken and in what sequence, 
and how individual actions will be aggregated into a collective decision (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982, p. 
179). In other words, this framework explains phenomena attributed by the aggregation of individual 
actions that an individual decides to take or strategies (plans of action) based on situations and the 
individual. The situation depends on rules, events, and community. This framework also captures the 
dynamic situation by feedback from the phenomena that influence the community, situation, and 
individuals.  
Five working parts of the institutional structure 
There are five working parts in an institutional structure: the decision-maker or individual, the 
community, the event (or goods and services), the institutional arrangement, and the decision situation. 
The results of the institutional structure are individual actions or strategies, and the aggregation of 
individual actions. The figure shows the interactions, which are explained below: 
 
Figure 4. The working parts of an institutional analysis11 
Attributes of an individual or decision-maker 
When an individual wants to take an action or strategy, he or she must know the consequence of the 
action or strategy, or the outcome and value of the alternative actions or strategies. A tennis player 
makes a decision to charge at the net or wait for the ball bounce and use a groundstroke: the outcome 
of the action is different. In order to predict actions, a minimum of the following assumptions must be 
made: the level of information about decision situations, the valuation of potential outcomes, the 
alternative actions within the situation, and the process of calculation to act from alternative actions or 
strategies. 
                                                            
11 Source: Kiser and Ostrom (1982, p. 187) Figure 7.1 
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Attributes of decision situations 
The decision situation is determined from interdependent relationships. Relationships depend on more 
than one input from institutional arrangements, events, and the community. If the environment 
changes during the game, e.g., a new ball or racket, the decision situations change and influence the 
player’s actions and strategies. 
Institutional arrangement 
An institutional arrangement is a set of rules to: 1) allow entry and exit conditions for participation; 2) 
determine allowable actions and outcome from interaction; 3) distribute authority among positions; 4) 
aggregate joint action; 5) provide procedural rules in complex situation; and 6) identify information 
constraints. 
In order to implement rules, they should be enforced in parallel, depending on the attributes of the 
community. 
The types of rule mentioned above are: 1) boundary rules, 2) scope rules, 3) position and authority 
rules, 4) aggregation rules, 5) procedural rules, and 6) information rules. 
The rules of World Cup football provide an example of institution arrangements, as follows: 
1) Boundary rules: which teams can enter the tournament, i.e., qualifying rounds for countries on 
continents and number of teams on each continent; 
2) Scope rules: the size of the football field, ball, and goal area that allow actions and outcomes, 
and the number of players, the number of player changes, and the number of faults; 
3) Position and authority rules: the rights and duties assigned to players, referees, linemen, and 
coaches; 
4) Aggregation rules: how to score, wins, and losses; 
5) Procedural rules: how teams proceed through the tournament competition in the first round, 
second round, third round, quarterfinal, semi-final, and final; and 
6) Information rules: how information about the tournament rules, the opponent’s strategies, and 
other matters are conveyed to players. 
Attributes of events (public and private goods) 
There are four attributes of events that individuals seek to produce and consume: jointness of use or 
consumption, exclusion, measurement, and degree of choice, in order to define private goods, tool 
goods, common-pool resources, and public goods. 
Jointness of consumption explains separable and joint consumption goods. An individual consumes 
separable consumption goods, while more than one individual consume joint consumption goods. Joint 
consumption goods are defined as public goods that are non-subtractable, while separable 
consumption goods are private goods. 
Exclusion attributes explain the difference between private and public goods. Public goods are non-
excludable goods that an individual can consume without exclusion. Private goods are excludable 
goods that individual can consume with exclusion. 
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Measurement is the degree of packaging and unitization. Public goods are hard to package and unitize, 
while private goods are easy to package and unitize. The calculation of private goods is more precise 
than of public goods. 
The degree of choice indicates the consumers’ choices between public and private goods. Public goods 
are non-subtractable and non-excludable, so there is not much choice, while private goods can produce 
many choices from subtractable and excludable goods. 
V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom (1997) use the level of subtractability and the cost of exclusion to classify 
private goods, tool goods, common-pool resources, and public goods. Private goods, such as bread, 
milk, automobiles, and haircuts, have a low cost of exclusion and a high level of subtractability. Toll 
goods, for example, theaters, night clubs, telephone service, cable TV, electric power, and libraries, 
have a low cost of exclusion and low level of subtractability. Common-pool resources, i.e., water 
pumped from a ground basin, fish taken from an ocean, and crude oil extracted from an oil pool, have 
a high cost of exclusion and a high level of subtractability. Public goods, such as peace and security of 
a community, national defense, mosquito abatement, air pollution control, and weather forecasts, have 
a high cost of exclusion and a low level of subtractability. 
World Cup football is tool goods at a low level of subtractability because football players and 
spectators jointly benefit from football matches, whereas the cost of exclusion is low but managed by 
selling tickets to matches. 
The community 
The community includes all stakeholders that directly or indirectly affect the decision situation. The 
attributes of the community comprise levels of common understanding, common agreement, and 
distribution of resources. 
After rules setting, the individual or member of the community must have a common understanding of 
the rules, i.e. the allowable actions and outcomes. Without a common understanding of the rules, the 
rules cannot be exercised. 
With a common understanding of the rules, real actions must be evaluated. If community members 
obey the rules, allowable actions, and outcomes, the need for rules enforcement is low. If, on the other 
hand, the individual disagrees, the need for enforcement is high. 
The distribution of the resource represents a situation on the market or in the community. If resources 
are distributed equally, a competitive environment arises. Otherwise, oligopoly or monopoly may 
occur. 
Three worlds of action and three levels of analysis 
Five working parts explain the relationships of individuals (decision-makers), the decision situation, 
the institutional arrangement, the events, and the community, as mentioned in Figure 4. The 
aggregated result not only influences or feeds back to the institutional arrangement in the same world 
of actions, but also influences the next world of actions. Kiser and Ostrom (1982) suggest that there 
are three worlds of action: constitutional choice, collective choice, and operational world. The top 
level is the constitutional choice world. The middle level is the collective choice world. The low level 
is the operational world. The following figure shows the interaction of the three worlds of action over 
time. 
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Figure 5. Three levels of institutional analysis12 
                                                            
12 Source: Kiser and Ostrom (1982, p. 207), Figure 7.2 
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The constitutional choice level also comprises five working parts, with additional feedback from the 
aggregate result from the collective choice level. At this top level, the decision-maker makes a high-
level decision in terms of constitution, e.g., constitution, law, or regulation. This decision is given to 
the collective choice level.  
The collective choice level also comprises five working parts, with additional feedback from the 
aggregate result from the operational level. At this middle level, the decision-maker makes the 
operational rule, such as determining, enforcing, continuing, or changing the actions authorized by the 
constitutional rules from the constitutional choice level.  
The operational level also comprises five working parts with the feedback from the aggregate result 
from its level. At this low level, the actions or strategies of individuals happen according to 
determined rules from the above level. 
Constitutional decisions establish rules as institutional arrangements and their enforcement for the 
collective choice level. Collective decisions establish institutional arrangements and their enforcement 
for individual action at an operational level. 
As a constitutional decision-maker, FIFA determines the rules of football at a high level. European or 
national football associations use FIFA’s rules for their tournaments, such as EUROPA and the 
Premier League. Football teams must obey the rules to join tournaments. 
An example of the Maine lobster industry 
The three levels of action are applied to the Maine lobster industry by Schlager and Ostrom (1992). 
The purpose is to explain a conceptual scheme to distinguish a bundle of property rights from the 
authorized user, proprietor, claimant, and owner of the Maine lobster industry. 
The Maine lobster industry comprises the fishing ground, state authority, and fishermen. The fishing 
ground is the area in the sea that contains the scare resource, in this case, the lobster. There are two 
types of fishing ground. First, inland, it is the sea associated with the harbor. Second, the open water 
ground, the sea that is outside the inland area. The state authority is the State of Maine, the community 
owner. The fishing ground is a common property resource or common pool resource. Fishermen are 
people who fish in the fishing ground. 
There are two types of property rights: de jure and de facto. De jure rights are given by law or 
regulation and are formal and legalized. De facto rights originate from resource users who manage 
their resources among themselves as de jure rights. 
Moreover, there are five rights for common pool resources: access, withdrawal, management, 
exclusion, and alienation. At an operational level, there are access and withdrawal rights. At the 
collective choice level, there are management, exclusion, and alienation rights. The following table 
shows the summary of rights at each level. 
Table 5. Property rights of common-pool resources13 
Level of action / Economic Rights 
Constitutional - 
Collective choice / Institutional Management, Exclusion, Alienation 
Operational Access, Withdrawal 
                                                            
13 Source: Kiser and Ostrom (1982, pp. 250-251) 
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Schlager and Ostrom (1992) provide the definition for each right. Access right is the right to enter a 
defined physical property. Withdrawal right is the right to obtain the products of a resource (e.g., 
lobster in the fishing ground). Management right is the right to regulate internal use patterns and 
transform the resource by making improvements. Exclusion right is the right to determine who will 
have an access right and how that right may be transferred. Alienation right is the right to sell or lease 
either or both of the above collective choice rights (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992, pp. 250-251). 
The State of Maine issues the right to fish, including access and withdrawal rights for authorized users, 
as de jure rights and leaves other rights for the community to decide as de facto rights. 
Authorized users are fishermen who have rights to access the fishing ground, access right, and obtain 
lobsters from the fishing ground, withdrawal right, as day-to-day activities. At operational level, 
fishermen go to the fishing ground and use the fishing equipment at a particular location specified by 
the claimant in a collective choice. 
The claimants determine management rights in terms of which fishing equipment is allowed or 
prohibited. Where fishermen can fish is set for authorized users at the operational level. This 
management right is not given by the State of Maine. The claimant has a management right as a de 
facto right. 
The proprietor has an exclusion right for who can fish in the fishing ground. This exclusion right is not 
given by the State of Maine. The proprietor has an exclusion as a de facto right. 
If, however, no one intends to use the fishing ground, the exclusion right is not practicable. The 
difference between claimant and proprietor disappears. 
Owners have all the rights to use the resource, including an alienation right to rent, lease, sell, or 
transfer their right to others. In the Maine lobster industry, the State of Maine owns the fishing ground, 
and fishermen cannot sell or lease their fishing ground. Thus, a de jure and a de facto right of 
alienation are not different, because the fishermen do not have an alienation right. A summary of the 
bundles of rights is shown in the following table. 
Table 6. Bundles of rights associated with position14 
Position 
Rights 
Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorized User 
Access and withdrawal x x x x 
Management x x x  
Exclusion x x   
Alienation x    
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) also refer to the study of the Maine lobster industry by Acheson (1975), 
Grossinger (1975), and Wilson (1977). The State of Maine has owned the fishing ground since the 
establishment of the state. It is a de jure right. The fishermen have to obtain a license to fish in the 
fishing ground. 
Prior to 1920, the fishing ground was separate from the owners of the harbor along the coast. The 
fishermen in the harbor determined who could enter the fishing ground, and how, when, and where to 
fish. The fishermen obtained the management and exclusion rights as de facto rights. The fishermen 
                                                            
14 Source: Schlager and Ostrom (1992, p. 252),  Table 1 
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cannot lease, sell, or transfer the right, however, because the alienation right is owned by the State of 
Maine. 
Enforcement within the fishing ground was also down to the fishermen. The sanction for persons 
violating the communal rules was gear destruction. The fishermen used wooden traps on the sea floor 
and tied up buoys. If anyone violated the communal rules, the rope was cut. The cutting rope 
represents the exclusion right to determine who can access the fishing ground. 
After 1920, new technology emerged. Motors were installed on boats instead of buoys. Fishermen 
could harvest lobster in a large area all year long. The traditional wooden trap and buoys could only 
operate in summer. The fishermen who installed the motors gained more benefit from fishing lobster 
both inland and on the open water. The traditional inland fishermen could only fish on inland fishing 
ground. 
The new motor technology changed the mode of how to fish. The enforcement of exclusion turned 
into a lobster war between the inland and open water fishermen. The de facto rights for management 
and exclusion became blurred and were reduced to de jure rights – only access and withdrawal rights. 
In order to solve the problem, the inland and open water fishermen agreed to have a mixture of 
traditional wooden trap and buoys, and motors. Moreover, the separation between the fishing grounds 
allowed traditional communal rules, such as cutting the rope, as exclusion rights – de facto right and 
did not allow enforcement, free access as an authorized user – de jure right was established. 
The enforcement of communal rules that remain in the fishing ground helps fishermen limit the 
harvest. This exclusion right has encouraged fishermen to invest in institutional arrangements. Fishing 
grounds that have no communal rules, however, harvest all year long without a limit. Thus, over-
harvesting represents as tragedy of commons. Wilson (1977) also reports that controlled fishing gains 
average 22,929 USD per year, with fishermen in uncontrolled fishing grounds gaining on average 
16,449 USD per year. 
The Maine lobster industry example proposes property rights for decision-makers, ranging from 
authorized users, claimants, proprietors, and owners, to understand better the bundle of rights at 
different institutional levels. Exploring the institution and decision-makers interaction helps to 
understand the bundle of rights (access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation right) in a 
property rights regime. 
The economic institution: constitution, institution, and operation, therefore provides a decision-making 
context. Moreover, the bundle of rights in the property regime also clarifies the differences between 
decision-making positions. 
Three worlds of action in spectrum management 
The concept of three worlds of action and the property rights regime mentioned above provide an 
understanding of the interaction between the decision-maker and the decision situation within and 
between three levels. Moreover, the property rights regime from the Maine lobster industry provides 
the bundle rights to resources, especially the common pool resources.  
An analysis of decision-maker at each level of spectrum management reveals the relevant stakeholders 
shown in the following table. 
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Table 7. Level of action and stakeholders 
Stakeholders Level of action / Economic institution 
Administrator / Regulator / Authority Constitutional choice 
Operator / Provider / Standard Setting Organization Collective choice / Institutional 
User Operational choice 
Constitutional choice level 
A high level of regulation conducted directly will influence the collective choice level. In 
radiocommunication, the constitutional level starts from the regulator, administrator, or authority in 
each country up to the ITU level. The constitutional level gives the overall regulation and broadly 
influences the collective choice (or institutional level). 
The following sample is at constitutional level and includes the allocation of spectrum commons and 
relevant recommendations, which have been to allocate the spectrum commons frequencies that have 
been decided to the ITU-RR 2008. There are two main footnotes i.e. 5.138 and 5.150 allocated for 
industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) applications. The use of ISM applications is according to 
ITU-RR No. 1.15. These applications are used to generate and use radio-frequency energy locally for 
ISM, domestic, or similar purposes, excluding applications in the field of telecommunications. Short-
range radiocommunication devices in this band must accept harmful interference (SM.1538-2, 2006) 
however.  
SM.1538-2 (2006) also provides a definition for short-range radio communication devices (SRDs), 
covering radio transmitters that provide either unidirectional or bidirectional use with low capacity, 
causing interference with other radio equipment. 
Examples of short-range device applications are telecommand, telemetry, voice and video, equipment 
for detecting avalanche victims, broadband radio local area networks (RLANs), railway applications, 
road transport, and traffic telematics (RTTTs) equipment for detecting movement and for alerts, 
alarms, model control, inductive applications, radio microphones, RF identification (RFID) systems, 
ultra-low power active medical implants (ULP-AMI), wireless audio applications, and RF- (radar) 
level gauges (SM.1538-2, 2006). 
Footnotes 5.138 and 5.150 contain five and seven sub-bands, respectively. In 5.138, there are 6,765-
6,795 kHz, 433.05-434.79 MHz in Region 1, 61-61.5 GHz, 122-123 GHz, and 244-246 GHz. These 
bands are designated for ISM applications. The use of these frequency bands for ISM applications is 
subject to special authorization by the administration concerned, in agreement with other 
administrations whose radiocommunication services may be affected. In applying this provision, 
administrations shall have due regard for the latest relevant ITU-R Recommendations. 
In 5.150, there are 13,553-13,567 kHz, 26,957-27,283 kHz, 40.66-40.70 MHz and 902-928 MHz, and 
in Region 2, 2,400-2,500 MHz, 5,725-5,875 MHz, and 24-24.25 GHz. These bands are also designated 
for ISM applications. Radiocommunication services operating within these bands must accept harmful 
interference that may be caused by these applications. The ISM equipment operating in these bands is 
subject to the provisions of No. 15.13. 
A summary of ISM frequencies and the main applications is shown in the following table. 
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Table 8. Frequencies of ISM bands 5.138 and 5.15015 
Frequency Footnote Bandwidth Region 1 Region 2 Regions 3 Main 
application 
6,765-6,795 kHz 5.138 30 kHz    Inductive application 
13,553-13,567 kHz 5.150 14 kHz    RFID 
26,957-27,283 kHz 5.150 326 kHz    
Railway 
application 
– 
Eurobalizing 
40.66-40.70 MHz 5.150 0.04 MHz    Control signal 
433.05-434.79 MHz 5.138 1.74 MHz    Control signal 
902-928 MHz 5.150 26 MHz    Cordless telephone 
2,400-2,500 MHz 5.150 100 MHz    WLAN 
5,725-5,875 MHz 5.150 150 MHz    WLAN 
61-61.5 GHz 5.138 0.5 GHz    Millimeter-
wave radar 
122-123 GHz 5.138 1 GHz    Non-generic 
SRDs 
244-246 GHz 5.138 2 GHz    Non-generic 
SRDs 
Note: The total bandwidth of 5.138 and 5.150 is 3,778.15 MHz. This is only 0.126% of the whole 
usable spectrum of 3,000 GHz however. 
SM.1538-2 (2006) also suggests the other six bands commonly used for SRDs. These are 9-135 kHz, 
3,155-3,195 kHz, 402-405 MHz, 5,795-5,805 MHz, 5,805-5,815 MHz and 76-77 GHz. The use of 
these bands is subject to specific regulation, such as the 402-405 MHz band used for ultra-low, power-
active medical implants subject to Recommendation ITU-R RS.1346, the 5,795-5,805 MHz bands, and 
the 5,805-5,815 MHz band used for transport information and control systems subject to 
Recommendation ITU-R M.1453. 
The use of SRDs depends on national administration regulations. In general, SRDs cannot claim 
protection from other radio communication services, although some NRAs specify protection due to 
the nature of the application. SRDs are used on a worldwide basis. The technical and operating 
parameters, and the spectrum requirement are also found in SM.1538-2 (2006). The SDR regulations 
should not be more restrictive than necessary. 
As in every country, in order to adopt ITU regulations, Thailand puts these footnotes into the National 
Frequency Allocation. The following table is an example of the Thailand Table of Frequency 
Allocation in the 2,400-2,500 MHz band.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
15 Source: Radio Regulation (2008), Articles No. 5.138 and 5.150 
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Table 9. Example of Thailand’s Table of Frequency Allocation16 
Allocation to services 
Thailand Remark 
2,300-2,450 FIXED T17 T21 
  MOBILE 
  RADIOLOCATION 
  Amateur 
  S5.150 S5.282 S5.396 
 
2,450-2,483.5 FIXED T21 
  MOBILE 
  RADIOLOCATION 
  S5.150 
 
2,483.5-2,500 FIXED T22 
  MOBILE 
  MOBILE-SATELLITE (space-to-Earth) 
  RADIOLOCATION 
  Radiodetermination-satellite (space-to-Earth) S5.398 
  S5.150 S5.402 
 
Countries should also specify domestic regulations for the use of these footnotes. For example, in the 
USA, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) specifies rules in Part 15 of the Communication 
Act. In the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), 
countries adopt recommendation CEPT/ERC/REC 70-03 “Relating to the use of short-range devices 
(SRD)” for use in these footnotes. In Thailand, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) 
issues the National Telecommunications Commission Regulation of Exemption of 
Radiocommunication Licences (2007c) for use by short-range devices. Most of these regulations 
specify the frequency, power limitation, and necessary technical specification for use by these 
footnotes. The following table shows an example of the technical specification by the FCC and CEPT. 
Table 10. CEPT power level17 
Maximum power level Frequency bands 
100 mW(1) 2,400-2,483.5 MHz (for RLANs only) 
17.1-17.3 GHz 
24.00-24.25 GHz 
61.0-61.5 GHz 
122-123 GHz 
244-246 GHz 
(1) Levels are either effective radiated power (e.r.p.) (below 1,000 MHz) or equivalent isotropically radiated 
power (e.i.r.p.) (above 1,000 MHz). 
Table 11. FCC general limits for any intentional transmitter18 
Frequency 
(MHz) 
Electric field strength 
(µV/m) 
Measurement distance 
(m) 
0.009-0.490 2,400/f (kHz) 300 
0.490-1.705 24,000/f (kHz) 30 
1.705-30.0 30 30 
30-88 100 3 
88-216 150 3 
216-960 200 3 
Above 960 500 3 
                                                            
16 Source: http://www.ntc.or.th/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3368&Itemid=191 (accessed on May 26, 2010) 
17 Source: SM.1538-2 (2006, p. 9) Table 3 
18 Source: SM.1538-2 (2006, p. 9) Table 4 
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The ITU regulations and the national regulation are both at the constitutional level, providing a broad 
guideline for collective-choice or the institutional level. 
Collective choice or institutional level 
After the administrator, authority, or regulator outlines technical specifications, the operators, 
providers, or standard setting units have to create technology according to the regulation 
(constitutional choice level). For example, in the 2,400-2,500 MHz band, there are two popular 
technologies, i.e., Wi-Fi and Bluetooth. These technologies provide personal and local connectivity 
with a peer-to-peer connection for Bluetooth and a Wi-Fi infrastructure for Internet connection, 
respectively. 
Wi-Fi technology has been developed by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 
and the current standard is 802.11n. The standard provides many technical specifications on how to 
use this frequency, e.g., medium access control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) specifications. 
Bluetooth has been developed to replace cable connectivity for personal area networks (PANs). The 
Bluetooth standard uses the frequency hopping spread spectrum for radio technology. PAN can 
connect mobile phones, faxes, printers, computers, laptops, GPS receivers, video recorders, and 
cameras. 
At the collective choice or institutional level, technology or standard rules show how the frequency 
should be used by the provider, operator, or standard setting unit and determine which devices can 
access their network. 
Operational level 
At this level, the users have choices to select devices and use them. After selecting the devices, 
however, users have collective choice or institutional level rules. For example, once the users access 
Wi-Fi hotspots in hotels, they must have devices with a specified Wi-Fi connection and an account to 
access the Internet defined by the operator. If, on the other hand, the user connects to the Wi-Fi router 
at home, the user specifies the access rule by password to determine who can connect to his or her 
router. 
After understanding the three worlds of action from the decision-maker at each level: constitutional 
choice, collective choice, and operational levels, the following discussion considers the right to use 
frequency. It is related to the right to use the frequency from relevant literature. 
The difference between market-based approach (which assignee has property rights over the spectrum) 
and spectrum commons approach is explained by Benkler (2006). Benkler explains these two schemes 
as “I can buy an easement from my neighbor to reach a nearby river, or I can walk around her property 
using the public road that makes up our transportation commons.” 
According to the observations by Hardin (1968), spectrum commons allows use of the resource until it 
is overused or overpopulated, i.e., the tragedy of the commons. Hardin (1968) also suggested that this 
problem cannot be solved by technical means, except by implementing the concept: “freedom is the 
recognition of necessity.” This means that there should be constraints to control resource use. This 
reflects the basic characteristic of spectrum commons, i.e., unlimited access to resources but with 
constraints. The proposal of eight design principles by E. Ostrom (1990) is another way of solving the 
tragedy of commons. There is an opposing view from Heller (1998), however, of an underused 
resource with multiple owners with exclusive rights, as a new property right defined by the 
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government. Heller (1998) also suggested managing this underused resource by concentrating on the 
content of a property bundle rather than on the clarification of rights. 
If frequency (or spectrum) is regarded as property, there are two main kinds of property: public and 
private. Heller (1999) defined the boundaries of private property that lie between the commons and the 
anti-commons. The public also claimed property when the property could physically be monopolized 
by private persons, and the properties themselves were most valuable when used by indefinite and 
unlimited numbers of persons (Rose, 1986). In terms of property, the spectrum commons have no 
exclusivity, alienation, or management (Wang, 2009). Another idea by Werbach (2004) regards 
“Supercommons.” It has open entry and open boundaries, a white space which encouraged different 
business models to use spectrum with impermissible interference. The concept of Supercommons is 
hard to implement and goes far beyond the spectrum commons.  
Another interesting concept by Faulhaber (2006), and Faulhaber and Farber (2002) proposed a mix of 
market- and commons-based regimes to meet future needs. E. Noam (1995) and (1998) suggests a 
similar mix with full openness to entry for all users and a dynamic access fee payment, which is 
automatic by a clearing house. The access fee depends on the demand and supply conditions at the 
time of access. This idea is opposed by Brennan (1998) and Hazlett (1998) who argue that it would 
take a long time to prove the open-access concept and that the mechanism would duplicate the 
efficiencies of the market and make the spectrum resource under-utilized. 
The practical discussion on how to implement spectrum commons is also interesting. Benkler (1998) 
proposes a model based on non-owned components and an information infrastructure based on 
unlicensed wireless devices, such as commons, and suggests that the computer hardware and software 
market is necessary to operate in an unlicensed environment that will drive the innovation and 
deployment of the infrastructure. Werbach (2003) suggests that regulators should make more 
unlicensed spectrum available through a dedicated open-access band with low-power underlay and 
opportunistic sharing to overcome spectrum scarcity. Lehr and Crowcroft (2005) provide a concept to 
manage spectrum commons by implementing an appropriate protocol that includes liquidity and is 
decentralized/distributed, adaptive, and flexible. Peha (2005) suggests that a licensing scheme works 
better with a QoS requirement and that an unlicensed one works better for a wireless connection 
between a computer and cable modems.  
Bundle of rights to use frequency 
The example of the Maine lobster industry provides an understanding of property rights regimes, 
including access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation rights such as authorized users, 
claimants, proprietors, and owners. 
Considering the right to use frequency, the access and withdrawal right depends on the devices 
(transceiver: transmitter and receiver), which are similar and cover access as in the fishing ground 
example. When users access a resource, they withdraw the product or consume the frequency. 
Frequency is a non-depletable resource however. Thus, the access right is sufficient to explain the 
access to frequency. For example, the user makes a call from his or her mobile phones. The phone 
connects to the base station via a selected frequency. The selected frequency is occupied by users. 
After hanging up, the selected frequency can be used by others. 
The access right at operational level is defined by the network operator that defines the network rule to 
access the frequency in terms of the technical specification or standard. The network operator acts as 
both proprietor and claimant with the management and exclusion right to define how, when, where, 
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and who can access the frequency. For example, when the user makes a call from his or her mobile 
phone, the operator specifies which standard and technology the phone and the SIM card will use. 
An alienation right is defined as ownership that can be sold, leased, or transferred. For example, the 
frequency auction in the primary market and frequency trading in the secondary market provide 
ownership of frequency for the owner to trade. Normally, the alienation right is defined by the 
authority, regulator, or administrator. 
In Table 7, stakeholders are divided into the three levels. Applying the idea from Table 6, the bundle 
of rights of each stakeholder reveals the rights to use frequency shown in Table 12. 
Table 12. Bundles of rights associated with telecommunication stakeholders 
Stakeholders
Rights 
Regulator Operator 
A 
Operator 
B 
Advanced 
user 
General user 
Access and withdrawal x x x x x 
Management x x x   
Exclusion x x x x  
Alienation x x    
Assignment approach  Market-based Command-
and-control 
Spectrum 
commons 
Spectrum 
commons 
At the constitutional level, the regulator, administrator, or authority holds all the rights to frequency 
use, including access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation rights. Once the regulator 
delegates authority, using the market mechanism to assign frequency, the alienation right passes to a 
collective choice or institutional level, i.e., Operator A. Operator A is able to sell, lease, or transfer 
frequency to another party. Operator B, however, cannot sell because the regulator still holds the 
alienation right. Thus, the frequency assignment by the command-and-control approach means that 
Operator B must ask the regulator for approval to transfer the frequency, e.g., 2G frequency 
assignment in Thailand. Operator A represents frequency assignment by the market-based approach 
including primary trading (auction) and secondary trading (resale). Operator A has the freedom to 
transfer frequency without regulatory approval, e.g., 3G auction in the UK and the USA. 
At the collective choice or institutional level, the management and the exclusion right are held by the 
providers, operators, or standard setting units. They set-up their network rules on how, when, and 
where to harvest frequency reflected by technology or device choices. For example, mobile phone 
operators set their standard of network and equipment to allow only their consumers to use the 
network. The advanced user (at the operational level), however, sets his or her own rules that allow 
access to the frequency. For example, advanced users of Wi-Fi routers can set their own security code 
for network access. 
At the operational level, the access and withdrawal right are held by users. Users have to use devices 
according to the standard preset by the operators. 
As for the right to use frequency, the assignees, and command-and-control and market-based 
approaches have the exclusive right to use frequency, but spectrum commons have a non-exclusive 
right. For the exclusive right, assignees have priority to use it free of interference. For the non-
exclusive right, however, users have to share and accept interference. Exclusivity should be added to 
the property rights for the right to use frequency. 
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The level of deregulation of the right to use frequency from the regulator, at the constitutional level, 
can be delegated to operators at the collective choice or institutional level and users at operational 
level. The regulator can use the market-based approach to delegate alienation rights to operators. Thus, 
the operator can obtain the frequency from primary and secondary markets. The operator has the 
flexibility to sell, lease, or transfer frequency. At the operational level, the regulator can delegate its 
authority of self-regulation after defining the necessary conditions, including frequency, power 
limitation, and standard of devices. Thus, users have to manage the use of frequency. Table 13 shows 
the rights to use frequency and the regulated level. 
Table 13. The rights to use frequency  
                          Property right 
Regulated level 
Exclusive use Non-exclusive use 
Centralized by regulator / state agency Command–and-control Public commons 
Middleman/Operator Market-based Private commons 
Self-regulated/User - Unlicensed 
The command-and-control assignment approach means that regulators hold all the rights to use 
frequency while assigning frequency to assignees. The assignee has the exclusive right to use the 
frequency with all the imposed conditions. Assignee has inflexibility to change the use of frequency. 
The market-based approach is the assignment method in which assignees can buy frequency from the 
primary and secondary market. The assignee has the exclusive right to use frequency. The regulator 
gives away the alienation right to the assignee and this right can be sold, leased, and transferred. Thus, 
it is more flexible than the command–and-control approach. Some necessary conditions should be 
imposed on the use of frequency, however, such as the standard of devices. 
The next three categories have non-exclusive rights to use frequency. This means that users have to 
share frequency. At the regulated level, it includes management and exclusion rights. If a state agency 
or government manages the frequency use, it is public commons. If the operator manages the 
frequency use, it is private commons. If users manage the frequency use, it is unlicensed. 
In conclusion, the economic institution or level of action, and the property rights regime from the 
Maine lobster industry provide a starting point for the discussion. The economic institution or level of 
action has three levels: constitutional, institutional or collective choice, and operational levels that 
define and divide the decision-making positions. The property rights regime explains the bundle of 
rights, including access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation rights. The economic 
institution and property rights regime both explain the Maine lobster industry, for which the common 
pool resource is the fishing ground. 
In the Maine lobster industry, the decision-making positions are authorized user, claimant, and 
proprietor and owner. Property rights vary from access and withdrawal, management and exclusion to 
alienation right.  
By analogy, frequency is a scarce resource similar to the fishing ground. The economic institution 
comprises the stakeholder at each level. The authority, administrator, or regulator is at the 
constitutional choice level that provides the law and regulations. The operators, providers, or standard 
setting organizations are at the collective choice level. They provide network rules, namely, how, 
when, and where to use the frequency, and determine who can use the frequency. The user is at the 
operational level, which follows the rules from the collective choice level. 
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The bundled rights to use frequency can also be divided into five rights, as mention in the property 
rights regime in the Maine lobster industry. These are access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and 
alienation rights. The access and withdrawal rights to use frequency can be combined, however, due to 
the technical characteristics of the transmitter, receiver, and transceiver. When the transceiver is 
switched on, the transceiver operates or accesses the specified frequency and uses the frequency for 
the specified service. This means that the transceivers combine access and withdrawal rights to use the 
frequency at the same time. 
At the operational level, general users hold access and withdrawal rights to use frequency by selecting 
devices (transmitter, receiver, or transceiver) that follow specified conditions. Advanced users hold an 
additional exclusion right to determine who can use the frequency by specified username and 
password. 
At the collective choice or institutional level, operators, providers, and standard-setting organizations 
hold additional management and exclusion rights that specify how, when, and where frequency can be 
used in terms of the standard of device, technology, SIM card, etc. 
At the constitutional choice level, the authority, administrator, or regulator has all the rights to the 
frequency use and to specifying regulations. If, however, the regulator decentralizes the alienation 
right by using the market mechanism, the operator at the collective choice level can obtain the 
frequency from primary and secondary markets. 
The exclusive right to use frequency is a key point to separate the three spectrum assignment 
approaches: command-and-control, market-based and spectrum commons. The command-and-control 
and market-based approaches have an exclusive right to use frequency, but spectrum commons has a 
non-exclusive right. The regulated level indicates the decentralization of regulators. Regulators may 
give away some rights to the operator or end-user. Thus, both the exclusive right and the regulated 
level help to explain the differences between these approaches.  
In the exclusive right to use frequency, the regulated level depends on the degree on which the 
alienation right is decentralized. If the regulator holds the alienation right, the approach iscommand-
and-control. If the regulator delegates the alienation right via primary and secondary markets, the 
approach is market-based. 
In the category of non-exclusive right to use frequency, the regulated levels range from regulator, 
operator, and end-users, i.e., public commons and private commons, to unlicensed. Public commons 
have a state agency to manage frequency, such as a municipality or local administrator, etc. Private 
commons have private entities to manage frequency, such as a Wi-Fi operator in a hotel, airport, 
department store, etc. Unlicensed spectrum is self-regulated. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter addresses a suitable framework, derived from the three worlds of action and property 
rights regime, to understand the institution of spectrum commons. The analysis of the decision-maker 
and decision situation at each level helps us to understand the interaction between stakeholders. The 
property rights regime provides the right to use frequency from the study of the Maine lobster 
industry. These findings address a suitable framework for analyzing different types of spectrum 
commons (RQ.1). 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
The discussion of method considers specific methods that concern the type of data and the data 
collection method, research design, method of data analysis, and methodology. This thesis uses mostly 
non-numeric data and archival research design. It also uses deductive and inductive approaches. 
3.1 Type of data and data collection method  
In this thesis, the problem is on the conceptual level of telecommunications policy. Suitable data 
should contain the rationale and clearly describe the interactions between the regulator and other 
stakeholders involved in considering spectrum commons in the Thai context. Non-numeric data may 
be appropriate, because numeric data may not elaborate on the institution of spectrum commons, 
especially, the way it is. Moreover, it is hard to quantify policy matters in terms of numeric data. The 
conceptual part of the thesis relates to policy decisions by exploring the available documents 
containing policy decision-making. 
In order to use documents as data in this thesis, Flick (2009) provides guidelines on how to select 
suitable documents with criteria: authenticity (primary or secondary data), credibility (official or 
personal), representativeness (typical or non-typical), and meaning (clarity of text). 
The authenticity of documents depends on the source of the data. If the data come from a primary data 
source and they are documented by a first witness, then the authenticity is high. If the data come from 
a secondary data source and they are documented from primary data, the authenticity of the document 
is medium or low. The level of credibility of a document depends on the type of document. If the data 
are from an official document, the credibility is high. If the data are from a personal document, the 
credibility is low. The degree of representativeness is measured by the type of document. If the 
document was drawn up for a specific purpose, the representativeness is non-typical. If the document 
was drawn up for a general purpose, the representativeness is typical. The level of meaning of the 
document depends on the clarity of the document. For example, primary data should be clearer than 
secondary data. These concepts are applied to this thesis and through each research questions as shown 
below. 
Research question 1 – What is a suitable framework for analyzing different types of spectrum 
commons? The primary source is obtained from Kiser and Ostrom (1982) and Schlager and Ostrom 
(1992). The three levels of action by Kiser and Ostrom (1982) also contribute to a metatheoretical 
framework that explains the relationship between an institutional arrangement and individuals in terms 
of transformation of rules for individual behavior. The article by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) explains 
the conceptual scheme to distinguish a bundle of property rights from the view of the decision-makers. 
These two main pieces of literature help to explain and describe the institution of spectrum commons. 
They are original works intended to generalize the framework for many fields and typical 
representativeness. 
Research question 2 – What type of spectrum commons has been used in Thailand? The necessary 
document includes the history of the institution and how it developed. The research presented here is 
original and unique and is based on personal archival research. The primary data come from the 
minutes and summary of minutes of the National Frequency Management Board, the archive of the 
International Telecommunication Union in part of Thailand (Siam), the history of the Post and 
Telegraph Department (PTD) at its 100-year anniversary (1983), the regulations including the 
Radiotelegraph Convention, the Radiotelegraph Act, the Radiocommunication Act, Sound and 
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Broadcasting, the Ministerial Regulations, the National Telecommunications Commission 
Regulations, the Constitution of Thailand, the Act of Establishment of the National Broadcasting 
Commission and the National Telecommunications Commission, the Telecommunication Business 
Act, and the PTD’s Regulations. Additional interviews were conducted with people who helped to find 
the right documents and confirm the requested incidents. 
The number of the WLAN devices collected from the PTD is the old archive of type approval of 
radiocommunication devices. There was a manual count, item by item, of all radiocommunication 
devices that were submitted for the type approval process. Each record of a type-approved 
radiocommunication device was from the PTD’s official issue by issue. Each issue can contain one 
item or a thousand items, depending on the applicant’s requirement. The record of type-approved 
radiocommunication devices was made manually and was contained in several big logbooks. First, 
only the 2,400-2,500 MHz band was filtered from the whole logbook, from 1996 to 2004, item by 
item. This involved a large amount of work. The second filtering from all the radiocommunication 
devices operating in the 2,400-2,500 MHz band was done by counting only WLAN devices. It 
includes the access point, portable unit, circuit board, and PCMCIA or USB module that enables the 
creation of an access point. The data exclude the Wi-Fi module in the mobile phone. The result of the 
second filtering was put into an Excel file for the database. 
The number of the WLAN collected from the Customs Department of Thailand has been available 
from 2001 to now. The item code of the WLAN has been requested by formal letter from the Customs 
Department via the Customs Customer Service. After obtaining the item code, the manual count from 
the online database at the Customs Department was done month by month in order to construct the 
Excel file as a database. 
The history of spectrum management in Thailand is an original work that collects the important events 
from the above-mentioned sources. Exploring the laws and regulations, double-checking the minutes 
of board meetings, and interviewing the relevant persons help to confirm the crucial moment of history 
of spectrum management in Thailand. 
Research question 3 – What are the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons in general? 
The primary and secondary data come from literature, including Cave (2007), Chaduc and Pogorel 
(2008), Mark and Williams (2007), Tonge and Vries (2007), and from the public consultations of the 
Radio Spectrum Policy Group on “Aspect of a European Approach to Collective Use of Spectrum” 
posted on June 10, 2008 and closed on September 29, 2008. There are nine respondents, including the 
ARD-ZDF, Deutsche Telecom/T-Mobile, the EICTA, GSMA Europe, Metil Telecom consultants, 
Microsoft, Telefónica, PWMS Manufacturer Group, and Delft University of Technology. The result of 
this public consultation was posted on November 19, 2008.  
Data from the public consultation contain the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons in 
European countries. Finding important dimensions for the public in Europe may also be relevant to 
other countries. The literature also helps to categorize the most important issues associated with the 
consideration of spectrum commons and the consequences of applying it. 
Research question 4 – How can the benefits and costs of spectrum commons be measured? The data 
come from the work by Campbell and Brown (2003) and provide a benefit and cost analysis with and 
without a project for the decision-maker. If the decision-maker undertakes the project, how much of 
the scarce resource will be allocated to this project and what the value of the project will be. If the 
decision-maker does not undertake the project, the same amount of the scare resource can be allocated 
to alternative uses. 
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Data also come from the study of Indepen (2006). This work provides details on the use of a benefit 
and cost analysis for spectrum assignment and, within this, exploits the consequences of applying 
spectrum commons. Indepen (2006) is measuring the valuation of unlicensed applications in the UK 
from 2006 to 2026. 
The view of using the engineering value from Sweet et al. (2002) also provides the valuation of 
spectrum as a cost saving in the infrastructure of the network operator. 
These three pieces of literature indicate practical ways of measuring the benefits, costs, and 
consequences of spectrum commons. Practical possibilities of introducing spectrum commons in 
Thailand will be discussed and a similar approach considered and applied to Thailand. 
Research question 5 – What are the implications of implementing spectrum commons in Thailand? 
The information comes from the results of the four previous research questions. Combining these 
provides suggestions and implications for implementing spectrum commons in Thailand and describes 
the consequences and expected outcomes of certain implementation strategies. 
To conclude this section, the primary data from the International Telecommunication Union, the Post 
and Telegraph Department, and the National Telecommunications Commission provide a high degree 
of authenticity. Moreover, most of the information comes from official documents from the 
International Telecommunication Union, the Post and Telegraph Department, and the National 
Telecommunications Commission. It has a high level of credibility. The representativeness of the 
documents depends on the purpose of creating them. The purpose may have been general (typical) or 
specific (non-typical). In this thesis, the documents are specific. The representativeness of this thesis is 
also mainly non-typical. Furthermore, the meaning of the document is measured by the clarity of the 
document. It is reflected in the level of understanding of the document that communicated the message 
from authors. 
3.2 Research design  
The main research strategy is archival analysis, including history, content analysis, and literature 
critique (Lee, 1999; Miles & Huberman, 1994). In order to fulfill the research questions, data will be 
gathered from the archive of the Thai regulator, including the regulations and the minutes of meetings, 
and relevant literature, including journals and books.  
The first research question provides a suitable framework for analyzing different types of spectrum 
commons. Analyzing the conceptual analysis of the three levels of action model by Kiser and Ostrom 
(1982), and the property rights regime and natural resources by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) provides 
a metatheoretical framework. This framework addresses the relationship between the institutional 
arrangement, the individual, and the bundle of property rights regime. The benefit of discriminating 
between the three levels of actions includes important data on the relationship between the 
constitutional choice, collective choice, and operational levels. This describes the relationship between 
the decision-maker and the decision situation for each of the levels. This interaction helps to describe 
the institution that needs to be considered in this thesis. The bundle of property rights regime 
addresses the rights that are relevant to the resources and stakeholders. This helps to describe the right 
to use frequency.  
The second research question uses the framework from the first research question to understand the 
institution of spectrum commons in Thailand. The thesis uses the deductive approach of two theories: 
the property rights regime and three levels of action and applies them to the rights to use frequency of 
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spectrum commons in Thailand. The possible forms of spectrum commons in Thailand are induced 
from the rights to use frequency of spectrum commons, indicating three forms of spectrum commons, 
including public commons, private commons, and unlicensed. 
The third research question uses relevant literature (Cave (2007), Chaduc and Pogorel (2008), Mark 
and Williams (2007), and Tonge and Vries (2007)) and the Radio Spectrum Policy Group’s (RSPG) 
public consultation on aspects of the European Approach to “Collective Use of Spectrum,” 2008, as 
sources of data to analyze many aspects of the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons, 
including the relevant stakeholders’ viewpoint and summing up the framework to analyze a suitable 
time to implement spectrum commons. The method of data analysis is document analysis, especially 
content and hermeneutics analysis. The methodology has been adopted by Bryman and Bell (2007) 
and has been used successfully to analyze information generated from the social factor, as stakeholders 
in public consultations on spectrum commons. 
The fourth research question deals with conceptual benefit and cost analysis (Campbell & Brown, 
2003; Indepen, 2006; Sweet, et al., 2002). This shows how the overall concept of valuating spectrum 
commons is applicable. Using the existing framework, the thesis uses the deductive approach of 
benefit and cost analysis. In the case of Thailand, however the adjusted framework can be treated as 
constructive. 
The fifth research question uses the output from the previous research questions to indicate the impact 
of spectrum commons applied to the case of Thailand. 
3.3 Approach 
The three levels of action by Kiser and Ostrom (1982), and the property rights regime and natural 
resources by Schalger and Ostrom (1992) use the existing theory in the first research question. 
Moreover, the concept can be applied to analyze the institution of spectrum commons in Thailand with 
a deductive approach. Furthermore, the empirical results from the history of spectrum commons are 
used to induce the type of spectrum commons in Thailand. 
The advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons have been drawn from the public 
consultation of the Radio Spectrum Policy Group on spectrum commons in European countries in 
2008. The research into each contribution by nine respondents from academia, manufacturers, end-
users, operators, and consultants has been investigated in order to categorize the common view or idea 
of spectrum commons in consultation. Moreover, the Radio Spectrum Policy Group has also 
summarized the main ideas and responded to the public consultation in a final report. The final report 
and relevant literature have been explored to create a point of discussion on the view of advantages 
and disadvantages of spectrum commons and further issues to be considered when implementing 
spectrum commons. The output of a discussion on advantages and disadvantages induced from public 
consultation and relevant literature is categorized by stakeholders. 
Furthermore, the concept of the benefit and cost analysis from Campbell and Brown (2003), Indepen 
(2006), and Sweet et al. (2002) is used for the valuation of spectrum commons in Thailand by a 
deductive approach from this literature and a constructive approach to Thailand. 
The methodology of the thesis is therefore both deductive and inductive. It is deductive because the 
right to use frequency and the valuation of spectrum commons are deduced from existing theory, 
including three layers of action, the property rights regime and natural resources, and a benefit and 
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cost analysis. It is inductive because the type of spectrum commons, and the advantages and 
disadvantages are induced from the history of spectrum commons in Thailand and a public 
consultation in Europe. The possible forms of spectrum commons in Thailand are induced from the 
rights to use frequency. 
3.4 Summary 
The type of data used in this thesis consists of documents (non-numeric) collected from the 
International Telecommunication Union, the National Telecommunications Commission, and the Post 
and Telegraph Department, as well as academic literature, which has a high degree of authenticity and 
credibility. The thesis uses documents as data for the data collection method. 
This thesis uses archival analysis for data analysis, including history, content analysis, and literature 
critique. Non-numeric data and archival analysis are both used in the qualitative method. 
The methodology of this thesis is both deductive and inductive, as it uses existing theories: layers of 
action, property rights regime and natural resources, and a benefit and cost analysis to deduce the 
results. The type of spectrum commons, and the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons 
are induced the from author’s perspective.  
Finally, the thesis uses mixed methods, with quantitative methods as the primary method and archival 
research design as the qualitative method, which uses deductive methodology, archival analysis, and 
non-numeric data as document. 
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Chapter 4 The history of spectrum assignment in Thailand19 
This chapter elaborates on the second research question: What type of spectrum commons has been 
used in Thailand? From the understanding of the framework for the right to use frequency and the 
interaction by the stakeholder in frequency management activities in Chapter 2, the concepts provide a 
framework to explore the history of spectrum management in Thailand. This chapter provides a 
chronological account of how spectrum assignment, especially spectrum commons, developed in 
Thailand with regard to the regulated level of the decision-maker for spectrum assignment.  
4.1 The context of examining the history of spectrum management in Thailand 
By understanding the history of spectrum assignment in Thailand, the development of right to use 
frequency originates from the regulator for command-and-control approach with full rights to use 
frequency as exclusive right to use frequency. On the other hand, the spectrum commons is also 
developed with two stages: authorization and unlicensed. 
In Thailand, telecommunications developed from wireline to wireless communication: from telegraph, 
telephone over a telegraph infrastructure, and radiotelegraph for ship-to-shore communication, to 
radiocommunication for both broadcasting and telecommunication. At the initial stage (without 
regulations), the use of radiocommunication devices was limited to government agencies, especially 
the Navy and the Army. Frequency assignment was initially made by His Majesty the King of 
Thailand. After December 10, 1932, this authority was transferred to the Prime Minister. The King 
delegated his authority to the responsible ministry. The ministry used the command-and-control 
approach on a first come, first served basis to authorize the use of radiocommunication devices 
according to the international treaty (The International Telegraph Convention (1906) and (1912)). 
Most of the users were government agencies. There was otherwise little usage and low demand, so 
there was no congestion of the use of radiocommunication. 
After the Radio Act was enacted, all radiocommunication activities were prohibited, except with 
authorization granted by the authority in terms of radiocommunication licences. The authority was the 
PTD and it still used the command-and-control approach on a first come, first served basis to authorize 
the use of radiocommunication devices. However, the PTD functioned only for radiocommunication 
licences in technical respects, and did not take into consideration the growing demand for the use of 
radiocommunication devices until congestion led to harmful interference.  
The government realized that “good” spectrum management of frequencies would provide efficient 
national allocation. Thus, on March 26, 1974, the National Frequency Management Board (NFMB) 
was established to determine the national technical standard, and control, assign, and register 
frequency, examine the standard of radiocommunication devices, create an efficient procedure, 
evaluate radiocommunication stations, and coordinate all radiocommunication users. The NFMB 
comprised several representatives from government agencies and it was chaired by the Minister of 
Transport. The NFMB acted as the approval board before the PTD issued radiocommunication 
licences. The NFMB operated until 2002, while the PTD was transferred to the Ministry of 
Information and Communication Technology. 
On October 1, 2004, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) was established, and the 
PTD was dissolved by law to become the Office of the NTC on January 1, 2005. A new era of 
                                                            
19 This chapter is a revision of Ard-paru (2010). 
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telecommunication with an independent regulator, the NTC, was founded in order to change the 
authorization process into a licensing process. Not only the technical aspects, but also social and 
economic aspects were included in the licensing process. 
The development of spectrum assignment started from command-and-control, though the spectrum 
commons (unlicensed devices) initiated by the NFMB delegated some authorities to the PTD and 
issued the Ministerial Regulation for Exemption of Radiocommunication Licences. The use of a 
market-based approach for frequency assignment was mentioned at the NFMB. Unfortunately, it was 
not a success. 
4.2 No Radio Act20 
At the initial stage, before the establishment of the Radio Act, decision-making for frequency 
assignment belonged to His Majesty the King of Thailand, according to the monarchy system before 
December 10, 1932. His Majesty the King transferred the authority to a government agency to provide 
radiocommunication services. Without domestic regulations, His Majesty the King used the 
international treaty, the International Telegraph Convention, as an institutional arrangement. The use 
of frequency during this period was infrequent. The radiocommunication service was primarily a 
wireline replacement, i.e., a radiotelegraph service. The radiotelegraph was used within the 
government agency and extended to the general public at a later stage. 
The first attempt to build a telegraph infrastructure was made during the reign of King Rama X in 
1869 by English telegraph technicians. It failed to meet the deadline however. In 1875, the Thai 
government’s Ministry of Defence built the first telegraph infrastructure from Bangkok to Samuth 
Pragran, with a range of 45 kilometers. Moreover, the first telephone using the telegraph infrastructure 
was established between Bangkok and Samuth Pragran to report on boat traffic at the seafront. At the 
early stage, communication was limited to within government agencies. The general public had 
telegraph service provided on July 16, 1883. The building of a telegraph infrastructure with zinc-
coated iron wires was extended through the main provinces in Thailand and connected to those of 
neighboring countries. 
On August 4, 1883, the Post Department and the Telegraph Department were established. On April 21, 
1883, however, Siam (now Thailand) filed an application for membership of the International 
Telegraph Union (which changed its name to International Telecommunication Union, ITU, in 1932), 
and this obliged Thailand to adopt its conventions and constitution. 
In 1886, the Ministry of Defence transferred the telephone and its related tasks to the Telegraph 
Department to provide telephone service for the general public. 
On July 19, 1898, the Post Department and the Telegraph Department merged to form the Post and 
Telegraph Department (PTD) under the Ministry of Interior and provided mainly postal and telegraph 
services.  
In April 1903, the first attempt to use radiotelegraph communication took place between Koh Sri 
Chang, Chol Buri and Phu Khao Thong, Wat Sa Ket, and Bangkok and it was granted by the Ministry 
of Interior. It failed however. 
                                                            
20 This section is mainly based on the Post and Telegraph Department (1983), the registration letter of May 29 (1883), and the International 
Telegraph Convention (1906) and (1912). 
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In 1906, Thailand participated in the First Radiotelegraph Conference and signed the radiotelegraph 
convention in Berlin, Germany. In 1907, the first successful radiotelegraph communication in 
Thailand was conducted by the Army and the Navy. 
In 1912, Thailand participated in the Second Radiotelegraph Conference, London, which revised the 
First Radiotelegraph Convention to strengthen measures relating to the improvement of safety at sea 
by means of radiotelegraphy, after the tragedy of the Titanic. Thailand also adopted the word “radio” 
for use in Thailand and translated it into the Thai language in 1914. 
To summarize this period, radiotelegraphy as radiocommunication was only used in government 
agencies and was strongly restricted. The use of the radiotelegraph was adopted at the International 
Radiotelegraph Conventions in both Berlin and London in 1906 and 1912, respectively, however. 
Frequency assignment was made by the authority, using the international treaty as guidance on a first-
come first, served basis. The use of radiotelegraphy was limited for the general public, because of the 
lack of equipment and supporting regulations.  
A summary of significant events is shown in following table. 
Table 14. Period before the Radio Act 
Time Event 
1875 The first telegraph infrastructure from Bangkok to Samuth Pragran was built. 
1883 The first telegraph service for the public was launched. 
1883 Siam became an ITU member. 
The Post Department and the Telegraph Department were founded. 
1898 The Post and Telegraph Department was founded. 
1906 Thailand signed the first radiotelegraph convention in Berlin, Germany. 
1907 The first radiotelegraph communication in Thailand was established. 
1912 Thailand signed the Second Radiotelegraph Convention in London, UK. 
1914 Thailand adopted “radio” for use in the Thai language. 
4.3 The Radio Act –command-and-control21 
At this stage, His Majesty the King delegated his authority to the government agency, as stated in the 
Radio Act. The decision-maker for frequency assignment changed from time to time depending on the 
amendments to the Radio Act. The Radio Act empowered the PTD as the decision-maker. The PTD 
also endorsed the international treaties, such as the International Radiotelegraph Convention, as 
domestic regulations. The use of radiocommunication was prohibited, unless the users obtained 
approval from the authority. The use of radiocommunication services was highly regulated by the 
authority in terms of the conditions of use and inflexibility in terms of change. Only government 
agencies were allowed to access frequency. The government agency still provided 
radiocommunication service directly to the general public. The government agency had the role of 
administrator and operator at the same time. 
The Radio Act in Thailand was enacted on April 28, 1914, in the Radiotelegraph Act. The Act 
empowered the PTD, under the Ministry of Transport, to control the use of telephony over 
radiotelegraphy on ships on the Thai seas, ashore, and inland in Thailand. The use of radiotelegraphy 
endorsed the International Radiotelegraph Convention, London, 1912, as a necessary regulation. All 
                                                            
21 This section is mainly based on the Post and Telegraph Department (1983), the Radiotelegraph Act (1914, 1919, 1921 and 1930), the 
Radiocommunication Act (1935, 1938, 1940, 1942, 1948 and 1954), the Radiocommunication Act (1955, 1961, and 1992), and the Sound 
and Broadcasting Act (1955, 1978 and 1987). 
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radio stations had to be approved by the Minister of Transport prior to installation, except for use by 
the Army and the Navy. The use of radiotelegraphy on commercial ships was only for distress and 
safety. The second amendment of the Radiotelegraph Act was in 1921 in order to allow ships on Thai 
seas, including the Koh Si Chang area, to use radiotelegraph communication temporarily with 
approval of the Minister of Transport. On September 14, 1930, the third amendment of the 
Radiotelegraph Act was enacted in order to decentralize power from the government to the Minister of 
Commerce and Transport to allow the general public to have radiotelegraph receivers, including 
trading, possessing, using, and installing licenses. 
During World War I (WWI), all uses of radiotelegraph communication within Thai territory were 
prohibited, while Thailand declared a neutral position on August 17, 1914 until May 22, 1919, when 
cancellation of the prohibition on the use of radiotelegraph communication was enacted because 
Thailand joined the Allies in WWI. Radiotelegraphy on board Allied and neutral ships could be 
operated over Thai territory.  
In 1927, the Navy transferred two radiotelegraph stations, Sa La Daeng and Songkhla, to the PTD. 
Fifty radiotelegraph stations were also built in provinces and districts throughout Thailand. 
In the same year, the Minister of the Ministry of Commerce and Transport conducted a pilot 
broadcasting station and arranged a national radiocommunication meeting in Thailand in order to 
allocate frequency between the PTD, under the Ministry of Commerce and Transport; the Ministry of 
Navy; the Ministry of Army; and the Department of Aircraft. 
On January 15, 1928, international radiotelegraphy was conducted by the PTD with a 20,000-watt 
vacuum tube transmitter and high frequency (HF) between Bangkok and Berlin. 
On February 15, 1930, a permanent broadcasting-sound station was established at Phayathai Palace 
(Radio Bangkok at Phayathai) with 2,500 watts of transmitting power, 350-meter wavelength or 
826.44 kHz, 41-meter wavelength or short wave radio, and a 40-meter antenna tower. The call signs22 
of this station were HSP1 and HSP2. 
In 1930, the PTD established two aeronautical radio stations at Phisanulok and Don Muang to 
facilitate aeronautical activity, including weather news broadcasting, and direction and location 
finding. In 1934, the PTD established three additional aeronautical radio stations at Nakhon 
Ratchasima, Udon Thani, and Surat Thani. In 1938, the PTD established the last aeronautical radio 
station at Koh Samui. In 1940, the PTD established the radio beacon station north of Don Muang for 
navigation systems and transferred all aeronautical activities to the Department of Civil Aviation and 
Aerothai Company Limited in 1948. 
On February 1, 1935, a new Radiocommunication Act was enacted to replace the Radiotelegraph Act 
in order to update the regulation and cope with the change of technology in radiocommunication. The 
Act empowered the PTD, the Ministry of Commerce, to control the use of broadcasting receivers, 
including trading, importing, possessing, using, making licences, and the use of radio stations on board 
ships and aircraft. The majority of this Act related to broadcasting service. There were five 
amendments to this Act in 1938, 1940, 1942, 1948, and 1954. In 1938, additional power was given to 
the Prime Minister, apart from the Minister of the Ministry of Commerce. In 1940, the definition of 
repair was included in the licence. In 1942, there was an extension to the date line from March 31 to                                                             
22 The call sign is the identifier of the radiocommunication station that supplies a territory or geographic area. All stations open to 
international public correspondence, all amateur stations, and other stations that are capable of causing harmful interference beyond the 
boundaries of the territory or the geographical area in which they are located shall have call signs from the international series allocated to its 
administration, as given in the Table of Allocation of International Call Sign Series in Appendix 42 (Nos.19.28A and 29 -RR2008). 
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December 31, and a change in responsibility for the Minister of Transport. In 1948, additional power 
was given to the Minister of Transport to issue special licenses for safety for civil aviation. In 1954, a 
legal person was added by the Cabinet approval, for exemption from the Radiocommunication Act in 
order to promote broadcasting service in Thailand. 
On April 1, 1939, the PTD transferred the broadcasting activities to the Public Relations Department. 
In 1945, during World War II, the power plant in Bangkok was bombed, so the Minister of Transport 
requested that the PTD prepare a spare broadcasting transmitter for temporary use and experimental 
purposes. It was named HS1PN. On June 5, 1946, the HS1PN extended its frequencies to 4755, 7022, 
920, and 5955 kHz. 
On February 8, 1955, two important acts were enacted: first, the new Radiocommunication Act and, 
second, the Sound and Television Broadcasting Act. 
The Radiocommunication Act of 1955 revoked all previous acts regarding radiocommunication and 
prohibited the use of radiocommunication equipment, the operation of radios, and the reception of 
international news for commercial purposes except with authorization granted by officials. According 
to this Act, the licences were for making, importing, possessing, using, exporting, and installing. 
Moreover, the radio operator and international news reception for commercial purpose licence was 
also included. This Act empowered the Minister of Transport to authorize the aeronautical radio 
stations and empowered the PTD to control and assign frequency to stations. The Act limited the use 
of frequency to the PTD, the Public Relations Department23, the Ministry of Defence, and other 
specified government agencies in the Ministerial Regulations. There were two amendments to the Act, 
in 1961 and 1992. In the 1961 amendment, permission was granted to all government agencies to use 
radiocommunication equipment. In the 1992 amendment, further additions were made: a new trading 
licence, the empowerment of the PTD to authorize the installation of radio stations, and the 
empowerment of the Minister of Transport to exempt radiocommunication licences for some services 
and charge the licensee a frequency usage fee. 
The Sound and Television Broadcasting Act 1955 allowed the general public to use broadcasting 
receivers with a one-time registration for the lifetime of the receiver, and separated the Broadcasting 
Act from the Radiocommunication Act. This Act prohibited transmission of sound and television 
broadcasting services, as well as making, possessing, importing, exporting, and trading receivers of 
sound and television broadcasting, and using radiocommunication equipment, except with 
authorization granted by officials or specified in the Ministerial Regulations. The licences according to 
this act were for transmitting sound or a television broadcasting service, making, possessing, 
importing, exporting, and trading. This act empowered the Prime Minister and appointed the Public 
Relations Department to administer the act. The act was not enforced, however, for the Public 
Relations Department, the PTD, the Ministry of Defence, and other specified government agencies in 
the Ministerial Regulations. Thus, the Act controlled only the use of sound and television broadcasting 
receivers. Transmitters of sound and television broadcasting fell under the Radiocommunication Act 
and its amendments. There were three amendments, in 1959, 1978 and 1987. In the 1959 amendment, 
permission was given for the general public to possess, import, export, and trade sound and 
broadcasting receivers without related licences. In the 1978 amendment, there was a revision of 
licence fees according to the current economic situation. In the 1987 amendment, there was an 
addition of media in sound and television broadcasting services including cable TV. 
                                                            
23 The Public Relations Department is the government broadcasting agency with both regulator and operator roles. 
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On June 24, 1955, a television broadcasting station was established at Pang Khun Prom Palace with 
the National Television System Committee (NTSC) system of Radio Corporation of America (RCA) 
from the USA. It used Channel 4 for this station. On June 14, 1959, the second television broadcasting 
station was established and used Channel 7 with NTSC system. 
To summarize this period, both the Radiocommunication and Broadcasting Acts were developed. With 
regard to the Radiocommunication Act, there were three acts, including the Radiotelegraph Act 1914, 
the Radiocommunication Act 1935, and the Radiocommunication Act 1955. The purpose of the Radio 
Act is to cover the areas that wireline communication cannot reach in the initial stage. The need for 
distress and safety communication at sea and in the air also makes the implementation of 
radiocommunication mandatory. The first radiocommunication was ship-to-shore, which developed 
into aeronautical radio stations for aircraft and grew into the mass communication of the sound and 
television broadcasting service. With regard to the Sound and Television Broadcasting Act, only the 
use of broadcasting receivers and content management was controlled, leaving the installation of 
transmitting stations to the Radiocommunication Act. The majority of radiocommunication usage only 
occurred in the government agencies. The priority was national security, distress and safety at sea and 
in the air, followed by broadcasting.  
A summary of significant events is shown in following table. 
Table 15. Period of Radio Act 
Time Event 
1914 First radio act – the Radiotelegraph Act 
1928 First international radiotelegraph – Bangkok and Berlin 
1930 First permanent sound broadcasting station – Phayathai Palace 
Two aeronautical radio stations – Phisanulok and Don Muang 
1935 The Radiocommunication Act enacted 
1955 The Radiocommunication Act and the Sound and Television Broadcasting Act were 
enacted. 
The first television broadcasting station – Channel 4 Pang Khun Prom Palace 
4.4 The National Frequency Management Board –command-and-control24 
After the government delegated decision-making for frequency assignment to the PTD via the Radio 
Act, the government decided to change its positions on the telecommunication industry. The 
government decided to separate the role from a solely integrated government agency, including the 
decision-maker for frequency assignment, and provide service to the general public, to have separate 
functions: a decision-maker for frequency assignment and providers. The decision-maker was the 
PTD, which had its responsibilities reduced to frequency management only. Government-established 
state enterprises were to provide service to the general public, such as Telephone Organization of 
Thailand (TOT) and the Communication Authority of Thailand (CAT). 
All of the frequency assignees were government agencies and state enterprises however. The Radio 
Act only empowered the PTD as decision-maker for frequency assignment. There was much political 
intervention by government agencies. Using cabinet approval, the government therefore set up the 
NFMB to decide on frequency assignment over the PTD. The authority centralized the regulated level 
however.  
                                                            
24 This section is mainly based on the Post and Telegraph Department (1983), minutes of the meeting of the National Frequency Management 
Board (1974 - 2000), and a summary of minutes of the meeting of the National Frequency Management Board (2001). 
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The Radiocommunication Act and the Sound and Television Broadcasting Act were enacted on 
February 8, 1955. These acts empowered the PTD and the Public Relations Department to control the 
use of frequency of radiocommunication stations and issue sound and television broadcasting licences, 
respectively. No technical characteristic were imposed on the use of such radiocommunication stations 
however. Moreover, these two acts did not encroach on government agencies, which had control over 
radiocommunication stations. Thus, the Thai government received experts from the United States 
Operations Mission (USOM) to investigate and report with recommendations to the Thai government. 
In the USOM report of 1966, there was a crucial recommendation to set up a radio regulatory office at 
the same level as the department25 in order to determine the technical specifications of 
radiocommunication devices, assign frequency, register the use of frequency to the ITU, enforce the 
regulations, solve interference problems, monitor the use of frequency, and research and develop 
radiocommunication services. This office could be under any government agency. 
On October 24, 1967, the Cabinet agreed not to implement the radio regulatory office and to set up the 
Frequency Management Board instead. Most of the work of this board concentrated on broadcasting, 
especially drafting its governmental broadcasting regulations. 
On February 8, 1972, the government agreed to set up the National Frequency Management Board 
(1972), after a suggestion by the Ministry of Defence, in order to strengthen the PTD in terms of staff 
and instruments. The National Frequency Management Board (1972) supported the creation of the 
radio regulatory office inside the PTD. The radio regulatory office was succeeded in 1973 and called 
the Frequency Management Bureau. The Frequency Management Bureau has the same rank as the 
division within the PTD. After that, the National Frequency Management Board (1972) was dissolved. 
Until March 26, 1974, the Thai cabinet approved and ordered the Ministry of Transport to establish the 
NFMB by the Ministry Order of 78/1974 on April 19, 1974, to examine and coordinate 
radiocommunication activities before licenses were granted by the PTD. 
In the beginning, the NFMB comprised representatives from the Security Council, the Military 
Communication Department, the PTD, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
the Office of the National Economics and the Social Development Board, and the Budget Bureau, and 
was chaired by the Minister of Transport. In 1991, two specialists were added to the NFMB. 
The NFMB had responsibility for determining the national technical standard, and control, assign, and 
register frequency, examine the standard of radiocommunication devices, create efficient procedures, 
evaluate the radiocommunication stations, and coordinate all radiocommunication users. 
The NFMB convened meetings from 1974 to 1979 and from 1982 to 200226. The NFMB met on a 
monthly basis. The total number of meetings was 164. The total number of issues considered was 
2,003. The number and issues of the meetings are shown in Table 16. The NFMB worked as the 
approval board for all the radiocommunication activities in Thailand and had the PTD to work as the 
secretary of the NFMB to implement board decisions. 
 
 
                                                            
25 In Thailand, the bureaucracy of government comprises the ministries. Each ministry has several departments under supervision. Each 
department has several divisions under supervision. Each division has several sections under supervision. 
26 From 1980 to 1982, the Director General of the PTD dissolved the NFMB using direct power from the Radio Act of 1955, but strong 
political intervention re-established the NFMB. 
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Table 16. National Frequency Management Board meetings  
Year 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Times 9 5 5 11 13 8 7 5 11 10 10 11 9 6 
Issues 26 76 63 106 190 143 68 64 112 100 112 164 152 119 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total 
Times 5 6 5 5 5 3 2 4 2 2 2 2 1 164 
Issues 132 90 53 48 41 30 14 36 23 16 10 11 4 2045 
The NFMB gave guidelines or procedures for frequency management of several services, including 
broadcasting service, fixed service or microwave link, land mobile service, satellite service, and low-
power devices. The highlights were the guidelines of amateur radio service, the sound and television 
broadcasting plan, the citizen band for the general public, the fixed microwave link plan, the trunk 
radio plan, the National Table Frequency Allocation 1999, etc. 
The NFMB drafted the National Frequency Management Regulation, which came into force on 
January 9, 1975. This regulation was under the Office of the Prime Minister and signed by the Prime 
Minister, but the Minister of Transport was the person in charge. 
The National Frequency Management Regulation of 1975 empowered the NFMB to authorize all 
radiocommunication stations before they could obtain radiocommunication licences from the PTD. 
There were five sections in this regulation. Section 1 – Radiocommunication Station: all 
radiocommunication stations belonged to the government agency or to private sectors that had 
contracts with government agencies. Section 2 – Transmitting Power: no transmitters should operate 
over the given limit. Section 3 – Antennas and propagation: all antennas should use the given 
specification. Section 4 – Frequency assignment: only assigned frequencies should be operated and 
followed under the Radio Regulations and ITU Recommendations. Section 5 – Others: all transferred 
radiocommunication stations should be approved by the NFMB prior to transfer. 
From 1974 to 1979, the NFMB had several important issues ranging from drafting the relevant 
regulation to assigning frequency to specific users. The majority of licensees are government agencies 
(national security and civil service) such as the military, the police, and the Royal Bureau, the Ministry 
of Public Health, the Department of Provincial Administration, the Royal Forest Department, and the 
Princess Mother’s Medical Volunteer Foundation. The private companies that had contracts with a 
government agency, such as mining, road construction, sugar factories, were the second group of 
licensees. The objective of frequency assignment during this period ranged from national security and 
national interest to specific uses by private companies. The majority of uses or services of frequency 
assignment was fixed service and land mobile service. Fixed service included fixed link point-to-point 
and point-to-multipoint. Land mobile service included walkie-talkie and trunk radio. The NFMB used 
the first come, first served basis for frequency assignment. 
From 1982 to 2002, the second period after the re-establishment of the NFMB, due to the strong 
political intervention, the NFMB still used the first come, first served basis. The most important 
frequency assignment by the NFMB was the frequency assignment to TOT and CAT for cellular 
service, especially the concession under both TOT and CAT. 
In the sixth meeting of the NFMB in 1989, the NFMB assigned the frequency of the 900 MHz band 
for cellular service to TOT. TOT has Advanced Info Service PLC (AIS) as a concessionaire. The AIS 
uses GSM 900 for its service. 
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In the first and third meetings of the NFMB in 1990, the NFMB assigned the frequency of 1800 MHz 
for cellular service to CAT. CAT has Total Access Communication PLC (DTAC) as a concessionaire. 
The DTAC uses GSM1800 for its service. 
On November 4, 1997, the NFMB issued guidelines on frequency assignment to provide clear criteria 
and transparent processes. There were four sections in this regulation. Section 1 gave the 
characteristics of the frequency assignees, which were the government agencies, state enterprises, or 
private sectors that had contracts with government agencies. Section 2 covered the assignment criteria 
including 1) the purpose of frequency usage, 2) efficient use of frequency, 3) block allocation for 
flexibility of users, 4) National Frequency Allocation Table, Radio Regulations, and ITU-R 
Recommendation, 5) primary and secondary service, 6) neighboring country, 7) the duration of 
frequency assignment was five years, and 8) auction possibility. Section 3 dealt with the right of 
frequency assignees that cannot be transferred to others, partially or wholly, before NFMB approval. 
Section 4 was ex-post regulation after frequency assignment, including 1) utilization report after one 
year, 2) recall of unused frequency after two years, 3) enforcement for the missed use of frequency 
assignment, 4) compensation to the existing assignees if there has been harmful interference, 5) partial 
recall if frequency utilization was inefficient, and 6) the right to change the frequency assignment, if 
necessary. 
On February 20, 1998, at the first meeting of the NFMB, the NFMB approved a frequency transfer 
within the CAT concession (now CAT Telecom PLC). CAT proposed the transfer of 1710-
1722.6/1805-1817.6 MHz to Wireless Communication Service Company Limited (now True Move) 
and 1747.9-1760.5/1842.9-1855.5 MHz to Digital Phone Company Limited (now belongs to the AIS), 
additionally from the DTAC, which was the existing concessionaire on 1800 MHz of CAT. The 
NFMB approved CAT’s proposal to limit the duration of frequency transfer to that of CAT-DTAC’s 
contract. The whole process was conducted from January 31, 1997 to February 20, 1998. 
The frequency transfer reflected the property right of frequency, which gives ownership or individual 
right to use. The whole frequency transfer process was with the NFMB via the command-and-control 
approach however. 
The main purpose of establishing the NFMB was to reduce political intervention by government 
agencies, because the Radio Act 1955 did not enforce it27. Thus, there was much political intervention 
in the PTD. The emergence of the NFMB acted as a buffer for the PTD. From 1980 to 1982, the 
Director General of the PTD dissolved the NFMB using the direct power of the Radio Act of 1955, but 
strong political intervention re-established it. 
On October 11, 1997, the Constitution 1997 of Thailand was enacted. Article 40 gave guidelines to an 
independent agency to regulate frequency as a national resource. This constitution did not affect the 
working of the NFMB until the Act on Establishment of the National Broadcasting Commission 
(NBC) and the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) were enacted on March 7, 2000. 
There was a provision in Article 80 that prohibited additional frequency assignment and business 
licenses, so the NFMB could not assign new frequency. The NTC was ultimately formed on October 
1, 2004. During almost four years, from March 7, 2000 to October 1, 2004, there were no new 
frequency assignments or business licences for telecommunication or broadcasting service. 
Furthermore, the NBC could not be established because of the extremely strong political intervention. 
                                                            
27The Post and Telegraph Department, the Public Relations Department, the Ministry of Defence, and other government agencies in 
Ministerial Regulations shall not be enforced under the Radio Act 1955. This means that these government agencies do not require a 
radiocommunication licence.  Prior authorization from the NFMB shall be sought however. 
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On October 1, 2002, the PTD was transferred to the Ministry of Information and Communications 
Technology and the PTD proposed the continuation of the NFMB, but the Ministry of Information and 
Communications Technology dissolved it. 
On November 16, 2002, the Telecommunications Business Act was enacted and it removed all 
monopoly rights from the government agencies or state enterprises, including TOT and CAT, which 
monopolized domestic and international telecommunication services, respectively, by revoking the 
Telegraph and Telephone Act of 1934 and 1974.The opposite situation arose, however, because there 
was no regulator NTC to exercise the power of this act. The existing operator under the state-owned 
enterprises became stronger because it faced no new entrants or regulator. 
During the period of the NFMB, all radiocommunication services were monopolized by government 
agencies or the private sector that had contracts with government agencies. In the beginning, the 
general public was only allowed to use low-power devices, which will be discussed in Section 4.6, 
first with relevant licences and then unlicensed. The frequency assignment used the command-and-
control approach on a first come, first served basis. At this stage, the technical aspects in terms of 
harmful interference were the main concern of the assignment process. 
To summarize this section, the NFMB was set up to separate the roles of the PTD. Before the NFMB, 
the PTD had sole authority as administrator, regulator, and operator of frequency assignment in 
Thailand. After the NFMB, the PTD only had an administrator and operator role. The NFMB had the 
regulator role instead. 
The NFMB used command-and-control on a first come, first served basis for frequency assignment. 
Until the end of 1997, the NFMB set the broad scope of a market-based approach for auction, if 
necessary, and allowed the transfer of the right to use frequency to other parties after NFMB approval. 
The frequency transfer showed that the NFMB frequency assignment guidelines of 1997 gave property 
rights to frequency. Unfortunately, there were no auctions during the NFMB period.  
A summary of significant events is shown in following table. 
Table 17. Period of National Frequency Management Board  
Time Event 
1955 The Radiocommunication Act and the Sound and Television Broadcasting Act enacted 
1972 The first National Frequency Management Board is dissolved 
1974 The National Frequency Management Board (NFMB) founded by ministry order 
1975 The National Frequency Management Regulation came into force 
1997 The first guidelines for frequency assignment came into force 
The Constitution of Thailand enacted 
2000 The Act on Establishment of the NBC and NTC – Article 80 enacted 
2002 The PTD transferred to the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology 
The Telecommunications Business Act enacted 
The NFMB dissolved 
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4.5 The National Telecommunications Commission28 
After the separation of the decision-maker for frequency assignment from the providers during the 
NFMB period, the decision-maker was still under the direct control of the government. The 
Constitution of 1997 initiated an independent regulatory agency to regulate the use of frequency as 
national interest. The constitution changed the decision-maker to an independent agency. 
Consequently, the relevant acts and regulations changed the old scheme of authorization or permission 
to have a licensing scheme that allowed all qualified parties to obtain frequency. The authority still 
held highly regulated power imposed on radiocommunication use however. The telecommunication 
industry comprised an independent agency, a provider (state enterprise and private entity), and users. 
The NTC was established on October 1, 2004, after a long delay of almost four years from the Act on 
Establishment of the NBC and NTC was enacted in 2000, and three years after the Telecommunication 
Business Act was enacted in 2001. The PTD was dissolved by law and transferred to the Office of the 
NTC on January 1, 2005. 
The Act on Establishment of the NBC and NTC 2000 separated the role of authority for frequency 
assignment. The NTC comprised seven commissioners acting in the regulator role. The office of the 
NTC acts as the secretary office of the NTC. The MICT acts as administrator on behalf of the Thai 
government in international activities. 
For almost six years, the NTC issued regulations to change the scheme of authorization of frequency, 
which was monopolized by government agencies, state enterprises, or private sectors that had 
contracts with government agencies, into a licensing scheme for all parties, including both government 
and non-government organizations in order to optimize the benefits of frequency, which is a national 
resource, at all levels (local, regional, and national). 
The NTC issued almost 112 regulations, which were published in the Royal Gazette29 from October 1, 
2004 to March 30, 2010, to ensure the transition from the monopoly to a liberalized market. There are 
two NTC sets of regulations concerning the frequency assignment published in the Royal Gazette, but 
one regulation on frequency assignment was never published. 
The NTC regulations that were not published concerned the interim provision on frequency 
assignment on January 7, 2005 and were not published in the Royal Gazette. There were three phases: 
short, medium, and long term. The short term ran from January 7 to March 31, 2005, and did not allow 
new assignment except for national security and disaster relief. The medium term ran from April 1 to 
July 31, 2005, and allowed new assignment, if necessary, apart from national security, disaster relief, 
and international treaty or state contract. The long term was after July 31, 2005, and was subjected to 
the NTC regulation of the frequency assignment criterion. 
The NTC regulation of the frequency assignment criterion that was published in the Royal Gazette on 
September 28, 2005, consisted of ten sections. Section 1 revokes the NFMB guidelines for frequency 
assignment from 1997. Section 2 is the definition of non-commercial and commercial use. Section 3 
states the purposes of frequency assignment. Section 4 concerns necessary frequency assignment, 
including government agencies, one-year renewal of commercial and non-commercial use, the urgency 
                                                            
28 This section is mainly based on the Act of Establishment of the National Broadcasting Commission and the National Telecommunications 
Commission (2000), the National Telecommunications Commission Regulation of interim provision of frequency assignment (2005d), the 
National Telecommunications Commission Regulation of frequency assignment criterion (2005b), the National Telecommunications 
Commission Regulation of frequency assignment for experiment with temporary use (2005c), and the National Telecommunications 
Commission Regulation of frequency transfer (2007a). 
29 The regulations published in the Royal Gazette came into force. No one has the right to claim that he/she/it does not know the regulations. 
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of non-commercial use, and harmful interference to existing services. Section 5 gives the frequency 
assignment criteria including characteristics of frequency assignees, technical characteristics, social 
impact, financial aspects, and compatibilities with the Telecommunications Master Plan and 
Frequency Master Plan. Section 6 is the process of application. Section 7 states the frequency usage 
fees according to the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology Regulation on March 
10, 2003. Section 8 gives the right for the NTC to exempt this regulation. Section 9 is the enforcement 
date. Section 10 deals with the cancellation of all regulations that conflict with this regulation. 
The second NTC regulation of frequency assignment that was published in the Royal Gazette on 
November 17, 2005, concerned experimenting with temporary use and was intended to facilitate the 
development of new technology. Currently, there are 18 licensees to test the WiMax technology. Each 
licensee had to pay a frequency usage fee and had 90 days for experimenting. 
The NTC regulations on September 28 and November 17, 2005, do not mention the right of frequency 
assignees, which had been mentioned in the NFMB guidelines for frequency assignment in 1997. 
Article 53 of the Act of Establishment of the NBC and the NTC in 2000, however, clearly states that 
the frequency licence is an individual right that cannot be transferred prior to NTC approval. On July 
31, 2007, the NTC issued the regulation according to Article 53 as the guidance and process for 
frequency transfer. 
The frequency transfer was addressed in 2007, however, by the NTC regulation on frequency transfer 
in 2007 and provided the process and details of frequency transfer, including the rights of transferor 
and transferee, and the frequency transfer fee. Moreover, this regulation provided the concepts of 
frequency sharing, frequency substitution, and refarming. After the licensees obtained the frequency 
assignments from the NTC, they had to proceed as stated in the NTC regulation of frequency transfer 
if they wanted to transfer the frequency to other parties. 
The highlight of the frequency transfer was the transfer of 1900 MHz between the TOT Public Limited 
Company and CAT Telecom Public Limited Company. Both companies are state-owned and 
incumbents in the telecommunications market. The process began on October 22, 2008, and finished 
at the NTC meeting on March 13, 2009. The frequency transfer fee – five percent of the frequency 
value – was 262 million baht (around 8 million USD). 
This frequency transfer showed the property right of frequency, especially the exclusive right to use 
the frequency – an individual right. The mechanism is by the command-and-control approach, which 
followed the NTC regulation of frequency transfer in 2007. 
Four new NTC30 commissioners were appointed on February 18, 2010. The NTC has introduced a 
market-based approach – an auction for 3G frequency in the 2 GHz band. The process of the 3G 
auction was ended by the Supreme Administrative Court Order on September 23, 2010. 
To summarize this section, the NTC issues regulations to change the authorization scheme to a 
licensing scheme in order to shift from a command-and-control economy to a market economy. 
Frequency transfer that represents the property right of frequency can also be carried out by the NTC, 
by both a command-and-control and a market-based approach. 
A summary of significant events is shown in following table. 
 
                                                            
30 The NTC comprises seven commissioners – one chairman and six commissioners. The term of the NTC is six years. In the first three years, 
three commissioners had to withdraw. In this case, one commissioner resigned before withdrawing. There are therefore four new 
commissioners of the NTC. 
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Table 18. Period of the National Telecommunications Commission  
Time Event 
1997 The Constitution of Thailand enacted – Article 40 gave birth to the independent regulator 
2000 The Act on Establishment of the NBC and NTC – Article 80 
2002 The Telecommunications Business Act enacted 
2004 The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) founded 
2005 NTC frequency assignment criterion came into force 
2007 NTC frequency transfer came into force 
2009 1900 MHz frequency transfer – TOT and CAT telecom 
2010 Four new NTC commissioners appointed 
3G auction ended by the Supreme Administrative Court Order on September 23, 2010 
4.6 Self-regulated – spectrum commons31 
The exclusive right to use frequency was awarded to the frequency assignees to ensure there was no 
harmful interference in the use of radiocommunication services. The new technology developments 
made the use of exclusivity of frequency unnecessary however. The non-exclusive use of frequency 
was initiated in the low-power devices, especially in the ISM band. The users shared the frequency 
with others and accepted the interference from the other users or devices. The constraints of such uses 
included the specified frequency and power limitations. 
The NFMB fist attempted to delegate the authority to the PTD to assign the use of frequency under 
one watt. The regulated level was transferred from the NFMB to the PTD. The decision-maker for 
frequency assignment under the power of one watt was therefore the PTD.  
Using low-power devices in Thailand 
The PTD authorized the use of low-power devices, depending on the technical characteristics, as a first 
priority to avoid harmful interference. The users had to obtain authorization from the PTD. The use of 
low-power devices still require the relevant radiocommunication licences however. The PTD realized 
the benefit of the general public and the initiation of the exemption of relevant radiocommunication 
licences pushed forward as the Ministerial Regulations. The exemption of licenses facilitated the use 
of low-power devices such as spectrum commons.  
The stakeholders for low-power devices were the authority, users, and manufacturer or importers. The 
NTC also allowed the Internet service provider to use the spectrum commons. The stakeholders were 
extended to the service provider as well. 
In Thailand, there are two separate steps for unlicensed devices. First, the devices must receive 
authorization under the Radio Act, according to the Table Frequency Allocation and related 
regulations in terms of technical specification or standard of devices. Second, when the use of these 
devices increases over time, the authority may consider exempting the related licences imposed on the 
                                                            
31 This section is mainly based on minutes of meeting of the National Frequency Management Board (1974 - 2000) and a summary of 
minutes of the meeting of the National Frequency Management Board (2001), the Ministerial Regulation of the Ministry of Transport No.24 
(1993), the Ministerial Regulation of the Ministry of Transport No.28 (1998), the Ministerial Regulation of the Ministry of Transport No.30 
(2001), the Ministerial Regulation of the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology of the exemption of radiocommunication 
licences (2004), the National Telecommunications Commission Regulation of nature and categories of telecommunication business (2005e), 
the National Telecommunications Commission Regulation of criteria and procedure for Internet service licence application (2005a), the 
National Telecommunications Commission Regulation of exemption of radiocommunication licences (2007c), the National 
Telecommunications Commission Regulation of standard of the telecommunication devices for radio local area network (RLAN) (2007b), 
the National Telecommunications Commission Regulation of the standard of the telecommunication devices (2008a), and the National 
Telecommunications Commission Regulation of the standard of the telecommunication devices – procedure and standard (2008b). 
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use of these devices to reduce the burden for the general public by issuing a regulation to exempt the 
related licenses in terms of the ministerial or NTC regulations. The authorization of the use of 
radiocommunication devices by command-and-control for frequency assignment and technical 
standard approval of devices was centralized by the authority.  
Use of low-power devices before 1974 
During the time of no regulation – without the Radio Act – there was no use of radiocommunication 
devices for the general public except by government agencies. With the Radio Act enacted, all 
radiocommunication usages were prohibited except the authorization granted by PTD since 1914. On 
March 26, 1974, the cabinet approved for the Ministry of Transport to set up the NFMB with the 
Ministry Order of 78/1974 on April 19, 1974, to double-check the work of the PTD. Thus, all the 
radiocommunication activities of the PTD had to ask the NFMB for approval. This was the centralized 
management style of the NFMB at the initial stage.  
Use of low-power devices in 1975-1986 
In 1975, the NFMB delegated some authority to the PTD at the first meeting in 1975 on January 8, 
1975. The NFMB authorized the PTD to allow the private sector to install transmitters for paging 
service in the 26.92-27.23 MHz band in limited areas. The power of the transmitters must not exceed 
one watt. That was the starting point of decentralization in spectrum management and the initiation of 
allowing the general public to use low-power devices. 
On January 22, 1975, in the second meeting in 1975, the NFMB authorized one company to make an 
anti-theft device with the frequency of 27.060 MHz and authorized the PTD to allow the use of the 
anti-theft device in cars and motorcycles for the general public. 
In the first meeting in 1978 on January 25, 1978, the NFMB authorized the PTD to allow the private 
sector to use UHF transceivers in the 461.150-461.250 MHz band with power up to one watt. The 
UHF transceiver was the walkie-talkie application service. 
On June 25, 1982, in the second meeting in 1982, the NFMB re-authorized the PTD to allow the use of 
radiocommunication devices with power up to one watt for all applications and anti-theft devices in 
cars and motorcycles for any frequency. 
In the third meeting in 1982 on July 8, 1982, the NFMB authorized the PTD to allow the use of the 
citizen band (26.96-27.23 MHz) transceivers, cordless telephones, wireless microphones, wireless 
remote controls, such as small plane remote controls, anti-theft devices, garage door openers, and 
radiocommunication devices in the industrial science service that were not used for communication 
purposes such as microwave ovens. 
The minutes of the NFMB for the fourth meeting in 1982 on August 18, 1982, authorized the PTD to 
allow installation of base stations for wireless telephone for one-to-one (one transmitter and one 
receiver) only. The wireless telephone used frequencies of 1.7/49, 27/49 MHz with power up to 500 
milliwatts for short-range communication (around 500 meters). Moreover, the wireless telephone used 
frequencies of 27/49 MHz with power up to five watts for long-range communication (around 10 
kilometers). 
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Additional low-power devices introduced in 1986 
On April 17, 1986, in the fifth meeting in 1986, the NFMB authorized the PTD to allow use of radio 
warning devices with power up to one watt and a 16 kHz bandwidth. 
After the NFMB delegated authorization of all radiocommunication devices with power up to one 
watt, the PTD allowed the use of transceivers in medical instruments with power up to 10 milliwatts, 
and electronic and telecommunication measurement equipment. 
Previous events concerned the authorization of the use of radiocommunication devices. Their use 
required related licences however. The story of the exemption of licenses was different because the 
power to waive licences belonged to the Ministry of Transport, which had to issue the Ministerial 
Regulations according to the Radio Act of 1955 and its amendment.  
Increased number of low-power devices after 1986 
The PTD realized that the use of low-power devices had increased over time and wanted to facilitate 
the use of low-power devices for the general public. The PTD proposed the exemption of 
radiocommunication licences to the Ministry of Transport to issue the Ministerial Regulations. There 
were lengthy procedures from drafting to announcement however. First, the PTD drafted the 
Ministerial Regulations. Second, the draft of the Ministerial Regulations was sent to the Council of 
State in order to check the format and content and send it back to the PTD for revision. Third, the draft 
of the Ministerial Regulations included revision by the Council of State to be sent to the Ministry of 
Transport for consideration and signing. Fourth, the final version of the Ministerial Regulations was 
sent to the Royal Gazette for formal publication. The process took almost two years. 
Ministerial Regulations for radiocommunication licence exemptions 1993-2004 
Ministerial Regulation No. 24 
Ministerial Regulation No. 24 – the first Ministerial Regulation for radiocommunication licence 
exemption – was published on March 12, 1993. It comprised five sections. Section 1 was an 
exemption on making, possessing, using, importing, exporting, and trading radiocommunication 
licences. Section 2 was an exemption on possessing, using, and exporting radiocommunication 
licences. Section 3 was an exemption on importing radiocommunication licences. Section 4 was an 
exemption of parts of radiocommunication devices when assembled with devices that already had a 
licence. Section 5 was an exemption on installing radiocommunication licences.  
The unlicensed devices were in Section 1, which exempted all radiocommunication licences. There 
were: 1) wireless microphones with power up to 10 milliwatts in the 33-50, 88-108, 165-210, and 470-
490 MHz bands and with power up to 30 milliwatts in the 902-960 MHz band; 2) wireless telephones 
with power up to 10 milliwatts in the 1.6-1.8, 30-50, and 54-74 MHz bands; 3) radio-control models 
with power up to 100 milliwatts in the 26.964-27.405 MHz band; 4) long-range radio control with 
power up to 100 milliwatts in the 26.964-27.405 MHz band and with power up to 10 milliwatts in the 
300-500 MHz band; 5) transceivers of the citizen band with power up to 100 milliwatts in the 26.964-
27.405 MHz band, and warning devices with power up to 10 milliwatts in the 300-500 MHz band; 6) 
transceivers in medical instruments with power up to 10 milliwatts in the 300-500 MHz band; and 7) 
electronic and telecommunication measurement equipment. 
Section 1 of Ministerial Regulation No. 24 exempted all radiocommunication with specified 
applications, power limitation, and operating frequency that were not flexible for the new applications. 
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On October 15, 1996, the PTD allowed the general public to use radiocommunication devices in the 
2400-2500 MHz band with Effected Radiated Power (E.R.P.) up to 100 milliwatts for indoor use only. 
These devices had to hold either the possessing, using or installing radiocommunication licences. The 
devices had to be type-approved by the PTD. 
Ministerial Regulation No. 28  
On December 21, 1998, Ministerial Regulation No. 28 was published, as well as two additional items 
in Ministerial Regulation No. 24, one in Section 2 and one in Section 5. These allowed the use of 
cordless telephones for personal use with power up to 10 milliwatts in the 1900-1906 MHz band and 
they could be used with DECT and PHS technology with slight modification of frequency 
arrangements. 
Ministerial Regulation No. 30  
On January 17, 2001, Ministerial Regulation No. 30 was published and Section 3 of the Ministerial 
Regulation No. 24 revised to allow cellular phone and radio paging that already had type approval 
from the PTD and international roaming agreements for device circulation. 
After October 1, 2003, the PTD was transferred to the Ministry of Information Communications and 
Technology. On November 28, 2003, the PTD amended the regulation that allowed the general public 
to use radiocommunication devices in the 2400-2500 MHz band by deleting “of indoor use only.” The 
limitation of power, the related radiocommunication licences, and the type approval remained imposed 
however. 
Change in Ministerial Regulation [2004] 
There was a change in the format of the Ministerial Regulations that called on the substance of the 
regulation. The Ministerial Regulations Nos. 24, 28, and 30 have been revised and called the 
Ministerial Regulations of the Exemption of Radiocommunication Licences, and were published on 
March 25, 2004. 
The Ministerial Regulation of the Exemption of Radiocommunication Licences in 2004 consisted of 
ten sections. Section 1 revoked Ministerial Regulations Nos. 24, 25, 28, 29, and 30. Section 2 
exempted the making, possession, use, importing, exporting, and trading of radiocommunication 
licences. Section 3 exempted the possession, use, and exporting of radiocommunication licences. 
Section 4 exempted the possession, importing, exporting, and trading of radiocommunication licences 
for cellular telephone, radio paging, and radiocommunication devices in Global Mobile Personal 
Communication by Satellite (GMPCS), which had been type-approved by the PTD. Section 5 
exempted importing and exporting of radiocommunication licences for cellular telephone, radio 
paging, and radiocommunication devices in GMPCS that had international roaming agreements. 
Section 6 exempted the possession and use of radiocommunication licences for transceivers of the 
citizen bands 78 and 245 MHz. These already had licences and they were transferred. Thus, the 
transferees did not require the possession and use of radiocommunication licences. This did not 
include the transfer of ownership of the radiocommunication device, however, which required a 
relevant licence. Section 7 exempted the possession and use of radiocommunication licences for 
transceivers of amateur radio that already had licences and been transferred. Thus, the transferees did 
not require the possession and use of radiocommunication licences. The operation of amateur radio 
required the amateur radio certificate separately, however, and it did not include transfer of ownership 
of the radiocommunication device, which had to be done legally with the relevant licence. Section 8 
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exempted the parts of the radiocommunication devices when assembled with other such devices. 
Section 9 and Section 10 exempted the installation of radiocommunication licences. 
In the Ministerial Regulation of the Exemption of Radiocommunication Licences in 2004, Section 2 
and Section 10 related to unlicensed devices. When comparing Ministerial Regulation No. 24 and the 
Ministerial Regulation of the Exemption of Radiocommunication Licences in 2004, there were several 
differences. First, the Ministerial Regulation of 2004 added an exemption on installing 
radiocommunication licences from Ministerial Regulation No. 24 (the exemption of making, 
possessing, using, importing, exporting, and trading radiocommunication licences). Second, the 
Ministerial Regulation of 2004 added five items in Section 2. These were 8) the receiver in radio 
navigation service, radio navigation satellite service, radio location service and radio location satellite 
service, 9) the radar application in the 5.725-5.875, 10.0 10.6, 24.05-24.25, and 76-81 GHz bands with 
Equivalent Isotropically Radiated Power (E.I.R.P.) up to 10 milliwatts, 10) devices in the band lower 
than 135 kHz with E.I.R.P. up to 150 milliwatts, 11) devices in the 13.533-13.567 MHz band with 
E.I.R.P. up to 5 milliwatts, and 12) devices in the 2400-2500 MHz band with E.I.R.P. up to 100 
milliwatts. 
In the Ministerial Regulation of 2004, there was flexibility or neutrality of technology for 
radiocommunication devices in Section 2, Items 10, 11, and 12, which allowed all applications using 
the specified frequency band and the power limitation, including Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID), Tag, e-SEAL, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi devices. 
Establishing the National Telecommunications Commission and its regulations [2004-2007] 
On October 1, 2004, the NTC was established and the PTD was dissolved by law to be transformed 
into the Office of the NTC from January 1, 2005. 
The NTC regulation has the same rank as the Ministerial Regulations32. The procedure to publish the 
regulation is much shorter than the previous procedure. The Office of the NTC drafts the new NTC 
regulation and prepares an agenda for NTC meetings in order to obtain approval from the NTC. After 
the NTC approval, the Chairman of the NTC signs and sends it to the Royal Gazette for publication. 
The whole new procedure takes around six months. 
On June 22, 2005, the NTC Regulations of Nature and Categories of Telecommunication Business 
(2005) and Criteria and Procedure for Internet Service Licence Applications (2005) were published to 
determine the nature and categories of telecommunication business, and provide clear and 
unambiguous criteria and conditions for Internet service licence application, respectively. Wi-Fi 
service (public hotspots) falls into the “Type 1” Internet licence. 
Adapting the Ministerial Regulation for exemptions by the NTC [2007] 
On August 29, 2007, the NTC Regulation of the Exemption of Radiocommunication Licences was 
published, adapting the Ministerial Regulation for the Exemption of Radiocommunication Licences in 
2004 and indicating which radiocommunication licences were and were not exempted. 
The NTC Regulation on the Exemption of Radiocommunication Licences in 2007 comprises eleven 
sections. Section 1 revokes all prior regulations against this regulation. Section 2 is similar to Section 
2 and Section 10 of the Ministerial Regulation for the Exemption of Radiocommunication Licences in 
                                                            
32 The hierarchy of Thai law is Constitution, Act, Ministerial Regulations, Ministerial Announcements, Department Regulations, and 
Department Announcements. The NTC regulations have the same rank as Ministerial Regulations. 
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2004. The differences are: 1) the deletion of the wireless microphone in the 902-960 MHz band, which 
is the same band as cellular phone (GSM 900 MHz); 2) the deletion of wireless telephone in the 54-74 
MHz band, because the technology is obsolete; 3) open applications in the 26.965-27.405 MHz band 
with power up to 100 milliwatts; 4) open applications in the 30-50 MHz band with power up to 10 
milliwatts; 5) open applications in the 300-500 MHz band with power up to 10 milliwatts; 6) receivers 
in the meteorological aid service, meteorological satellite service, Earth exploration-satellite service, 
standard frequency and time signal service, standard frequency and time signal satellite service, space 
research service, radio astronomy service, and safety service. Section 3 has the exemption of 
possessing, using and exporting radiocommunication licences but still holds the making, importing, 
and trading radiocommunication licences. Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the NTC Regulation on the 
Exemption of Radiocommunication Licences 2007 are the same as Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the 
Ministerial Regulation for the Exemption of Radiocommunication Licences in 2004. Section 10 is the 
exemption of importing and exporting of radiocommunication licences for radiocommunication 
devices for experiment and research and is also used by the United Nations specialists, the Red Cross, 
and foreign embassies. The use of these radiocommunication devices exempted the possession, use, 
and installation of radiocommunication licences for temporary use up to a period of three months. 
Section 11 is the enforcement date after publication in the Royal Gazette.  
On January 26 and August 3, 2007, the NTC regulation of standard telecommunication devices for 
radio local area network (RLAN) allowed the use of RLAN in the 5150-5350 MHz band with E.I.R.P. 
up to 200 milliwatts for indoor use only, and in the 5470-5725 and 5725-5850 MHz bands with 
E.I.R.P. up to one watt. 
On January 18, 2008, all short-range devices (according to the NTC regulation) were certified by 
suppliers according to the NTC Regulation of Standard of Telecommunication Devices (both 
procedure and standard). The suppliers must certify that the equipment has technical specifications 
according to the NTC Regulation, as a Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity.  
Remarks on collected data on WLAN in Thailand 
Before this time, there were three regulations regarding the type approval test by the Post Telegraph 
Department. On July 21, 1992, the PTD imposed the regulation of a type approval test for amateur 
radio equipment, because there was much illegal equipment in use in amateur radio service that could 
be tuned to other frequency bands. On December 7, 1995, the PTD revised the regulation of 1992, and 
on April 7, 1998, it extended the type approval test to other services, including land mobile, maritime 
mobile, and aeronautical mobile service. On June 7, 2001, the PTD revised the regulation of 1995 to 
accept test reports from accredited test laboratories other than the PTD. 
In 1996, the PTD allowed the use of WLAN in Thailand with the relevant radiocommunication 
licences including the type approved for radiocommunication devices. The number of WLANs on type 
approval, possessing and importing licences are available in the archive of the PTD and the NTC FMS 
database. They are not publicly available on the website however. The manual access to the PTD has 
been conducted to gather the information from 1996 up to 2004. After the Ministerial Regulation of 
the Exemption of Radiocommunication Licences – the Ministry of Information and Communication 
Technology came into force; the information regarding the unlicensed devices at the PTD was not 
collected. 
Fortunately, the Customs Department has an online database on the importation of 
radiocommunication devices, including WLAN routers. The information is available from 2001. 
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Figures 6 and 7 show the number of WLAN routers that were type-approved by the PTD from 1996 to 
2004 and the imported number of WLAN routers by the Customs Department from 2001 to 2010. 
The number of WLAN routers in Figure 6 depicts the gradual growth of the use of WLANs in 
Thailand from 1996 to 2000. At that time, WLANs were used little and in a limited area. The 
increased growth in WLANs occurred from 2000 to 2004, in parallel with the big demand from 
warehouse management in big supply distribution.  
The number of WLANs collected from the PTD was a subset of the number of WLANs collected from 
the Customs Department. The PTD’s number had been collected since 1996 and ceased in 2004, 
however, after unlicensed regulations came into force (Figure 6). The Customs Department’s number 
is available from 2001 to now (Figure 7). Figures 6 and 7 show the number of WLANs at two 
important points. The first point is after 1996 (the first time that WLAN was allowed to be used in 
Thailand). The second point is after 2004 (after the unlicensed regulations came into force). In order to 
compare the two stages of implementing unlicensed regulation – before and after – the growth of 
WLAN routers can be observed from Figures 6 and 7. 
The number of WLAN routers in Figure 7 addresses the continued growth since 2001. The big growth 
started after the Ministerial Regulation of the Exemption of Radiocommunication Licences in 2004. 
This growth was in parallel with the event of WLAN being put into in the chipset of the smart phone 
and laptop. Mass production may also reach economy of scale, rendering the low price of the Wi-Fi 
chipset.  
Figures 6 and 7 display differences in the number of WLAN routers before and after the 
implementation of unlicensed regulations in Thailand. This unlicensed regulation is one of many 
factors that encouraged wide use of WLAN routers in Thailand. 
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Figure 6. Number of WLAN routers 1996-200433 
                                                            
33 Source: Post and Telegraph Department, Thailand 
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Figure 7. Number of WLAN routers 2001-201034                                                             
34 Source: Customs Department, Thailand 
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Summary 
To summarize this period, after the NFMB delegated power to the PTD, development of short-range 
devices was gradually introduced. It proceeded from specific applications. Power limitation and 
specified frequency were still enforced, however, to avoid harmful interference in this limited area. 
The use of short-range devices was non-exclusive, i.e., no one had an exclusive right to use this 
frequency. The management of the use of short-range devices, or managerial right also started from 
self-regulation: users have to manage, with middleman management, service providers, or private 
commons, with the provider managing the use of commons, such as the Wi-Fi hotspot or public 
commons managed by the state agency. 
A summary of significant events is shown in the following table. 
Table 19. Period of self-regulated spectrum commons  
Time Event 
1955 The Radiocommunication Act enacted 
1974 The National Frequency Management Board (NFMB) founded by ministry order 
1975 The NFMB authorized the PTD to allow 1-watt transmitters (paging + anti-theft) 
1978 The NFMB authorized the PTD to allow walkie-talkies 
1982 The NFMB authorized the PTD to allow 1-watt transmitters for all applications, including the 
Citizen Band (26.96-27.23 MHz) transceivers, cordless telephones, wireless microphones, 
wireless remote controls, such as small plane remote controls, anti-theft devices, garage doors 
1986 The NFMB authorized the PTD to allow radio warning devices 
1993 Ministerial Regulation No. 24 came into force – Ministry of Transport 
1996 The PTD allowed WLAN on 2400-2500 MHz, indoor only 
1998 Ministerial Regulation No. 28 came into force – Ministry of Transport 
2001 Ministerial Regulation No. 30 came into force – Ministry of Transport 
2003 The PTD allowed WLAN on 2400-2500 MHz, indoor and outdoor 
2004 Ministerial Regulation of the Exemption of Radiocommunication Licences – Ministry of 
Information and Communications Technology 
2005 Wi-Fi service provider – hotspot 
2007 The NTC Regulation of the Exemption of Radiocommunication Licences 
RLAN 5150-5350/5470-5725/5725-5850 MHz allowed 
2008 Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity (SoD) for unlicensed devices 
4.7 Discussion 
In Thailand, the development of spectrum assignment has several roles. There are four important roles 
related to spectrum assignment: administrator, regulator, secretary office35, and operator. Figure 8 
shows the different actors in each period and the role of the actors. 
 
Figure 8. Role of actors in spectrum assignment in Thailand 
                                                            
35 The Secretary Office is the secretary unit of the regulator. The secretary office works as the administrative unit of regulators. 
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Figure 8 shows the actors, including the administrator, regulator, secretary, and operator. The 
administrator represents the Thai government as the Thai delegate to international activities, such as 
international conferences, conventions, treaties, negotiations, and cooperation. The regulator acts as 
the national authority to assign frequency and issue the relevant regulations. The secretary works as 
the regulator’s office and does all the administrative works for the regulator. The operator provides the 
services to the end-users after obtaining the frequency from the regulator. 
Before 1975, the Radio Act had been enacted since 1914 and it gave sole authority to the PTD to 
assign frequency to users. At same time, the PTD acted as the administrator, regulator, and operator. 
The NFMB was founded in 1975 by cabinet approval. The NFMB’s role is as regulator to separate the 
authority from the PTD. The NFMB worked as regulator to assign frequency to users until 2002 and it 
was dissolved by the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology. The PTD was 
transferred under the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology in 2002. 
After the Act on Establishment of the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) and the National 
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) was enacted in 2000, the NTC was founded in 2004. During 
2002-2004, there was no regulator to assign new frequency to users, according to the provision of the 
Act on Establishment of the NBC and NTC 2000. There was uncertainty in the Thai 
telecommunication industry. 
The NTC was founded in 2004. The NBC was never founded however. So far, the NTC has only acted 
as regulator to assign frequency in telecom matters. The NTC does not have full authority to form the 
Joint committee between the NTC and the NBC to approve the National Table Allocation or National 
Master Plan. The reason of the Supreme Administrative Court on September 23, 2010, was not to 
provide the NTC with any right to pursue the 3G auction until the establishment of the National 
Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission. 
Table 20 presents Thailand’s frequency assignment profile and the development of frequency 
assignment. 
Table 20. Thailand’s frequency assignment profile  
Country 
Issue 
Thailand 
Type of economy Command–and-control economy (beginning) and becoming a 
market economy 
Frequency transfer 
(alienation right) 
The NFMB in 1998 
The NTC in 2009 
Auction The NFMB initiated in 1997 
The NTC attempted in 2010 
Spectrum commons Authorization since 1974  
and unlicensed since 2004 
In order to elaborate on Table 20, Table 7 in Chapter 2 provides the stakeholders at each level of 
actions. At the constitutional choice level, there is an administrator and a regulator. At the collective 
choice level, there are operators. At the operational level, there are users. 
At constitutional level, the decision-makers range from His Majesty the King or an authority 
appointed by the King during the monarchy period to the authority appointed by the Radio Act and the 
government. At constitutional level, the decision-maker produces rules and regulations to govern the 
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use of frequency. The decision-maker changes from time to time, starting from His Majesty the King, 
the authority appointed by the King, the authority appointed by the Radio Act, and the authority 
appointed by the Cabinet to the independent regulatory agency. 
At the collective choice or institutional level, the operator or provider appears in terms of state 
enterprises as 100% owned by the Ministry of Finance. State enterprises, at the collective choice level, 
follow the rules and regulation from the constitutional level and create their own rules as network rules 
for users at operational level to follow. In Thailand, the state enterprises can have a private company 
as a partner to provide service to users.  
During the authorization period, before the NTC, only state enterprises and their private companies 
can obtain frequency to provide telecommunication service to the general public, until the NTC 
changes to a licensing scheme to allow all qualified entities to obtain the frequency. At the collective 
choice level, there were therefore only state enterprises at the initial stage and many more private 
companies after the NTC period. 
At the operational level, users always follow rules from both the operators at the collective choice 
level and the regulator at the constitutional choice level. 
In Thailand, the rights to frequency use – access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation – 
vary by the regulated level and position in the telecommunication industry. 
Before the Radio Act, all rights to frequency use belonged to the authority – His Majesty the King. 
There was a high degree of regulation because only the government agency could access frequency 
that was strictly controlled by His Majesty the King or an authority appointed by the King. The use of 
frequency had followed international treaties such as the International Radiotelegraph Convention. 
Through the Radio Act, all rights to frequency use belonged to the stated authority: the PTD. 
Regulation was high because the PTD imposed conditions on the use of radiocommunication devices 
in terms of the installation of a radiocommunication station to provide the exclusive right to use 
frequency without interference. Conditions on use, including frequency, duration, area, and technical 
characteristic are rights to access, withdrawal, management, and exclusion. The alienation right 
belongs to the authority however. 
After the NFMB was set up with Cabinet approval, the decision-maker of the frequency assignment 
changed from the PTD to the NFMB. Moreover, the NFMB exercised the alienation right (frequency-
transfer of DTAC in 1998) and initiated auction of frequency in 1997. There was no case for holding 
auctions at that time however. The regulation was therefore slightly reduced because of the auction 
initiative to use the market mechanism to assign frequency. 
In 2004, the NTC changed the authorization scheme to a licensing scheme and opened the 
telecommunication industry to qualified entities. The decision-maker for frequency assignment 
changed to the NTC. Regulation remains at a high level, however, according to the conditions imposed 
on the use of radiocommunication devices. In 2009, the NTC approved the frequency-transfer between 
TOT and CAT, in the case of the 1900 MHz band. This event reflects that the NTC holds the 
alienation right of frequency. The licensees have access, withdrawal, management, and exclusion 
rights. Now, the NTC aims to hold a 3G auction by 2010 but be ceased by the Supreme Administrative 
Court Order. Therefore, the degree of regulation may change due to the use of a market mechanism – 
an auction to assign frequency. The alienation right will be passed on to the winner during the auction. 
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While regulations from the regulator give exclusive rights to use frequency without harmful 
interference, a degree of self-regulated or spectrum commons allows for a non-exclusive right to use 
frequency. No one owns frequency. Everyone has to share frequency. In order to avoid harmful 
interference, the regulator assigns specific frequency, power limitation, and application as constraints. 
In Thailand, the spectrum commons as an unlicensed device was stated in 2004. The Thai experience 
shows that two steps are required for the spectrum commons approach, however: authorization of the 
use of spectrum commons and the exemption of radiocommunication licences allowing open access.  
Moreover, the regulated level of network for spectrum commons is provided by the Internet service 
provider type 1 according to the NTC Regulation of Criteria and Procedure for Internet Service 
Licence Application (2005). The providers have the ability to manage Wi-Fi hotspots for their service. 
Furthermore, spectrum commons can be divided into three groups, depending on the level of 
management rights: public commons, private commons, and unlicensed. If there is someone – a 
service provider or state agency – to manage access to the frequency, it is private commons or public 
commons, respectively. An example of private or public commons is access to the Internet via a Wi-Fi 
hotspot provided by the Wi-Fi operator or state agency to manage the frequency to access the Internet. 
An example of unlicensed use is access to the Internet via a wireless router or Wi-Fi at home or in the 
office. Importantly, users do not pay for frequency access via a wireless router or Wi-Fi, but have to 
connect to the Internet by other means.  
4.8 Summary 
To summarize this chapter, the discussion on Thailand’s history confirms the rights to use frequency 
in Table 13 in Chapter 2, provided the exclusive right to use frequency by using a command-and-
control and market-based approach. The level of regulation depends on the alienation right the 
regulator delegates to the assignee. Spectrum commons is a non-exclusive right to use frequency and 
can be divided into three types: public commons, private commons, and unlicensed, responding to 
RQ.2. 
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Chapter 5 Advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons in 
Europe36 
This chapter elaborates on the third research question: What are the advantages and disadvantages of 
spectrum commons? The chapter reflects on the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons 
from the author’s perspective by blending the perspectives of stakeholders in the consultation with 
relevant literature. 
The views of different stakeholders in European countries provide issues to be considered when 
implementing spectrum commons. The chapter starts by collecting views of stakeholders in the public 
consultation37 of the Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG) on commons on the “Aspect of a 
European Approach to Collective Use of Spectrum.” There are nine respondents including the ARD-
ZDF, Deutsche Telecom/T-Mobile, the EICTA, GSMA Europe, Metil Telecom consultants, 
Microsoft, Telefónica, PWMS Manufacturer Group, and the Delft University of Technology. These 
contributions, together with the results of the RSPG public consultation, provide input data for this 
chapter. 
The main literature comes from Cave (2007), Chaduc and Pogorel (2008), Mark and Williams (2007), 
and Tonge and Vries (2007). They provide additional ideas in parallel with the RSPG consultation. 
These include suggestions for discussion on the appropriate time to implement a frequency, choosing a 
suitable frequency and an amount, and the technical aspects. 
5.1 Examining literature and consultation 
This section discusses the views of Cave (2007), Chaduc and Pogorel (2008), Mark and Williams 
(2007), Tonge and Vries (2007), and the RSPG public consultation in November 2008 in terms of the 
advantages and disadvantage of spectrum commons. Finding similarities and differences in the 
examined data motivates the identification of issues for spectrum commons. Table 21 summarizes the 
main advantages and disadvantages commonly recognized by the different input data. 
Table 21. Advantages and disadvantages of using spectrum commons 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Irreversibility Reduce the barrier to entry 
Lack of innovation if sharing with licensed services Lower administrative cost 
No legal right to complain of interference Greater social benefit 
Congestion and limited quality of service Create innovation and stimulate demand for new 
service 
 Suitable for small user and low-density area 
These advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons are discussed in more detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
 
 
                                                            
36 This chapter is a revision of Ard-paru and Bohlin (2009). 
37 The public consultation on the draft RSPG opinion on “Aspect of a European Approach to Collective Use of Spectrum” was posted on 
June 10, 2008, and closed on September 29, 2008. The results of this public consultation was posted on November 19, 2008 (RSPG, 2008).  
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5.2 Disadvantages of using spectrum commons 
Irreversibility 
Once the regulator or administrator assigns a frequency band with certain conditions for licensed 
exemption or unlicensed spectrum, anyone can use the band as a public good. An example is Wi-Fi 
devices. Most laptops include a Wi-Fi chip set, and the Wi-Fi access point can be used anywhere from 
the home to public areas such as airports, train stations, and universities. Wi-Fi hot spots are also 
located in hotels and department stores. 
If the regulator regained frequency and refarmed it for other users or services, it would be more 
difficult, because the equipment could be everywhere, and it would take a long time to clear this band. 
If, for example, the 2400-2500 MHz band, which is already used for Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and other 
short-range devices, were considered for refarming for new services, i.e., a cellular mobile network. 
All these devices would have to stop transmission to ensure a new service would not receive 
interference. 
Lack of innovation when sharing licensed services 
Normally, when regulators assign frequency to licensees, an appropriate constraint is imposed, such as 
the technical specification of transmitters and receivers, the height of the transmitting station, the 
modulation type, and the level of transmitter power. After that, the regulator sometimes identifies 
spectrum commons to share with the licensed services. The regulator places more constrains on 
spectrum commons to ensure that use will not interfere with licensed services. Sharing obstructs 
innovative applications, because new applications are limited to prior constraints. It is more likely that 
an extension of spectrum commons of less than 30 GHz will reduce sharing between licensed services.  
Solutions to interference between licensed services and spectrum commons are available by 
implementing an appropriate framework that addresses distance, level of power, part of spectrum, type 
of usage, and technology (especially cognitive technology) constraints. 
No legal right to complain about interference 
In general, after the regulator grants a specific frequency band to the spectrum commons for public 
use. All applications can be used with constraints. Users cannot complain when interference occurs. 
This means that users must bear their own risk when using equipment under spectrum commons.  
For example, many people use a Bluetooth earphone to communicate on their mobile phone. When 
capacity is fully occupied, the mobile phone cannot connect to the Bluetooth earphones because there 
are no vacant channels. The more users there are, the more congestion there will be. Another example 
is garage door openers. If the neighbor has the same model, when the device is pressed, the nearby 
garage door will open.  
Congestion and limited quality of service  
The use of devices under spectrum commons is generally limited in terms of the service area, because 
they are low-power devices. A common problem of congestion usually happens when all users use 
their applications at the same time. The quality of service will vary from high, when few people use 
the service at the same time, to poor quality of service when there is heavy concurrent usage. For 
instance, at the beginning of the ITS conference in Japan, a few participants logged on to the Wi-Fi 
network and the system worked smoothly. When all the participants tried to access the Wi-Fi network, 
however, they system became overloaded and collapsed. 
The use of spectrum commons in the band below 30 GHz with other services may create congestion of 
the existing spectrum use and cause poorer quality of service. 
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On the other hand, quality of service can be improved by combining licensed services and spectrum 
commons, which may improve the utilization of spectrum (make it more efficient) by introducing 
cognitive devices in the guard band or interleaving channels – spacing between the transmitting or 
receiving channel. The development of a relevant standard of spectrum commons will also reduce 
congestion and improve the quality of service through improved spectrum efficiency. 
5.3 Advantages of using spectrum commons 
Reducing barriers to entry 
When regulators assign frequency under spectrum commons, the frequency can be used equally. There 
is no license or frequency usage fee (unlicensed). Users only pay for their devices. This is a crucial 
advantage of spectrum commons. Moreover, new entrants or players can enter the market more easily 
and launch services to compete with incumbent operators. This means that the barrier to entry is 
reduced. The market under spectrum commons will have many more providers and applications. 
Furthermore, after the regulator announces a specific frequency band with certain constraints, the 
manufacturer who produces the equipment will have certainty over the introduction of its new 
products to the market. This announcement will reduce the manufacturing risk of creating the 
equipment. If the specific frequency band can be used in other countries – regional or worldwide – the 
manufacture will have an economy of scale to produce the devices more cheaply. For example, the 
price of Wi-Fi products has fallen dramatically. 
Lower administrative costs  
Under spectrum commons, the regulator only defines the frequency band, amount of bandwidth, and 
usage constraints (in terms of standardization of the equipment).  
In contrast, if the regulator uses the command-and-control or market-based approaches for frequency 
assignment, the regulator must define property rights, coordinate existing users, and settle disputes. 
Thus, administration costs under spectrum commons are lower. 
Greater social benefit 
Society benefits from the use of spectrum under spectrum commons in many ways. First, without 
paying spectrum access or usage fees, the operators will enter the market more readily. After the 
regulator assigns the band, under spectrum commons, manufacturers have certainty of producing 
equipment. Moreover, if the band is regional or worldwide, manufacturers are able to provide cheaper 
devices to the market. 
Furthermore, these devices will be circulated globally, i.e., GSM mobile phone roaming. Besides this, 
the compatible standards eliminate harmful interference. If, however, the devices cannot be used 
globally, global circulation will not occur. For example, the low-power FM micro transmitter and the 
ultra-wide band equipment (UWB) are widely used in the USA but are illegal in the EU.  
Innovation and stimulating demand for new services 
Rapid adoption of and demand for new applications increase under spectrum commons. This new 
demand drives innovators that create products. Competition innovation under spectrum commons will 
lead to new applications. 
To make this happen, regulators should remove all unnecessary constraints and only maintain rules for 
safety and prioritized services. Restrictions on spectrum commons should be more flexible, generic, 
and only be applied to broad categories of devices. 
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Suitability for smaller users and low-density areas 
Spectrum commons is suitable for use by small users. More users create more congestion. 
Furthermore, pilot projects under spectrum commons for the new frequency should be in low-density 
areas to avoid harmful interference to existing neighborhood services. 
Developments in wireless technology – cognitive radio, software define radio, and smart antenna – 
will improve sharing between existing services however. 
5.4 Examining advantages and disadvantages  
The discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons is categorized into a 
SWOT analysis and the results are interpreted for major stakeholders, according to their interest. 
Table 22. SWOT analysis of advantages and disadvantages of using spectrum commons  
Strength 
 - create innovation 
Weakness 
 - congestion and limited quality
    of service 
Opportunity 
 - reduce barrier to entry 
 - lower administrative cost 
 - greater social benefit 
 - stimulate demand 
Threat 
 - irreversibility 
 - lack of innovation when sharing 
    with licensed services 
Spectrum commons has a major strength in encouraging innovators to create, because spectrum 
commons allows the space to be shared by all technologies, services, and applications. This strength 
creates an ideal test bed for innovative activity. 
Furthermore, spectrum commons creates certainty for manufacturers and stimulates user demand. 
Once manufacturers have certainty38, they will develop and supply devices to the market more readily. 
From the newcomers’ viewpoints, spectrum commons reduces barriers to entry (licensed or access 
fee). Spectrum commons offers end-users more choices. Moreover, if the market is competitive, users 
will have access to better and cheaper devices. Spectrum commons also lowers the costs of 
administration and regulation. The regulator has to set the standard of the devices in terms of ex ante 
regulation. The standard of devices could be just the frequency, maximum power, and the general 
safety standard. 
When spectrum is already assigned to public use, it is harder to refarm39. For instance, if the regulator 
wants to refarm the 2.4 GHz band – the Wi-Fi band – the regulator has to recall all devices. Another 
threat of spectrum commons is lack of innovation while sharing with a licensed service. As spectrum 
commons and licensed services have constrained the use of devices to avoid interference, they also 
provide less opportunity to develop their spectrum use. Fortunately, this threat, congestion, and the 
limited quality of service can be solved by new technology and relevant standards, including software-
defined radio and cognitive radio. 
From the SWOT analysis, it is apparent that spectrum commons has more strengths than weaknesses. 
Most threats can be solved by the development of new technology and relevant standards. There are 
some risks, however, concerning the maturity of new technology that the regulator should consider. 
                                                            
38 The manufacturer and the innovator could be the same person. 
39 Refarming of spectrum is the process of recalling spectrum from existing services or users and re-assigning it to new services or users. 
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When the objective of spectrum use is safety and prioritized services, spectrum commons is not the 
appropriate solution. If there is no specific objective, however, spectrum commons should be selected. 
Furthermore, if the objective of spectrum assignment is to encourage innovation and stimulate new 
demand, spectrum commons may be appropriate. 
5.5 Issues for spectrum commons implementation 
Suitable time 
A possible indicator is the assessment of costs and benefits to find the net benefit of spectrum 
commons. A comparison of economic value between spectrum assignment approaches and economic 
value could possibly be measured from auction. 
Suitable frequency 
Existing users have paid for spectrum and do not want to share, but newcomers will want frequency 
band. 
Possible frequencies for spectrum commons are the remaining bands from the transition to Digital 
Television (white space in the US), the interleave channel in TV broadcasting (broadband wireless 
access), and the vacant frequency above 40 GHz. 
Suitable frequencies for spectrum commons have minimum use, are vacant or expected to be vacant in 
the future, or are inefficient or under-utilized. They will depend on the different situations, from 
country to country, which have no single solution for this topic. 
Amount of frequency 
The top-down approach determines the overall bandwidth required for spectrum commons across the 
frequency band. For example, if mostly low-power devices are used, the estimation of the amount of 
frequency for low-power device usage in the next ten years will be measured. After that, the regulator 
must identify the frequency and release it for spectrum commons. It will then review spectrum 
commons use periodically. 
In the bottom-up approach (band-by-band basis), the regulator selects the frequency band that is 
determined to be the most likely use of band under spectrum commons and licensed. Next, the 
regulator estimates the economic value of the use of that band under spectrum commons and licensed. 
The regulator selects the approach that maximizes economic value. If it is spectrum commons, the 
regulator should determine the restrictions to be applied. 
Technical aspects 
After the selection of frequency and amount of spectrum under spectrum commons, the technical 
specification for devices should be imposed. In order to control the use of spectrum commons, the 
technical standardization of the devices set by the regulator depends on the assigned frequency. 
Furthermore, the greater the risk of interference, the more restrictions on usage should be imposed. 
The implementation of band segmentation can also mean multiple classes of spectrum commons 
applications. The low level of power of UWB devices means that they can be used across the entire 
frequency band.  
Spectrum commons has many advantages, including the creation of an innovative environment and no 
spectrum usage fee because of the non-exclusive right to use frequency, lower administrative and 
social costs. The main disadvantages is irreversibility. To implement the spectrum commons scheme, 
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the regulator should use a benefit and cost analysis as an indicator of the potential net social benefit of 
the introduction of a spectrum commons scheme.  
5.6 Interpreting the results of the main stakeholders and discussion 
Figure 8 provides a synthesis of the stakeholders’ view based on close readings of the stakeholders’ 
consultation document by the ARD-ZDF, Deutsche Telecom/T-Mobile, the EICTA, GSMA Europe, 
Metil Telecom consultants, Microsoft, Telefónica, PWMS Manufacturer Group, and Delft University 
of Technology, and the final report from the RSPG consultation. 
The interpretations are made by examining stakeholders as decision-makers, the decision situation 
according to Figure 4 in Chapter 2, and the level of actions according to Table 7 in Chapter 2. 
 
Figure 9. Stakeholders of spectrum commons 
At the constitutional choice level, the decision-maker is the regulator. The decision situation 
comprises the institution arrangement, events, and the community. At this level, the regulator has an 
international agreement as the institution arrangement, such as the Radio Regulations as an 
international treaty. The feedback from the event is also a characteristic of spectrum commons. 
Spectrum commons has a non-exclusive right to use frequency. Spectrum commons therefore has a 
high cost of exclusion and is highly subtractable, like common-pool goods such as the fishing ground 
in the Maine lobster industry. The community is the common understanding of the international 
regulation. 
The regulator provides the law and regulations for spectrum commons. The regulator has the 
advantage of low administrative costs to manage spectrum commons compared with other spectrum 
assignment approaches. Spectrum commons has the disadvantage of irreversibility however. 
At the collective choice level, the decision-makers are manufacturers, innovators, incumbents, and 
newcomers. They use law and regulations of spectrum commons from the regulator as an institutional 
arrangement to create their own rules for users at the operational level. These rules, namely network 
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rules, are standards for devices for manufacturers and innovators, and network management for 
incumbents (existing operators) and newcomers (new operators).  
If the regulations are technology and service neutrality, innovators can create new applications. If the 
regulator allocates frequency worldwide, the manufacturer gains economies of scale from mass 
production. The price of the device then becomes cheaper. 
The operator or provider will also set up the access rules for users to access frequency. This could be 
via a username/password. The access rule determines who qualifies to access the network. 
The event is the characteristic of spectrum commons that is similar to the constitutional choice level. 
The community is the common understanding of the national law and regulations from the regulator. 
Manufacturers have the certainty to produce spectrum commons devices as an advantage. Innovators 
have the potential to create any applications under spectrum commons that are specified by the 
frequency and power limitation as advantages. Newcomers have low-cost entry to the market, because 
spectrum commons is on a non-exclusive use basis. No one owns the spectrum or pays a spectrum fee, 
which are advantages. The incumbents worry about interference from sharing spectrum commons with 
their existing service, which are disadvantages. 
At the operational level, the decision-maker is the end-user. The end-user has to use the devices 
according to the rules set at the collective choice level for spectrum commons. The institution 
arrangement is a network rule from the collective choice level. The event is the characteristic of 
spectrum commons that is similar at the constitutional choice level. The community is the common 
understanding of network rules including how to use the devices. 
The end-users have many choices of devices and application as advantages. Spectrum commons have 
the potential to create competition among devices, applications, and operators. This competition 
provides cheaper prices, better devices, as advantages. Unlimited use of spectrum commons devices 
may, however, create congestion and limit the quality of the service, which are disadvantages. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter discussed the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons corresponding to the 
third research question. 
Advantages of spectrum commons include a lower entry barrier and improved administration costs, 
the creation of innovation, and the stimulation of demand. On the other hand, a disadvantage of this 
approach is irreversibility after spectrum assignment. This problem can be solved by the development 
of new technology and relevant standards of devices. A SWOT analysis also shows that spectrum 
commons has more strengths and opportunities than weaknesses and threats. The riskiness of the new 
technology should be taken into account however. 
Finally, it is difficult for the regulator to select an appropriate frequency. A benefit and cost analysis 
will be used to compare the economic value of spectrum usage under spectrum commons with other 
approaches. The result will be information to help regulators select the spectrum assignment 
approaches. The challenge of the activity for the regulator is to balance the benefit of spectrum usage 
for all users. 
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Chapter 6 Conceptual benefit and cost analysis 
The chapter addresses the fourth research question: How can the benefits and costs of spectrum 
commons be measured? The purpose is to measure the benefits and costs of spectrum commons to find 
its value.  
The value of spectrum commons depends on its applications. The applications of spectrum commons 
are mostly short-range devices. Short-range devices have many applications and frequencies. For 
example, the Wi-Fi routers can operate at both the 2.4 and 5.7 GHz band. The Bluetooth wireless 
headset operates at 2.4 GHz. If the regulator provides the technology and service neutrality for 
spectrum commons regulations, there will be great potential for many new applications to emerge. 
Thus, the applications of spectrum commons have been identified, in the first place, to value spectrum 
commons. 
The value of spectrum commons can be viewed from different perspectives. From the perspective of 
firms that use spectrum commons for their businesses, the value of spectrum commons derives from 
the financial benefits and costs at firm level. From the perspective of the national economy, however, 
the value of spectrum commons derives from economic benefits and costs. The financial benefit and 
cost analysis at firm level is therefore part of the economic benefit and cost analysis. The value of 
spectrum commons to the national economy will be important information for the regulator to decide 
whether to license or unlicense spectrum. 
This chapter elaborates on the benefit and cost analysis at the conceptual level. The concepts are 
benefit and cost analysis (Campbell & Brown, 2003), valuation of unlicensed applications (Indepen, 
2006), and engineering value (Sweet, et al., 2002). A possible framework for valuation of spectrum 
commons in Thailand is provided at the end. 
6.1 Benefit and cost analysis 
Campbell and Brown (2003) provide a benefit and cost analysis to appraise the project: with and 
without projects. If the decision-maker undertakes the project, there is a need to know how much of 
the scarce resource will be allocated to it and what the value of the project will be. If the decision-
maker does not undertake the project, the same amount of scare resource can be allocated to 
alternative uses.  
Campbell and Brown (2003) also provide a conceptual scheme view for appraisal of the project. 
Figure 10 provides both a firm and whole economy (social) point of view. 
 
Figure 10. Relationship between the project and the private, efficiency, and reference group net benefits40 
                                                            
40 Source: Campbell and Brown (2003, p. 7), Figure 1.3 
72 
Figure 10 shows the overlap between circle A+B (project) and circle A+C (social or referent group41) 
from the appraisal of the project. The A+B area represents the project benefit and cost analysis at the 
firm level (financial benefit and cost analysis). This A+B area can be obtained from the value of the 
project at private market prices. The B area represents the private benefit and cost analysis for the firm 
by subtracting tax, interest, and debt from the project. The A+B+C area represents the efficiency 
benefit and cost analysis that is used to shadow prices instead of market prices42. The A+C area 
represents the benefit and cost analysis of the referent or social group. The A+C area can be obtained 
directly from the value of all members in society. Alternatively, the analyst can obtain the whole 
A+B+C and subtract B. 
With regard to suitable information for the regulator to license or unlicense spectrum, the efficiency 
benefit and cost analysis will be selected. The process should begin with the financial benefit and cost 
analysis at the firm level and, as far as possible, the added value of all members in society. 
To appraise the project (implementing spectrum commons), the benefits are measured as revenues 
from the project. The costs are measured as all the expenses. Forecasts are made for both the revenues 
and the costs through the duration of the project. For simplicity, the demand forecast may be set to be 
the same for the whole project. After identifying all the benefits and costs, the calculation of the net 
present value (NPV) of the project is made by using an appropriate discount rate. The discount rate is 
calculated from the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) of the firm. A positive NPV 
throughout the project duration indicates a profitable project. The value of spectrum commons is 
represented by the net present value of the project. 
Moreover, the value of all the members in society should be identified as the stakeholders. The details 
of finding the value of all the stakeholders should be further investigated. 
6.2 Valuation of unlicensed applications 
Indepen (2006) provides details of the benefit and cost analysis: how the valuation of unlicensed 
applications can be measured in the UK from 2006 to 2026. There are a number of unlicensed 
applications in the UK. It is hard to project all applications however. Ten unlicensed applications were 
selected: road user charging in the 5.8 GHz band; automotive short-range radar in the 24, 77/79 GHz 
band; blood glucose sensor in the 401-406, 600, and 1400 MHz bands; RFID in the retail market in the 
860-960 MHz band; public access Wi-Fi in the 2.4 and 5 GHz bands; home data networking, 
especially home entertainment, in the 2.4 and 5 GHz bands; wireless building automation in the 2.4 
and 5 GHz bands; fixed wireless link in the higher 70 GHz band; telemetry in the utilities in several 
bands; and wireless home alarms in several bands. These applications are the most important 
unlicensed application in the UK. Table 23 shows the value of spectrum commons of ten unlicensed 
applications. 
Table 23. Spectrum value of unlicensed applications in the United Kingdom43 
Application* Value in 2026 (£m)* Frequency (GHz)* Relevant to Thailand 
road user charging 53 5.8 similar use, initial phase 
automotive short-range radar 1776 24, 77/79 76-77 radar 
24-79 not used 
blood glucose sensor 0 0.4 less use 
                                                            
41 The referent group is defined as a group of individuals deemed by the decision-maker to be relevant in the relatively narrow interpretation 
in the context of the social benefit and cost analysis (Campbell & Brown, 2003, p. 6). 
42 In certain instances, the accounting prices can replace the shadow price (Campbell & Brown (2003), Chapters 5 and 12). 
43 (*) Source: Indepen (2006, p. 53) Figure 6.2 
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Application* Value in 2026 (£m)* Frequency (GHz)* Relevant to Thailand 
RFID in retail market 2478 0.860-0.960 warehouse 
register board 
 
public access Wi-Fi 5270 2.4 similar use and continued 
growth 
home data networking 395 2.4 similar use and continued 
growth 
wireless building automation 96 2.4 pilot project 
fixed wireless link 50 70 not used 
telemetry in the utilities 600 0.4 not used  
wireless home alarms 143 0.9+0.4 not used  
As mentioned in Section 1.6, most of the frequency assignments use a command-and-control approach 
that is inefficient in terms of the frequency licensee’s distribution. Most frequency licensees are 
government agencies or state-owned enterprises. The development of a spectrum commons policy in 
Thailand has two separated processes: authorization of the use of radio communication devices and 
exemption of relevant radiocommunication licences or unlicensed. 
The unlicensed regulation was imposed in 2004. The application in the 2400-2500 MHz band, 
especially WLAN, was authorized for use in 1996 with the relevant radiocommunication licences. 
Until 2004, the 2400-2500 MHz band was open for any applications with power up to 100 milliwatts 
(e.i.r.p.). The consequent growth in the number of WLANs from the Customs Department is displayed 
in Figure 7. 
From Table 23, the biggest value unlicensed application in the UK is public access Wi-Fi. It is used in 
the 2.4 GHz band. In the study by Indepen (2006), there are three applications in the 2.4 GHz band, 
i.e., public access Wi-Fi, home networking, and wireless building automation. Wireless building 
automation is not widely implemented in Thailand. Public access Wi-Fi and home networking are 
interesting to explore however. 
The framework of Indepen (2006) is shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure 11. Approach to projecting the economic value of license-exempt applications44 
First, the framework begins by defining the application to provide a definition of an application that 
makes unambiguous projections of economic value. Second, research into the demand for and 
economic value of the application helps analysts understand the application, the technical 
characteristics of the application, the demand for the application, and the sources of economic value 
from the application.  
Third, by making demand projections, analysts project future application demand, which reflects 
market demand, excluding any congestion and cross-application interference. Future demand 
projections involve four tasks: 1) defining the basic measure of demand for public access Wi-Fi and 
home networking using the volume of traffic and number of households with wireless access, 
respectively; 2) constructing demand scenarios, i.e., low, medium, high, reflecting the range of likely                                                             
44 Source: Indepen (2006, p. 2), Figure S1 
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outcomes and associated probabilities of each scenario; 3) considering the drivers of demand and 
constructing a basic demand model; and 4) using a spreadsheet to generate high, medium, and low 
demand projections. 
Fourth, the economic value from the demand projection of future cost and benefit estimates is 
obtained. There are three projections reflecting high, medium, and low demand scenarios. Fifth, 
looking for the substitution effect to avoid over-estimating the economic value of an application. For 
example, the Wimax will be the substitution service for public Wi-Fi hotspots to provide access to the 
Internet. Indepen (2006) selected 10 out of 100 unlicensed applications, however, and given that, there 
is no substitution effect of the study. 
Indepen (2006) provides the number of access point per square kilometer subject to the empirical test 
and assumptions, i.e., 8.7 and 19.5 per square kilometer outdoors and indoors (public access Wi-Fi). 
The number of access points is the output of the interference testing scenario at 50 test points. 
Moreover, the maximum volume of the capacity that an access point can handle is also assumed. 
During a busy hour, the access point activity ratio is 30%, the workable carrier is 11 Mbps, and the 
interference protection of the test point is 90%, and three non-overlapping channels at 2.4 GHz are 
assumed. The maximum handling volume is 87,000 and 39,000 Mbytes/square kilometer indoors and 
outdoors during a busy hour, respectively. The population penetration can be used to calculate the 
traffic volume per year including dense areas, urban areas, and rural areas. 
6.3 Engineering value  
Sweet et al. (2002) provide the concept of valuation of the spectrum by using the engineering value. 
The engineering value is determined by the cost saving in the infrastructure of the operators’ network, 
obtained when the additional spectrum is used (Sweet, et al., 2002). This is one way to value B stated 
in Section 6.1. 
Wireless communication can replace wire communication. For example, the copper wire telephone 
line from the local exchange to the customer premises can be replaced by the wireless local loop. The 
cost saving from implementing a wireless connection instead of a wire connection is the value of the 
spectrum. 
In the other case, the use of WLAN or Wi-Fi in the office replaces the LAN connection to all personal 
computers. The cost saving for wiring the LAN connection is the value of the Wi-Fi or spectrum 
commons. 
The value of spectrum commons depends on its application and operating frequencies. For example, 
Internet access from xDSL, cable modem, Fiber to the X (FTTx) (home, building, and curb, etc.), and 
mobile telephone networks can be replaced by spectrum commons via Wi-Fi or WiMax (if the 
regulator allows WiMax as spectrum commons). The value of spectrum commons depends on which 
part of the network is replaced as a cost saving. At the least, the copper wire local loop to the customer 
premises can be replaced by a Wi-Fi hotspot. The WiMax can also be replaced by FTTx in rural areas. 
The cost savings are all relevant costs, including investment, installation, operation, and maintenance 
costs. The engineering value is the cost saving that can be used as the value of spectrum commons. 
6.4 Outline of the valuation of spectrum commons for Thailand  
In Thailand, spectrum commons has been implemented since 2004, according to the Ministerial 
Regulation of the Ministry of Transport No. 24 (1993), and the updated regulation of spectrum 
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commons is the National Telecommunications Commission Regulation of Exemption of 
Radiocommunication Licences (2007c). The regulator did not account for the valuation of spectrum 
commons when selecting a specified frequency for unlicensed devices.  
The process originates from importers or operators who want to market low-power devices. They send 
applications to import devices to the regulator for import radiocommunication licences. The regulator 
checks with the existing regulation, including the National Table Frequency Allocation, ITU 
regulations, and recommendations. The regulators check the technical specifications of the devices: 
frequency, power limitation, application, and standard to ensure there is no harmful interference with 
the existing services. After that, the regulators grant the authorization and the import 
radiocommunication licence. The authorization includes the relevant radiocommunication licences. If 
regulators want to facilitate the use of devices and deregulate them, they should support unlicensed 
regulation. Once devices are unlicensed, all relevant radiocommunication licences are exempted. 
The case of WLAN  
In Thailand, the PTD allowed WLAN use in 1996 under the PTD regulation and users had to obtain 
relevant radiocommunication licences. At the time, the use of WLAN was limited to indoor use only. 
In 2003, the PTD amended the regulation to allow both indoor and outdoor use with relevant 
radiocommunication licences. 
The WLAN devices became unlicensed in 2004 in terms of the Ministerial Regulation of Exemption 
of Radiocommunication Licences, the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology 
including WLAN in the 2400-2500 MHz band. Moreover, the NTC has granted licensed Wi-Fi 
hotspots to the Internet service providers since 2005. In 2007, the NTC updated the unlicensed 
regulation and allowed 5150-5350/5470-5725/5725-5850 MHz for WLAN. 
Two scenarios for spectrum commons in Thailand 
In Thailand, Wi-Fi devices co-locate with a fixed microwave link in the 2.4 GHz band. Wi-Fi devices 
operate with low-power output of 100 milliwatts (e.i.r.p.). The fixed microwave link operates at higher 
power output, however, for example, output power of 3 watts and antenna gain of 17 dBi. The Wi-Fi 
devices can operate with a fixed microwave link without causing harmful interference. 
From the case of Thailand, spectrum commons can be implemented into two scenarios. The first 
scenario, as mentioned above, is co-location with an existing service. The second scenario is the trade-
off between licensed and unlicensed for new frequency. 
Co-location with existing services 
In Thailand, the decision-makers or regulators must decide whether to implement spectrum commons 
with the existing services. If the regulator decides to allow spectrum commons to be co-located with 
existing services, the value of frequency use can be obtained from both existing services (Z) and 
spectrum commons (X), in the case of implementing spectrum commons and the externality of 
spectrum commons in terms of social benefit (Y). On the other hand, the value of frequency use can 
only be obtained from existing service in the case of not implementing spectrum commons. The value 
of implementing spectrum commons can be obtained directly from the value of the frequency use of 
spectrum commons and its externality. Figure 12 depicts the value of spectrum commons and whether 
it should be implemented. 
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Figure 12. Value of spectrum commons (co-location with existing service) 
The spectrum commons can be co-located with existing service. The value of spectrum commons can 
be derived directly from the spectrum commons itself and its externality. 
Trade-off between licensed and unlicensed for new frequency allocation 
If the regulator has to trade off between licensed and unlicensed application, the value of the spectrum 
has to be determined for both licensed and unlicensed. The value of licensed spectrum can be obtained 
from the financial benefit and cost analysis at firm level. On the other hand, the value of spectrum 
commons can be determined from an efficiency benefit and cost analysis at the economy level. The 
value of spectrum commons has been obtained from the financial benefit and cost analysis of its 
applications and the benefit of all the members of society. 
The regulator has to take the value of licensed and unlicensed spectrum into consideration. The 
regulator selects the higher value of the spectrum. Figure 13 describes the trade-off between licensed 
and unlicensed spectrum.  
 
Figure 13. Value of frequency in the case of trade-off between licensed and unlicensed spectrum  
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This helps to reflect the decision-maker’s choices to implement spectrum commons co-located or 
trade-off options. 
Suggestion for a valuation of spectrum commons in Thailand 
Spectrum commons was introduced into Thailand in 1993, according to the Ministerial Regulation of 
Ministry of Transport No. 24. At the time, only technical aspects had been taken into account, 
especially the harmful interference with other services or applications. The specific usage, frequencies, 
and power limitation have been addressed by the regulation. Until 2004, the Ministerial Regulation of 
the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology of the Exemption of 
Radiocommunication Licences, the unlicensed application had been more service and technology 
neutrality. Only specified frequency and power limitation remains in the regulation. 
The regulator does not take the valuation of spectrum commons in Thailand into account as important 
information on whether to allow usage of unlicensed applications. There are many unlicensed 
applications in any frequency band in Thailand. The focus on the operating application and frequency 
band should be identified. This thesis provides an initial suggestion to value spectrum commons. 
From the value of unlicensed applications from Indepen (2006) in Table 23, the highest value is public 
Wi-Fi that operates in the 2.4 GHz band. In the 2.4 GHz band, Thailand has allowed WLAN to be 
used since 1996 and unlicensed since 2004. It is interesting to explore WLAN, because there are two 
timelines: 1996-2004 and after 2004. Moreover, the Internet service provider has been able to use Wi-
Fi to provide hotspots for Internet access since 2005. The use of the 2.4 GHz band for Wi-Fi in 
Thailand also increases from time to time. 
At the initial stage, the operating frequency is identified as the 2.4 GHz band in this thesis. The 
application of unlicensed applications is Wi-Fi routers that can be used as public Wi-Fi hotspots and 
home Wi-Fi routers. 
The important stakeholders that are relevant to Wi-Fi routers have also been identified. At the 
constitutional choice level, it is the regulator (NTC). At the collective choice level, there are 
manufacturers, importers, dealers, retailers, Wi-Fi operators, Internet service providers, and telecom 
operators. At the operational level, it is the end-users. 
The stakeholders are the public Wi-Fi operator and the end-users. Table 24 shows the possible benefits 
and costs of the public Wi-Fi operator and end-users (home data networking). The Wi-Fi operator will 
use public Wi-Fi access as its project, as B in Section 6.1. The end-users use the Wi-Fi router at home 
as the benefit of the referent group, as C in Section 6.1. 
Table 24. Benefit and cost of public access Wi-Fi and home data networking  
Public Wi-Fi operator Home data networking 
Benefit Cost Benefit Cost 
Revenue Wireless router 
installation+maintenance 
Wiring cost reduction Wireless router 
Wiring cost reduction Internet connection fee Increased flexibility  
Licence exemption ISP licensed fee Licence exemption  
Public Wi-Fi operator 
Revenue: The Wi-Fi operators receive income by charging the users in several packages, pre-paid and 
post-paid service. The possible packages are charged per volume or duration of usage. The stream of 
income can be forecast from the user demand deriving from the network capacity utilization. 
78 
The forecast of demand is from 2010 to 2030. The volume of traffic varied from area to area. The 
three types of population density are business, urban, and rural area. The assumption of high, medium, 
and low demand can be applied. The portion, as a percentage of the maximum volume of traffic, can 
be adjusted as 100%, 85%, and 20%, respectively. The business, urban, and rural area can be 
calculated as a percentage of the overall area such as 3%, 6%, and 91%, respectively. These two 
assumptions are obtained from an NTC project in 2010 on comprehensive spectrum valuation wireless 
performance and demand assessment for the Kingdom of Thailand: towards and optimized spectrum 
master plan.  
The demand forecast for public access Wi-Fi can be captured as a portion of Internet traffic. The 
interpolation of the growth of that traffic can infer demand for public access Wi-Fi from 2010 to 2030 
as a top-down approach. 
Cost saving: The Wi-Fi connection can be replaced with a traditional local loop such as copper wire. 
The Wi-Fi as an access medium can save the cost for wiring the local loop to customer premises or 
line rental from a telecom operator. The local loop in Thailand is copper wired. Moreover, the Wi-Fi 
connection can provide higher bandwidth than xDSL and in areas without any wired network. 
Licence exemption: The Wi-Fi operators are exempted from paying for importation, installation, and 
using Wi-Fi routers, because of the unlicensed regulation. Moreover, the frequency usage fee is 
exempted. 
Cost: The public Wi-Fi operators have to pay for the Wi-Fi router and installation cost – a one-time 
charge. Moreover, they have to pay the maintenance cost after implementation to the end of business. 
The cost of connection from the public Wi-Fi router to the Internet gateway is the operating cost. The 
ISP license is the administrative cost payable yearly. 
Home data networking 
Cost saving: The Wi-Fi connection can replace the wire inside the home. The Wi-Fi as an access 
medium can save the cost of wiring cable to customer devices such as LAN connection, printer, 
speakers, and home entertainment. 
Other benefit: The flexibility of the customer to move around the home will be the added as a 
consumer surplus. 
Licence exemption: The end-users are exempted from paying for installation, and using Wi-Fi routers 
because of the unlicensed regulation. Moreover, the frequency usage fee is exempted. 
Cost: The users have to pay for their Wi-Fi routers once. 
The number of Wi-Fi routers at home can be calculated from the number of households with a 
wireless router, which can be obtained from the number of xDSL subscribers. Most providers offer 
wireless routers to new subscriber for free or at a deductible price. A portion of the growth of xDSL 
will be used to project the demand for home data networking.  
6.5 Summary 
The conceptual benefit and cost analysis provides the framework for valuing the project 
(implementing spectrum commons) at the first and the whole economy level. The financial benefit and 
cost analysis is used to find the value at firm level, which is one part of the economic benefits and 
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costs in the whole economy. The engineering value can also be used to value the cost reduction at firm 
level. The study of the valuation of unlicensed application in the United Kingdom provides the 
practical procedures to find the valuation of unlicensed application. 
The suggestion of a valuation of spectrum commons has been identified in the public access Wi-Fi and 
Wi-Fi routers at home as the initial stage. The possible benefits and costs of Wi-Fi operators and home 
data networking are specified in Table 24, responding to RQ.4. 
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Chapter 7 Findings and future research 
The purpose of this licentiate thesis is to examine the spectrum commons approach to spectrum 
assignment. The examined case is Thailand. The main research question is: “What are the 
consequences of using spectrum commons for frequency assignment in Thailand?”  
To approach the main research question – What are the consequences of using spectrum commons for 
spectrum assignment in Thailand? – this thesis addresses five research questions: 
RQ.1 What is a suitable framework for analyzing different types of spectrum commons? 
RQ.2 What type of spectrum commons has been used in Thailand? 
RQ.3 What are the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons in general? 
RQ.4  How can benefits and costs of spectrum commons be measured? 
RQ.5  What are the implications of implementing spectrum commons in Thailand? 
RQ.1 looks at finding a framework to analyze different types of spectrum commons. Three economic 
institutions from Kiser and Ostrom (1982) and Field (1992) are adopted. The five rights of the 
property regime by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) is also adopted in this thesis to find the interaction 
between the layer of the decision-maker and the right to use frequency. The comparison between 
property rights regimes and natural resources in the Maine lobster industry addresses the right to use 
frequency. 
RQ.2 looks at the use of the framework developed in RQ.1 to understand the institution of spectrum 
commons and its application to Thailand. The exploration of the history of spectrum assignment also 
helps the understanding of spectrum commons and the right to use frequency in Thailand. 
RQ.3 looks at the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons from the public consultation of 
the Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG) in November 2008 in the European Union to obtain the 
current thoughts of stakeholders regarding the use of spectrum commons.  
RQ.4 is the benefit and cost analysis of the spectrum commons concept from Campbell and Brown 
(2003), Indepen (2006), and Sweet et al. (2002) as the framework to measure spectrum commons in 
Thailand. Campbell and Brown (2003) provide the framework of the benefit and cost analysis in terms 
of the undertaken project or not. The comparison between the current values of whether to undertake 
the project or not provides the decision-maker with important information. The values without 
undertaking project measures are obtained from the same allocation resource to alternative uses. 
Indepen (2006) provides a practical method to measure the unlicensed application in the United 
Kingdom in 2006. Indepen (2006) selected the ten most important applications among a hundred 
applications of unlicensed devices. Sweet et al. (2002) provide the valuation of the spectrum using the 
engineering value – cost saving in the infrastructure of the network operator. The adjusted framework 
of Campbell and Brown (2003), Indepen (2006), and Sweet et al. (2002) addresses how to value 
spectrum commons in Thailand. The finding is a framework to evaluate spectrum commons in 
Thailand in terms of the benefit and cost analysis. 
RQ.5 covers the implications of implementing spectrum commons in Thailand. 
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The five research questions are intended to contribute to increased understanding of using spectrum 
commons and contribute to the effectiveness of using spectrum commons in Thailand. The summary 
of these findings are as follows: 
1) The economic institution or three worlds of action provide three layers of analysis: constitutional 
choice, collective choice, and operational level. This framework provides an understanding of the 
decision-maker and the decision situation within and between layers. Moreover, the property rights 
regime and natural resource of the Main lobster industry provides the right to use frequency: access, 
withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation rights. 
2) The frameworks from RQ.1 provide rights to use frequency in Thailand. Three types of spectrum 
commons have been used in Thailand: public commons, private commons, and unlicensed. The 
spectrum commons has non-exclusive right to use frequency. The regulated level of the network 
provides the different types of spectrum commons. If the state agency manages the network, it is 
public commons. If the private entities manage the network, it is private commons. If the end-users 
manage the network by themselves, it is unlicensed. The thesis provides an overview of the spectrum 
assignment institution in Thailand. 
3) The advantages of spectrum commons are lowering barriers to entry for newcomers, lowering the 
administration costs for the regulator, creating innovation for the innovator, and stimulating demand. 
The disadvantage of spectrum commons is irreversibility after spectrum assignment. 
4) The benefit and cost analysis provides the framework to value the spectrum. The 2.4 GHz band is 
the specified frequency for the spectrum commons. The applications of the 2.4 GHz bands are public 
Wi-Fi operators and home data networking. The valuation of spectrum commons can be used as 
important information for regulators to decide whether to license or unlicense spectrum. 
5) The spectrum commons has potential to increase spectrum usage more efficiently by allowing 
spectrum commons to be co-located with existing services. 
The research problem is divided into three parts: conceptual, empirical, and analytical parts. The 
conceptual part deals with the right to use frequency and examines the framework associated with 
spectrum commons. The empirical part gathers from history and public consultation to explore the 
type of spectrum commons in Thailand and the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons 
from the public consultation on spectrum commons in the context of European countries. The 
analytical part is to use the benefit and cost analysis concept on spectrum commons in Thailand.  
7.1 Findings 
RQ.1 What is a suitable framework for analyzing different types of spectrum commons? 
The economics institution and three worlds of action from Schlager and Ostrom (1992) provide the 
level of analysis for the decision-maker and decision situation. The property rights regime and natural 
resource in the Maine lobster industry from Kiser and Ostrom (1982) also provides the right to use the 
common pool resource. These two concepts provide a framework to analyze the right to use frequency 
in Thailand. The chronology of events of spectrum management in Thailand provides evidence of the 
rights to frequency use. The result is provided in Table 25. 
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Table 25. Bundles of rights associated with telecommunication stakeholders (cf. Table 12) 
Stakeholders 
Rights 
Regulator Operator 
A 
Operator 
B 
Advanced 
user 
General user 
Access and Withdrawal x x x x x 
Management x x x   
Exclusion x x x x  
Alienation x x    
Assignment approach  Market-based Command-
and-control 
Spectrum 
commons 
Spectrum 
commons 
The market-based approach has all the rights to use frequency, including access and withdrawal, 
management, exclusion, and alienation rights (i.e., selling or leasing frequency). Command-and-
control does not have an alienation right however. The command-and-control and market-based 
approaches both grant the exclusive right to use frequency to licensees. Spectrum commons does not 
have an exclusive right to use frequency however. There are two types of users in spectrum commons, 
i.e., general and advanced users. These users have access and withdrawal rights because of the 
characteristics of transceivers. The transceivers are specified to access and use the frequency at the 
same time. Only the advanced users have the additional exclusion right to determine who can use their 
network by setting passwords or encryption code. 
RQ.2 What type of spectrum commons has been used in Thailand? 
The type of spectrum commons that has been used in Thailand is addressed. Using the category of the 
right to use frequency from Table 25 provides the regulated level of the regulator. Moreover, the 
exclusivity of using frequency provides exclusive and non-exclusive use in order to separate the 
spectrum commons from the command-and-control and market-based approach. The type of spectrum 
commons is provided in Table 26. 
Table 26. The rights to use frequency (cf. Table 13) 
                          Property right 
Regulated level 
Exclusive use Non-exclusive use 
Centralized by regulator / state agency Command-and-control Public commons 
Middleman/operator Market-based Private commons 
Self-regulated/user - Unlicensed 
There are three types of spectrum commons, i.e., public commons, private commons, and unlicensed. 
Regulators delegate some rights to licensees to manage their network. These represent the regulated 
level. If the state agency is in charge of network management, it is called public commons. For 
example, the local municipalities have their Wi-Fi network for their community. If the private entities 
manage their network for commercial service, it is called private commons, such as the public Wi-Fi 
hotspots in hotels, airports, department stores, etc. If the end-users have to manage by themselves, it is 
called unlicensed. 
The history and development of the spectrum management institution in Thailand also provides an 
original work that narrates important events concerning spectrum management, especially spectrum 
commons in Thailand. There are two steps to implementing spectrum commons in Thailand: 1) the 
authorization of the use of devices and 2) the exemption of relevant radiocommunication licences.  
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RQ.3 What are the advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons in general? 
The advantages and disadvantages of spectrum commons are provided from the analysis of public 
consultation in Europe by the RSPG and relevant literature. Figure 14 shows the advantages and 
disadvantages of spectrum commons with the relevant stakeholders. 
 
Figure 14. Stakeholder of spectrum commons (cf. Figure 9) 
Advantages of spectrum commons include lowering barriers to entry, lowering the administration 
costs, creating innovation, and stimulating demand. On the other hand, the main disadvantage of 
spectrum commons is irreversibility after spectrum assignment. To determine the net benefit of 
spectrum commons, a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages is required. Most 
disadvantages can be solved by the development of new technology and a relevant standard of devices, 
except irreversibility, once the spectrum commons has been assigned to public use.  
RQ.4 How can the benefits and costs of spectrum commons be measured? 
The concept of the benefit and cost analysis for the appraisal project to undertake or not is the outline 
to value the spectrum commons. The efficiency benefit and cost analysis captures the financial 
benefits and costs at firm level plus the value or benefits and costs of all members in society from 
implementing the spectrum commons. The cost saving from the engineering value contributes to the 
value of spectrum commons as benefits for both the firm and society. 
The procedure to measure the benefits and costs of spectrum commons begins with the identification 
of the operating frequency and application of spectrum commons. The stakeholders of specified 
applications of spectrum commons have been explored. The limitation of stakeholders at the initial 
stage should be considered in order to limit the scope of valuation of spectrum commons. The 
categories of benefits and costs of the application of spectrum commons have been identified. Data 
collection from the identified benefits and costs should be pursued in order to calculate the value of 
spectrum commons. 
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In this thesis, the 2.4 GHz band has been identified as the operating frequency. The public Wi-Fi 
routers and home data working (home Wi-Fi routers) are the target of the valuation of the spectrum 
commons. The possible benefits of the public Wi-Fi operator are revenue, cost saving from wiring, 
and license exemption. The possible costs of the public Wi-Fi operator are wireless routers, 
installation and maintenance costs, Internet connection, and the ISP license fee. The possible benefits 
of home data networking are cost savings form wiring, licence exemption, and increasing flexibility. 
The possible cost is the wireless router. 
RQ.5 What are the implications of implementing spectrum commons in Thailand? 
The frameworks in Chapter 2 and RQ.1 (three worlds of action, and property rights regime and natural 
resource) provide the analysis of exclusive and non-exclusive right to use frequency. The exclusive 
use of frequency by a command-and-control or market-based approach has limited the use of spectrum 
to the assignees or winning bidders. They sometimes do not occupy the spectrum. The framework of 
non-exclusive use of frequency is introduced in spectrum commons, while no one owns the frequency 
or has an exclusive right to use frequency. Users must share frequency and accept interference. The 
non-exclusivity increases the number of users and the efficiency until the maximum capacity is 
reached. 
Moreover, three types of spectrum commons have been used in Thailand in Chapter 4 or RQ.2 (public 
commons, private commons, and unlicensed). They provide the current status of spectrum commons in 
Thailand. These three types also appear in other countries that have a similar situation. 
Regulators should use these findings for further consideration of using spectrum commons to increase 
spectrum efficiency in terms of utilization of frequency and distribution of frequency users. 
The public consultation of RSPG in November 2008 in Chapter 5 or RQ.3 provides the advantages 
and disadvantages in a European context. Most of the spectrum commons frequency is worldwide 
allocation however. The stakeholders are also most probably the same. The findings of advantages and 
disadvantages at high level should not be different. There may be a slight deviation in the local 
context. 
Regulators should conduct a similar public consultation to identify the advantages and disadvantages 
of spectrum commons in their context to adjust to their environment. 
The regulator may consider adding spectrum commons to other frequency bands, impose power 
limitation, and specify frequency as necessary constraints. These constraints have a high potential to 
attract innovation. The market will select services and applications freely under the constraint to 
respond to demand. The low entry barrier makes spectrum easier to access and encourages competition 
in the market. The end-user will have better quality of service and lower prices.  
The benefit and cost analysis to value spectrum commons in Chapter 6 or RQ.4 provides the 
framework to measure the value of spectrum commons. The result of the valuation of spectrum 
commons depends on the availability of data collection and varies from country to country. 
Regulators should use the value of spectrum commons as important information on whether to license 
or unlicense spectrum. The value of spectrum will reflect the best utilization of spectrum. Greater use 
of spectrum commons of frequency assignment will increase spectrum efficiency in terms of the 
number of frequency users and the spectrum utilization. 
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The regulator should consider the loss of the frequency usage fee through non-exclusive right as 
income loss. On the other hand, the operator and end-users gain the benefit of not paying the 
frequency usage fee. The benefits to society may be greater than the lost income of the regulator. 
7.2 Generalizability: Can spectrum commons be applied in other countries? 
Learning to use spectrum commons in Thailand provides information to regulators in other countries 
that have a similar use of spectrum in the same or other regions. The use of the ISM band in footnotes 
5.138 and 5.150 is the starting point to considering the use of spectrum commons in their countries. 
The worldwide frequency allocation will support the use of spectrum commons in terms of the 
available standard and devices. 
The benefit and cost analysis offers the valuation of spectrum commons as an indicator for the 
regulator to decide whether to license or unlicense spectrum. The value of spectrum commons depends 
on the number of applications. This study of the valuation of spectrum commons may serve as an 
example to considering the use spectrum commons in other countries. 
The RSPG public consultation in the European countries provides the perspective of relevant 
stakeholders. The context can be generalized if the behavior of stakeholders is similar to other 
contexts, such as the behavior of incumbents, manufacturers, end-users, and regulators in Thailand. 
There may be some extent of similarity. The public consultation in Thailand will help adjust and form 
a precise perspective on spectrum commons in the Thai context however. 
7.3 Future research 
The possible outcome of implementing spectrum commons in Thailand can be measured in terms of 
the valuation of spectrum commons from the perspective of the regulator. The valuation of spectrum 
commons provides important information on whether to license or unlicense spectrum. The other 
possible outcomes for implementing spectrum commons should be investigated further for other 
stakeholders, applications, and frequencies. The suggestion in this thesis is limited to public access 
Wi-Fi and home Wi-Fi routers in the 2.4 GHz band. There are only two stakeholders in this thesis, i.e., 
public Wi-Fi operators and end-users. The possible extensions of other frequencies, such as WiMax or 
other stakeholders such as manufacturers or innovators, should be considered in future research. 
Further exploration of spectrum commons theory may be a possibility for future research. A deeper, 
metatheoretical exploration of spectrum commons would be possible to gain a deeper understanding of 
spectrum commons theory. 
Deeper or wider exploration of the social benefits of spectrum commons should be considered as 
future research to find the contribution of spectrum commons to other areas in society. For example: 
Could spectrum commons contribute to the wealth of a country? Could spectrum commons improve 
the overall efficiency of spectrum? Could spectrum commons help to improve society? 
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List of abbreviation 
AIS  Advanced Info Service Public Company Limited 
APT  Asia Pacific Telecommunity 
ARD-ZDF ARD-Verbindungsbüro and ZDF-Europabüro 
BT  BT Public Company Limited 
CAT  Communication Authority of Thailand 
CCTV  Closed Circuit Television 
CEPT  European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications 
CISPR  Special Committee of the International Electrotechnical Commission for Interference 
CITEL  Inter-American Telecommunication Commission 
DSL  Digital Subscriber Line 
DTAC  Total Access Communication Public Company Limited 
EHF  Extra High Frequency 
EICTA  European Information & Communications Technology Industry Association 
E.I.R.P.  Equivalent Isotropically Radiated Power 
FCC  Federal Communication Commission 
FTTx  Fiber to the X 
GHz  Gigahertz 
GMPCS Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
GSMA  GSM Association 
HF  High Frequency 
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organization 
IEEE  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IMO  International Maritime Organization 
ISM  Industrial, Scientific and Medical 
ITU  International Telecommunication Union 
ITU-R  International Telecommunication Union – Radiocommunication 
kHz  Kilohertz 
LAN  Local Area Network 
LF  Low Frequency 
MAC  Medium Access Control 
MF  Medium Frequency 
MHz  Megahertz 
MICT  Ministry of Information and Communications Technology 
MoT  Ministry of Transport 
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mW  Milliwatt 
NBC  National Broadcasting Commission 
NFMB  National Frequency Management Board 
NPV  Net Present Value 
NRA  National Regulatory Authority 
NTSC  National Television System Committee 
NTC  National Telecommunications Commission 
O2  Telefónica O2 UK Limited 
ONTC  Office of the National Telecommunications Commission 
PAN  Personal Area Network 
PCMCIA Personal Computer Memory Card International Association 
PCS  Personal Communication Services 
PDA  Personal Device Accessories 
PHY  Physical layer 
PTD  Post and Telegraph Department 
PWMS  Professional Wireless Microphones Systems 
QoS  Quality of Service 
RCA  Radio Corporation of America 
RF  Radio Frequency 
RFID  Radio Frequency Identification 
RLAN  Radio Local Area Network 
RQ  Research question 
RR  Radio Regulations 
RSPG  Radio Spectrum Policy Group 
RTTTs  Railway applications, road Transport and Traffic Telematics 
SHF  Super High Frequency 
SIM  Subscriber Identity Module 
SoD  Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity 
SRD  Short-Range Device 
SWOT  Strength Weakness Opportunity Threat 
TOT  Telephone Organization of Thailand 
True Move Truemove Company Limited 
UHF  Ultra High Frequency 
ULP-AMI  Ultra Low Power Active Medical Implant 
USB  Universal Serial Bus 
USOM  United States Operations Mission 
UWB  Ultra Wide Band 
92 
VLF  Very Low Frequency 
VHF  Very High Frequency 
WACC  Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
Wi-Fi  Wide Fidelity 
WiMax  Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access 
WLAN  Wireless Local Area Network 
WMO  World Meteorological Organization 
WRC  World Radiocommunication Conference 
WWI  World War I 
2G  Second Generation mobile telephone 
3G  Third Generation mobile telephone 
